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Preface
This book is a translation and adaption of the Dutch report ‘Europese variaties’,
published by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and
presented to the Dutch government in 2018.1 In this study, the WRR advises the
Dutch government to readdress the fundamental question of uniformity and
diversity in the Union. The government gave its formal response in a Memorandum
to Parliament, in which it embraced the perspective of variation. More information
is available on the WRR website: www.wrr.nl/en.
This publication was written by Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Emina Ćerimović, Huub
Dijstelbloem and Mathieu Segers. Together they formed a project group, chaired by
member of the Council Ernst Hirsch Ballin and coordinated by Huub Dijstelbloem.
Previous members of the project included André Knottnerus, Henk Griffioen and Eva
Hendricks. The group was assisted by interns Roel van Oosten and Neha Bagga.
Prof. Dr. Linda Senden, Dr. Ton van den Brink and Prof. Dr. Sybe de Vries of
Utrecht University deserve special mentioning as they conducted the analysis of the
Internal Market on which Chap. 6 is based.
The book is the product of an extensive process of research, consultation and
analysis. In addition to studying the academic literature, we conducted numerous
interviews with experts, policy makers and stakeholders. We are very grateful for
their time and effort. Their names are listed at the end of the book. Special thanks go
to the experts who were prepared to read and comment at length on an earlier
1The original Dutch publication (2018) has been adapted for an international audience, but not
updated.
v
version of this book: Ir. Jeroen Dijsselbloem (former Minister of Finance and
Chairman of the Eurogroup), Prof. Dr. Ben Smulders (European Commission and
Free University of Brussels), Dr. Mendeltje van Keulen (Lector Haagse
Hogeschool) and Prof. Dr. Jan Rood (Clingendael and Leiden University).
Tilburg, The Netherlands Ernst Hirsch Ballin
The Hague, The Netherlands Emina Ćerimović
The Hague, The Netherlands Huub Dijstelbloem
The Hague, The Netherlands Mathieu Segers
vi Preface
This Is What We Have Agreed In Europe
Politicians and journalists often use these seemingly transparent words to refer to
the legislation and policy of the European Union, but their precise meaning is
somewhat obscure. In many cases, they refer to the outcome of rather complex
decision-making processes, unfamiliar to many of us.
Still, we can begin our brief explanation of how the EU operates by observing
that what matters, in the end, is what we have agreed in Europe: the agreements laid
down in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), based on the Maastricht Treaty of
1992, and the agreements laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), based on the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, concluded in Rome in 1957 by six Member States (including the
Netherlands). These Treaties are indeed agreements, binding under international
law, concluded by the Member States and ratified by their individual parliaments.
Beyond these two Treaties, the third foundation of the European Union is the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enshrines certain long-standing basic civil
rights. Under Article 6 TEU, the Charter has had the same legal status as the
Treaties since 2009, but the method by which it was drafted in 2000 was entirely
different: the national parliaments were directly involved and it was solemnly
proclaimed at the end of that year.
In essence, the role of the European Union is to apply this trio, i.e. the two
Treaties and the Charter. In their entirety, they underpin the rights and obligations
of the Member States, citizens and their enterprises and other organisations. The
‘principle of conferral’ (Article 5 TEU) is essential in this system. What this means
is that the EU’s institutions may act only within the limits of the competences
conferred on them by the Member States in the Treaties. This differs fundamentally
from a state, which can, after all, decide on its own authority to address a new
subject of legislation or governance.
The much-discussed expansion in the scope of the EU regulation is the result of
two processes: the process of amending the Treaties, in which the Member States
have added new subjects; and the process of working with policy objectives that
have already been adopted, leading to the realisation that additional competences
are needed. The ‘flexibility clause’ (Article 352 TFEU, based on Article 235 of the
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1957 Treaty) allows additional competences to be granted to the Union upon a
unanimous decision of the Council of the European Union (sometimes referred to
simply as the Council)—in other words, only if all the Member States agree—
concerning a proposal submitted to it by the European Commission after consulting
the European Parliament. This provision cannot be used as a basis for the
approximation of laws between the Member States.
The European Union’s competences are divided into exclusive competences,
competences shared with the Member States, and supporting, complementary and
coordinating competences. The Treaties stipulate which competences apply in
many specific tasks and procedures. The exercise of non-exclusive competences is
subject to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. This means that the Union may act only in
so far as the Member States are unable to attain a certain objective at the national,
regional or local level. All competences are also subject to the principle of ‘pro-
portionality’, which means that the Union may not take action beyond what is
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The national parliaments are
involved in scrutinising adherence to these principles, with detailed substantiation
being required.2
Since the establishment of the European Union, its main socio-economic
objective has been to operate an internal market permitting the free movement of
goods, capital, services and persons, to ensure equal rights for men and women, to
guarantee adequate social protection, to combat social exclusion and discrimination
and to protect consumers. These were joined in the final decade of the twentieth
century by the demands of sustainable development, along with new main objec-
tives, in particular regarding the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The most important part of the European Union’s work is its legislation, which
takes precedence over national legislation. Among other things, its laws set uniform
requirements for products that may be freely traded in the internal market. If these
requirements were not harmonised, the internal market would not be able to
function. Other European Union legislation concerns environmental requirements,
asylum procedures and mutual recognition of judicial and administrative measures
in the Member States.
European legislation consists of regulations, directives and—as in the case of
national legislation—delegated and implementing acts. Regulations are European
2See Article 5, Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Draft legislative acts shall be justified with
regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Any draft legislative act should contain
a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality. This statement should contain some assessment of the proposal’s financial
impact and, in the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member
States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons for concluding that a
Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and,
wherever possible, quantitative indicators. Draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for
any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments,
regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and commensurate
with the objective to be achieved’.
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laws that are directly enforceable throughout the Union; all individuals and legal
persons, including enterprises, are bound by them and can invoke them, even against
their own public authorities. Directives, on the other hand, are European laws that must
be transposed into national laws to be binding on individuals. When we say that we
have ‘agreed’ something in Europe, we are often referring to EU regulations and
directives. However, these laws do not constitute actual ‘agreements’ that can be
revoked, although all EU laws are based on agreements, i.e. the Treaties.
Unlike a state, the European Union is not responsible for implementing its own
legislation in most policy domains; implementation is largely the task of bodies and
organisations run by the Member States, with the important exceptions of com-
petition policy, agricultural and other subsidies, the European Central Bank and,
increasingly, the surveillance of external borders.
Any initiative to introduce new legislation or to amend existing legislation must be
taken by the European Commission. As noted above, such initiatives may only concern
matters which, according to the Treaties, fall within the competence of the Union. From
the outset, the Commission was intended to be the driving force behind the process of
European integration, but it can only do so to the extent permitted by the Treaties (over
which the Member States reign supreme). Although it initiates European legislation and
is involved in the legislative process (regulated by Article 294 TFEU), the Commission
does not control the outcome of that process. That is because, with a few exceptions,
the adoption of regulations and directives is the responsibility of the European
Parliament and the European Council (Scheme 1).
The legislative process aims to achieve legislative convergence, harmonisation
or even uniformity under the guidance of the Commission but with the direct
involvement of the Member States, both in prior consultation and through the
intermediary of the Council. The aim is to create a single market in the European
Union as a whole without distortionary differences in legislation and policies. New
Member States are expected to adopt these attainments of European economic
integration, the acquis communautaire, in their entirety.
By its very nature, then, this legislation is geared towards uniformity. The policy
domains in which the European Union has been active since the 1990s have been
subject to the same Community legislative system,3 with the same implicit focus on
uniformity, even though life in all its diversity has often proved to be more pow-
erful than doctrine.4
3The third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty had a predominantly intergovernmental model of
decision-making for cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs, but the Amsterdam (1999),
Nice (2000) and Lisbon (2007) Treaties gradually replaced the Community model of
decision-making by sub-area.
4According to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 February 1962, Case 26–62, ECLI:EU:
C:1963:1 (Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration), in which it
considered that ‘[t]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the subjects
of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation
of member states, community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage’.
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Because the crux of the European Union’s functioning lies in its legislation—in
particular as a way of eliminating unwelcome disparities between the Member
States when allowing the free movement of capital, goods, services and persons—
the Union is, in its origins and despite all the changes, first and foremost a legal
order. It is a political order, with institutions reminiscent of state institutions, only
as a function of that legal order. The Commission must focus on the general interest
of the Union; its members must not take instructions from a national government or
any other body. The Council is composed of national ministerial representatives; in
the exercise of the tasks conferred upon it by the Treaties, it decides, in most cases,
by a qualified majority corresponding to the number of Member States and the
populations they represent. However, in the case of sensitive issues as defined in the
Treaties, additional tasks or new subjects, unanimity is required. The Parliament is
elected directly by EU citizens according to a system of electoral regions in which
voters in relatively small populations exercise relatively more influence. The Court
of Justice of the European Union ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law by
ruling on points of law brought before it by the national courts; it also settles
disputes between the Member States and between the Member States and the EU
institutions. The Union’s institutional framework also includes the Court of
Auditors and the European Central Bank, the European Ombudsman (elected by the
Scheme 1 How do the institutions work together?
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Parliament), as well as Europol, Eurojust and other specialised bodies and
organisations.
The rise of the European Council—not to be confused with the Council (of
Ministers) of the European Union—shows that controversial political issues are
coming to play a greater role alongside the legislative competences of the European
Union. The European Council consists of the heads of state (insofar as they exercise
political leadership) and government leaders of the Member States, together with its
President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also takes part in the European
Council’s work. The European Council has no legislative authority and virtually no
administrative competences, but instead sets the political agenda; according to
Article 15 TEU, it ‘shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its
development and shall define its general political directions and priorities thereof’.
It was born out of an initially informal political deliberation by the heads of state
and government leaders, was incorporated into the EC Treaty in 1987 and became
an official European Union institution in 2009. The agreements reached by the
European Council, known as ‘Conclusions’, set the political agenda but are not
legally binding; they are often amended or watered down in the course of further
negotiations. The European Council is a significant political arena; when it comes
to binding decisions, it is most effective in those cases where a decision needs to be
taken on an issue about which Ministers failed to reach agreement in the Council
and as a framework for final negotiations on structural changes such as Treaty
amendments (Scheme 2).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Room for Variation in the European Union
The European Union will have to offer more room for variation. That is the main
thrust of this book, which we are presenting at a time when the European Union is
under pressure, both internally and externally. Two decades of growth, both in the
number of Member States and in its tasks, have placed so great a strain on the
Union’s internal resilience that cracks have begun to appear in its basis of support
and even in respect for its democratic foundations under law. Both the current
policy of the President of the United States and Russia’s policy respond to trends
that are weakening the position of the European Union, such as Brexit, internal
political controversies concerning migration and economic policy, and external
trade conflicts. In this book, we argue that more flexibility is needed in the Union’s
structure to bolster it in its critical tasks, including the internal market and pro-
tection against crime and social injustice. This is the lesson that we should be
drawing from the experiences of the past 25 years, since the Maastricht Treaty took
effect on 1 November 1993.
The Maastricht Treaty followed the upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe,
which had changed the balance of power dramatically on the continent. At that
time, few questioned that the process of European integration should continue. The
Treaty integrated the European Communities and the new domains (‘pillars’) of
European policy—law enforcement, migration, and foreign and security policy—
into a broad new framework: the European Union (EU). Much has changed since
then, not only because 16 new Member States have acceded but also because the
content of its policy has ‘deepened’, for example the introduction of the euro and a
common asylum system. In virtually every domain, the European Parliament, which
is elected directly by the people, is now a co-legislator, together with the Council,
composed of ministers representing the Member States. Moreover, since the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the institutional structure
© The Author(s) 2020
E. Hirsch Ballin et al., European Variations as a Key to Cooperation,
Research for Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32893-1_1
1
has been simplified by merging the three pillars into one revitalised European
Union.
The European Union must overcome the conflicts about its future that have
arisen ever since. To be persuasive, changes must be driven by a realistic view of
the European Union, which, despite Brexit, has almost 30 Member States. The
Netherlands’ position and the contribution it makes to the inevitable changes in the
EU’s functioning matter.
Uncertainty about the future of the European Union has arisen in a changed
political environment. Today, European integration no longer goes without saying.
The relief with which Europe welcomed the creation of a common market with free
movement of persons, goods, capital and services—not least in Central Europe,
with its recent history of closely guarded borders—has given way to a desire for
greater protection of the individuality of the Member States. The introduction of
rules and authorities to guarantee the functioning of the market is viewed on the one
hand as interference and on the other as the dismantling of existing protective
institutions such as state-owned companies and the ban on dismissals. Faltering
‘Europeanisation’, for example an asylum policy that is only partially harmonised,
or the rather noncommittal coordination of foreign policy, has made the EU’s
institutions responsible for their own weakness. That weakness was laid bare by a
series of dramatic events, from the repercussions of the Yugoslav Civil War (al-
ready raging at the time of the Maastricht Treaty), through the deep divisions over
the Iraq War and the financial crises, to the current Syrian catastrophe and its
consequences for migration.
And yet the institutions of the European Union perform vital tasks, day in, day
out, to organise economic life and guarantee an area of freedom, security and justice
for people and businesses. The fact that many are now questioning and have lost
confidence in the EU shows that a Union of so many and such different Member
States as the current 28 cannot be built on the idea that all of them, even after their
transitional periods, will be integrated on an equal footing. Despite the aforemen-
tioned tensions, however, the enlargement of the Union to include Member States
with disparate economies, histories, and legal and administrative cultures has given
many people a more solid economic and social basis. The Union has shown itself
capable of rebalancing after crises. That has had consequences, how-ever. Often,
and perhaps increasingly, it has had to accept the withdrawal of some Member
States from certain aspects of EU legislation and policies. With regard to the
Schengen Agreement, the euro, migration and asylum policy, and even the
enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms, it has, more or less reluctantly,
accepted differences between Member States or conceded during tough negotia-
tions. These are powerful indications that there is a need for variation between
Member States. That is true not only of the new Member States, moreover.
Differences of opinion that have arisen between the initial six Member States in new
policy domains, such as monetary union and migration policy, also indicate a need
for variation.
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1.2 Opening Positions in the Debate on the Future
of European Integration
The time when the process of European integration was clearly charged to the
positive side of the political balance sheet is over. But the direction in which
changes are to be made—less integration, transformation, deepening or variation—
is controversial. The reasons for criticising the current state of affairs vary. Some
emphasise the restrictions placed on national policymaking, others the lack of
solidarity on the most pressing issues, and yet others the absence of democratic
foundations or the inability of the Union to stop democracy from declining into
authoritarianism in some Member States.
Relinquishing an all-too-common fixation on uniformity opens up new oppor-
tunities for a debate on the future of European integration. A ‘freer’ perspective that
allows for more variation can foster a more realistic debate. The perspective pro-
posed in this book makes it possible to move beyond the over-simplified debate that
pits nation state against federation. While the contrast seems clarifying, it does not
do justice to the multifaceted nature of reality. Many European citizens, politicians
and policy-makers concerned about dichotomous thinking are extremely sensitive.
Variation in European integration is not a sign of weakness. European integra-
tion seems to have reached a point where solidarity, resolve and national engage-
ment will in fact benefit from specific forms of cooperation. Variation supports the
provision of public goods such as security, stability, prosperity and social protec-
tion. Accepting it can thus be a proactive means of revitalising the relationship
between internal and external, between institutions and citizens, and between public
tasks and perceived needs.
The trio consisting of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union provide the constitutional basis for the relationship between its
own institutions, between those institutions and the Member States, and between
those institutions and the citizens of those Member States. Although there are only
minor differences between this trio and the unsuccessful Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe with regard to their legal implications, the system that has
been accepted is more open in purpose and therefore less specific and unequivocal.
Continuing to see the European Union as a set of institutions serving a
non-exclusive European legal order has given rise to openness as a principle. That
is what we wish to elaborate on in this book.
The guiding principles enshrined in Articles 1–6 of the Treaty on European
Union have been respected and put into practise: the European Union is a union
among peoples—note the plural—based on common values such as respect for
human dignity, democracy and the rule of law, but also characterised by pluralism
and respect for equality between the Member States and their national identities.
The constitutional principles governing the Union’s competences (Articles 4–6)
mean that the Union has no more power than that which the Member States have
conferred on it by treaty, that the Member States are expected to be loyal to one
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another, and that the Union must adhere to the principles of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality in its actions.
These principles must do more than merely pay lip service to national diversity.
With the European Union now encompassing a wide variety of Member States,
tasks, and therefore societal problems—the result of the changes that occurred in
the 1990s and 2000s—the need for variation must be acknowledged. This book
considers the notion that, if these constitutional principles are taken seriously, then
the process of European integration might not only mean entrusting more compe-
tences to the Union and increasing the level of uniformity, but also giving the
Member States scope to take responsibility for themselves and therefore allowing
for pluralism within the Union.
It is not only jurists trained in a single legal system but also many others who are
inclined to see legal and political orders as pyramids: the top is more important than
the base, and the intermediate levels carry the weight of the top and pass on the
instructions issued from there. Regardless of whether this image was ever com-
pletely accurate, it is in any case not up to date. International, supra-state, national
and regional decision-making influence one another. The standards established in a
broader context can only work if they are interpreted in smaller circles and are
tailored to the situation in which they are applied—i.e. in different ways.
Multi-level governance of this kind is the actual but also necessary form of gov-
ernance and administration in the European Union.1 Our view of this reality
becomes blurred because we see the European Union as a kind of state, but also
because we deny what has been the case since 1957, namely that the sovereignty of
the Member States is limited because they have transferred legislative, executive
and judicial competences to EU institutions. It is important to note that even when
competences are transferred in this manner, the Member States exercise consider-
able influence on the drafting of legislation and the resolutions adopted within the
Council of Ministers.
1.3 Democracy in Plural
Variation will not always be the outcome, not even when Member States express a
wish for it. The nature of the tasks involved or the level of solidarity required may
prevent it from being accepted. Nor is variation an end in itself, and there must
always be solid common ground between all the Union’s Member States, partic-
ularly regarding the founding values of democracy and the rule of law, the common
market, and solidarity in the defence of freedom and security. Last but not least,
allowing scope for variation addresses the desire to give the European Union more
credible democratic foundations. The European Union has a relationship not only
with its citizens, who are represented as a whole by the European Parliament, but
also with the citizens of the individual Member States, who are represented by their
national parliaments. While is true that the European Parliament has become a
co-legislative body, it is precisely the other ‘leg’ of the Union’s legislature, namely
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the Council (in which ministers represent their Member States and usually decide
by qualified majority), that is too far removed from the democratic process in the
Member States that it represents. As a ‘demoicracy’—demoi is the plural of the
Greek root demos in ‘democracy’—the European Union must continue to align
itself with the ideas and interests of its Member States.2 The Council of Ministers is
still too much of a negotiating platform to fulfil its representative role properly.
There is room for improvement, even without amending the Treaties.
The notion of ‘demoicracy’ put forward in this book is based on the assumption
that the ‘demoi’, the political peoples of Europe, should be regarded in plural. This
would, for example, be possible if national parliaments not only had negative
powers, such as the yellow card procedure, but also the right to initiate European
policy and legislation, including variations in that policy. What we are emphasising
here is that there are no hierarchical but rather cooperative relationships between
EU and national institutions. The EU’s current system is in fact not modelled on the
structure of the national state, in which legislative, policy-making, administrative
and judicial competences are derived from the power structure shaped by history.
The exact opposite is true in the European Communities and now in the European
Union: the need for a partly common legal order led to the creation of institutions
by treaty.
What this implies is that, at European level, the principle of democracy takes on
a different meaning. The European order is a legal order, an economic order and, in
a certain sense, a political order, but it is not a democracy in the same manner as a
state. The EU provides a structure for cooperation, to offer protection and build a
future lived in freedom; based on those goals and the common values in which they
are rooted, however, it is also a structure for taking and overseeing joint decisions.
In this European context, citizens exercise their influence primarily through their
national elections, and it is there that the EU must seek its basis of national support.
Ultimately, proposals for the reform of the European Union are judged in terms
of what is required to tackle common and cross-border problems and how such
public goods as freedom, security, stability, prosperity and social protection can be
provided. Reasoned choices will have to be made about the intensity of cooperation
and the method of decision-making used for the tasks that must be performed, and
those choices may vary from one Member State to the next. When it comes to the
free movement of goods and other issues, full cooperation is required, and the
Community method is the most appropriate. In this book, the Community method
refers to joint decision-making by supranational institutions and representatives of
the Member States. At the moment, the most important example is the ordinary
legislative procedure set out in Article 294 TFEU: EU legislation (regulations and
directives) is adopted by the Parliament (acting as a supranational representative
assembly) and the Council (of Ministers, representing the Member States) acting
jointly on a proposal from the Commission. In this procedure, the Council decides
by qualified majority.
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1.4 Variation Is More Than Differentiation
Variation is not an end in and of itself, but it certainly should be considered as a
general solution for the major problems that beset the EU today, both internally and
externally. Accepting variation does not, after all, mean that uniformity and
like-mindedness are lacking, but rather that real differences in Member States’
needs, views and modes of action are recognised.
Accepting variation as a distinctive feature of the European Union’s future
means keying into existing differences within the EU that the Netherlands’
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International
Affairs) (AIV) described in its advisory report of 2015 as ‘differentiated integra-
tion’. The report claims that the EU’s existing differentiation is the result of political
impasses in negotiations on the preferred aim, namely the uniform integration of
each and every Member State. When this could not be achieved, differentiated
integration was accepted. The AIV cites the following as the most significant
features of differentiated integration:
– enhanced cooperation: a formal EU instrument introduced in the Treaty of
Amsterdam enabling a lead group of at least nine Member States to take the
initiative to further integrate a specific policy domain, with the possibility of
other Member States joining later (Article 20 TEU, 326–334 TFEU). This
requires a (qualified) majority decision by the Council;
– temporary or permanent opt-out and opt-in (i.e. exemption) clauses;
– temporary or permanent intergovernmental cooperation, on the basis of agree-
ments under international law; recent examples include the Treaty Establishing
the European Stability Mechanism (2 February 2012) and the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(2 March 2012);
– transitional provisions for parts of the acquis in the event of enlargement of the
Union.3
In some instances, differentiation has been incorporated into the Treaties
them-selves, resulting in key policy domains in which not all Member States par-
ticipate. Not all Member States participate in the euro area and the Schengen
Agreement, whereas some non-Member States do (e.g. Montenegro and Kosovo are
not EU Member States but do have the euro as their currency; Liechtenstein,
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are not EU Member States but do participate in
the Schengen Agreement). There are also associations with non-EU Member States
that conform to EU internal market rules and legislation to varying degrees, in
particular the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland. There are, more-
over, many forms of integration in which all the Member States participate but
which leave scope for individual states to fulfil their public tasks as they see fit.
That is the nature of directives as a category of EU legislation, as opposed to
regulations, which are directly applicable. The ‘open method of coordination’
leaves further scope for differentiation. The Member States then coordinate their
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policy by formulating joint policy objectives and monitoring the results; in this
case, however, there is no EU legislation.
The concept of variation described in this book includes forms of differentiated
integration, but goes beyond differentiated integration as we know it today. It is not
a derogation accepted after negotiation, but a desirable feature of the EU of the
future, given the large number of Member States, each one very different from the
next. Variation is not regarded as a failure of European integration, but rather as
another, and in certain situations better, way of ensuring its success. The reasons for
variation and its impact on citizens must be both acceptable and convincing.
Variation thus builds on the principle of subsidiarity and, as a matter of principle,
leaves room for the democratic functioning of each of the Member States: the EU as
a ‘demoicracy’, in which each demoi4 is part of its own state and part of the
European Union.
Our proposal regarding a future European Union with well-considered variations
also makes clear that the aim is not (or no longer) to form a European federal state.
In a federal state, the relationship between the members and the federal authority is,
in principle, symmetrical; asymmetry only occurs in exceptional cases.5 Allowing
variation is an asymmetric structuring principle. Even so, it does not imply a
general aversion to the supranational competences of EU institutions. Where the
nature of the tasks (for example organising the common market) so requires,
Community integration and the participation of all Member States remains a pos-
sible outcome. In this book, the we propose a method of assessment in each
individual case.
In the line of thinking outlined above, the question is not so much whether
varied cooperation should be permitted to ensure that the European project can
continue successfully, but rather how variation can best take shape. The book will
explore this and outline various possible considerations.
European variation offers a continuum of options in this way. By deliberately
accepting scope for variation, it becomes possible to break through long-standing
deadlocks and to maintain sufficient cooperation, despite the differences. The
analytical approach outlined in this book can be used to address the many issues
facing the EU and its Member States, both in existing policy domains, whenever
uniformity appears to be generating too much tension, and in new areas of
European cooperation. This book explores the option of variation in greater detail in
three domains: (1) the internal market, (2) the euro area, and (3) asylum, migration
and border control. The main purpose of these chapters is to clarify the many ways
that variation in cooperation can take shape. Although we have limited the dis-
cussion in this way, it should be noted that the variation perspective elaborated here
will also be effective in other policy domains.
Accepting variation in the number of participating Member States may, in cer-
tain contexts, resemble the ‘two-speed’ Europe, consisting of a ‘Core Europe’ and
the remaining Member States. What we envisage may go even further than that,
however. The circle of participating Member States may vary; indeed, it is
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conceivable that two or three circles could arise simultaneously, if this would
provide the most meaningful pooling of forces. Instead of a ‘hard core’, there would
be a flexible core (or cores).6
1.5 The Netherlands in the European Union
The founding of the European Communities gave the Netherlands a say in the law
and policy of its neighbouring countries for the very first time,7 on a collective
basis. It marked another stage in the history of Dutch-European relations. The
Dutch state is not only the result of national self-awareness and a desire for liberty,
but also of coordination with other European states, first through the series of
treaties known as the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and then within the framework of
the Congress of Vienna (1815). Shared control became acceptable once it was
realised that some interests should preferably not be surrendered to the dominance
of one state over another. It is here that the organisation of common European
interests by legal remedy has its origins.
How this works out in practice can be problematical, however. In this book, we
address the ‘why’ and ‘how’, the reasons for the European Union, its purpose, its
form, and how all these things relate to one another. This approach entails con-
sideration of the following issues:
1. What do we want from European integration? (tasks)
2. Why do we want it? (values, goals and public interests)
3. How do we organise it? (institutions and standards).
The overriding principle is that form follows content. The form that cooperation
takes can only emerge after the goals of that cooperation have been determined. For
a comprehensive consideration of such questions about European cooperation, we
first need to know why things have gone as they have during the various episodes of
European integration.
The first step is to understand the results of European integration in the context
in which they arose. Present-day discussions about the future of Europe generally
assume, without further explanation, that the EU is a new public law entity with a
territory, a population and a centrally organised authority. But the EU is not a state.
Many even consider it to be unique (‘sui generis’). Nevertheless, the EU is usually
compared to a state as an organising structure. Both proponents and opponents use
this image and then either argue that the EU should develop into a federal state or
are terrorised by the prospect. Presenting things in this way obscures the reality of
the EU’s history and hinders its further progress. The Communities from which the
EU stems and the Union itself are the outcomes of a desire to arrive at a common
legal order and common policy on certain issues. This is precisely how the
Communities were described in the early case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (in short, the Court of Justice). In the Van Gend en Loos ruling of
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5 February 1963,8 the Court of Justice found that ‘the Community constitutes a new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not
only Member States but also their nationals.’9
The EU’s institutions were created precisely to construct this common legal
order and to implement this common policy. Together, they form the institutional
structure that should enable the EU to translate the objectives linked to a common
legal order and a common policy into the fulfilment of European public tasks. In
this book, we do not focus on this institutional structure but on what is required of
the EU: the fulfilment of European public tasks. ‘Public tasks’ is not an adminis-
trative concept but a political and constitutional one. Public tasks concern matters
that enable citizens to live freely and to take responsibility for their lives, such as
market regulation, education, health care and infrastructure. Essentially, these tasks
can be derived from the definitions of fundamental rights, including economic,
social and cultural rights, and everything that relates to peace and security. The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union basically provides a legal
guarantee of these public tasks. This naturally makes demands on implementation
by the Member States, but it does not exclude variation (as noted in research on the
open method of coordination.10
European integration has its origins in the hope that cooperation will provide
a lasting counterweight to the dynamic forces of nationalism in international pol-
itics. After all, those forces lead to conflicts or to trade-offs, in both cases amounting
to the view that ‘your profit is my loss’ and ‘your security is my threat’. The
European integration process put an end to this zero-sum-game thinking. From the
outset, the aim was for the ‘union among peoples’ to focus on shared values. Public
tasks in the EU are therefore more than just a matter of common interest. They are a
shared actualisation of the values that guide European integration. Respect for
human dignity, and therefore for human rights, is decisive in this. However, how
these and other values of the Union are defined in Article 2 TEU leaves room for a
wide range of national interpretations. For this reason alone, the institutionalisation
of European cooperation requires constant reflection on Europe’s tasks and
functions.
1.6 Europe in the World
The process of European integration always takes place in dialogue with changes
occurring in the world that surrounds Europe. That is and will remain true both of
the widening and of the deepening of integration. Within the framework of the
European integration process, the aim from the outset has been an ever-closer
‘union among peoples’. But reinforcing that union economically, socially and
culturally is more than just an inward-looking European affair. European
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cooperation aims to combine globalisation in economic and interpersonal contacts
with socially embedded economic freedom and a common ‘area of freedom,
security and justice’.11 In so doing, it has given substance to the task of attaining the
closely interrelated aims of peace, socio-economic stability, security, and interna-
tional trade and mobility.
The European Union is meant to be an international force that increasingly acts
in unison; in 2009, it also gained full recognition as a legal entity. But every era has
different challenges and sees different demands and desires being expressed by
the participating Member States and peoples. Something fundamental has also
changed. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union
have altered entirely the context in which European integration is taking place. The
old negative reference point has disappeared. For more than two decades now, the
Union has no longer been able to base its identity on being ‘different’—i.e. freer,
more trustworthy and more economically efficient—from its counterparts in Eastern
Europe, and China seems too far away to serve as its new opposite number. Time
and again, the Union will have to determine how European integration stands in
relation to such geopolitical challenges as economic globalisation, migration,
security, global warming, financial stability and social protection. The fulfilment of
‘public tasks’ to produce the public goods demanded of it must be understood
within that relationship. The demand for public goods by European societies may
differ from one era to the next and it may also differ between Member States and
within them.
In the same way that the Netherlands is ‘attached to other countries’, as the
WRR put it in 2010, the EU is inextricably linked to global politics and the world
economy. That link is a two-way street. One the one hand, it forces the EU, time
after time, to accept its share of responsibility in international affairs, not only in
trade policy and development cooperation but also in foreign, security and climate
policy. On the other hand, being more relevant on the international stage may help
to reduce scepticism about European integration. European integration was origi-
nally driven, at least in part, by the ideal of lasting peace among peoples: the
nations of Europe were no longer prepared to submit to the ‘us-against-them’ forces
of nationalism and instead wanted to ensure the collective protection of rights and
interests for future generations. It is extremely important to emphasise in politics
and governance that security, stability and human rights come at a certain cost. It
takes sustained, collective effort and dedication to guarantee these public goods,
time after time.
1.7 Structuring Principles of the European Union
Many authors reflecting on the nature and future of the European Union assume that
the EU ‘overarches’ the national legal orders, as it were, in the form of an extra tier
on top of the Member States. However, this notion does no justice to the particular
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way in which the European Union is structured. That structure is difficult to
compare with such familiar patterns as federal states or confederacies.
Although EU law is binding on the Member States and has its own institutions,
these only fulfil public tasks with respect to specifically designated issues. The EU
is primarily a legal order that regulates the rights and obligations of citizens and
their organisations and enterprises through the incorporation of its law into the
national law of the Member States, as indicated in the rulings of the Court of Justice
in the early years of the European Communities. For the most part, the EU’s legal
order is shaped by the interaction between its institutions and its Member States.
People must be able to rely on this common legal order and that is why institutions
and procedures are necessary. However, these institutions and procedures are not
some mandatory template for resolving differences between the Member States or
issues that affect the populations.
The EU is not finished, and it never will be. Removing the pressure to achieve
uniformity offers scope for a discussion on the future of European integration that
does more justice to reality. The notion that all the Member States must cooperate in
every policy domain, resulting in ever more harmonised standards, is unrealistic.
We advocate taking a more proactive approach to the concept of variation and
considering it in a broader context. This does not mean that the EU should be
regarded as a kind of à la carte menu. There are downsides to variation as well. But
thinking only in terms of uniformity means disregarding all kinds of variations that
already exist, or that could be developed further. In addition, it is important to
recognise variations in cooperation for what they truly are: a fully-fledged method
of European cooperation. In the real world of European integration, variation in
cooperation is neither ‘second best’ nor merely opportune in times of crisis, when
nothing else helps.
Variation does not weaken the relationships that in fact shape Europe and the
Netherlands. Since the founding of the European Communities, the Netherlands too
has had a say in the law and policy of its neighbouring countries. Shared control
became acceptable once it was realised that some interests should preferably not be
surrendered to one state’s dominance over another.
This book recommends first introducing this approach as a political concept and
mode of action regarding the future of the European Union before proposing any
Treaty amendments. A thorough overhaul of the Treaties is a politically compli-
cated process that also involves complex constitutional procedures in several
Member States. In many instances, variation can be achieved by having the par-
ticipating Member States conclude their own treaties, as was the case with the
Schengen Agreement and emu, for example. In addition, variation can be applied
more often by using open standards and minimum harmonisation, and by making
more deliberate trade-offs within and between policy fields.
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1.8 Structure of the Book
Chapter 2 starts with an analysis of European integration after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989. At that time, the integration process faced numerous political chal-
lenges that proved difficult to cover in the Treaties. The core elements of the
integration process remained in place, such as reciprocity and harmonisation as a
basis for mutual market access, convergence driven by market integration, and the
Community method as an institutional decision-making process. There are, how-
ever, growing reservations about the triad of (1) the unique and intensifying
momentum of market integration, (2) spill-overs between sectors, i.e. the ‘dis-
semination’ of integration practices from one policy domain to another, and
(3) their consolidation by supranational institutions that uphold the rule of law in
both the theoretical and practical sense.
Chapter 3 describes how the pursuit of social protection has been pushed into the
background in recent decades by a focus on market liberalisation, and how that has
affected democratic trust in the EU’s institutions and the evolution of human rights
within the European legal order.
Chapter 4 applies the theory of motivations for collective action to create an
analysis matrix that aims to provide a better understanding of the discussions
concerning some of the EU’s most sensitive issues. The matrix is constructed along
two axes: ‘motivations for collective action’ and ‘institutional order’.
Chapter 5 describes the different forms of variation that already exist within the
internal market and that may therefore exist in other policy fields.
Chapter 6 analyses what variation can and cannot achieve. Here, variation in
cooperation is deliberately viewed on a continuum. The EU’s current situation calls
for a new, more conscious and proactive form of reflection on the potential
of variation. Variation can help get a better grip and a stronger sense of control; it is
an alternative to relying on a future ‘binding effect’ of convergence.
Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of variation in Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) and in migration, asylum and border control. They do not contain
specific recommendations concerning these policy areas; it is beyond the scope of a
single chapter in this book to make such recommendations anyway. What these
chapters do instead is broaden our understanding of the existing variation and
suggest various methods for identifying suitable forms of cooperation.
Finally, Chap. 9 will present the main conclusions with regard to an EU that
allows for variation. In particular, it examines what this approach means for the
Netherlands and its position in the EU.
Notes
1. Piatonni (2010: 247, 260).
2. Nicolaïdis (2003, 2012).
3. AIV (2015: 8).
4. Peoples in the constitutional sense, as opposed to ethnically identified ‘nations’.
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5. For example the position of the District of Columbia in the federal system of
the United States.
6. Cf. Schmidt (2016: 10).
7. Leaving aside the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine
(CCNR), which was granted supranational powers as long ago as 1815.
8. ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
9. The concept of the European Community as politically neutral, a technocratic
‘community based on the rule of law’ in that sense, has evolved into that of a
legal area with a much more pronounced political complexion. See Von
Bogdandy 2017.
10. Armstrong (2016: 15).
11. Article 3(2) TEU and Part Three, Title V TFEU.
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Chapter 2
The Tension Between Image and Reality
2.1 Introduction
Security, freedom, stability and prosperity create the conditions for people to
maintain economic and personal relationships with one another, to express them-
selves freely and to profess their beliefs, to be free from violence and to be pro-
tected from disproportionate risk. That is, in brief, the meaning of a democratic and
social legal state.1 The societies of Europe are in urgent need of these public goods,
which can no longer be provided by individual states acting on their own. However,
there is considerable debate about the way in which European cooperation furnishes
these public goods.
There is nothing new about the force field in which the relevant decisions must
be taken. This book begins its analysis by considering the historic changes that
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and that are associated with the
Maastricht Treaty (1991–1993). The Maastricht Treaty marked a turning-point in
the pattern of European integration initiated by the Single European Act of 1986 by
triggering a process of fundamental change. It was followed by further significant
changes, most recently the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which taken together determine
the nature of European integration today. In the remainder of this book, we stress
the significance of the Maastricht Treaty in that regard by referring to it as the
‘Maastricht Gateway’—a gateway to a long road—through which European inte-
gration passed upon the signing of that Treaty and the creation of the European
Union.
What is new about these problems is the incisive way in which they are being
addressed. That incisiveness creates scope for a debate on new directions for
European cooperation, one in which change and diversity are viewed as a realistic
starting point rather than as an obstacle.2 A similar approach can be found in the
White Paper presented in 2017, in which the European Commission (EC) attempts
to force a discussion between supranational institutions, Member States and EU
citizens.3 The White Paper spurs the search for new forms of integration. It should
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be noted, however, that that search remains doggedly focused on the ‘how’ of
European integration. We believe that this scope is too limited. After all, appeals for
greater diversity should also consider the ‘why’ of integration.
Any form of cooperation within ‘Europe’—if it is to be stable—must be a
sufficiently credible and therefore visible reflection of real needs and requirements.
Acknowledging that reality starts by admitting that, in many respects, we already
have the answer to the question ‘What kind of Europe do we want to live in’. After
all, we cannot alter history and geography. Geography alone has condemned
Europe to work constantly at maintaining its internal relationships. Indeed, it is
unique in the deeply penetrating, finely meshed, and multifaceted nature of those
relationships, and that colours European reality.
Cooperation as a credible reflection of real needs and requirements also means
that the EU’s ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ spaces must always be closely connected. Reality
does not cease at the external border, after all. It is in the relationship between
internal and external that international cooperation takes shape and values can be
fulfilled.4 That is why the system of internal organisation applied in the context of
European integration must respond to the external challenges facing European
societies, such as the arrival of refugees, security issues, and climate and envi-
ronmental matters.
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU consisted of the European Communities
and two other, new ‘pillars’; sixteen years later, the Union absorbed these pillars
under the Treaty of Lisbon. After ‘Maastricht’, the EU moved beyond the broadly
accepted realm of administrative tasks regulating a common European market.
European integration thus ventured into more controversial and political arenas, and
the number of Member States grew considerably. Accompanying these events were
new and more diverse forms of integration, the most striking examples of which
were the Schengen Agreement and the euro area. Despite these profound changes,
the integration process remained focused on further economic and social conver-
gence based on institutionally regulated reciprocity, rooted in a common market.5
In other words, while the reality of European integration after ‘Maastricht’ required
more and more institutional adjustments and political change, the dominant
approach to European integration remained roughly the same. That has caused
problems, with significant examples of divergence emerging in the euro area and
Member States such as Poland and Hungary falling out of step in terms of the basic
conditions guaranteeing the rule of law.
As the pressure of circumstances mounted, other forms of institutional integra-
tion have proved possible, both within and outside the framework of existing EU
Treaties. The crux of the credibility problems now challenging European integra-
tion is that diversity has been an increasingly important factor ever since the
Maastricht Treaty, but so far has not been acknowledged and defined, or only to a
limited extent and in any event not as an independent pathway to achieving
integration.
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2.2 The ‘Maastricht Gateway’
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, European integration abruptly
found itself in an entirely new geopolitical reality. Any analysis of the EU’s current
public tasks must take that historic episode into account. European integration then
passed through the ‘gateway’ of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a milestone on the
journey of deepening the integration process that the Communities had embarked
upon in 1986 with the Single European Act, but whose historical context had been
dramatically altered by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. By passing through this
‘gateway’, the European Union increasingly entered politically controversial terri-
tory, a process fuelled by the politicisation of its traditional economic policy
domain.
The Europe of European integration left behind the Cold War period and the
division of Europe and Germany and entered the multipolar world of the
twenty-first century, fundamentally changing both the circumstances and the pro-
cess of European integration. The EU gained more competences in more policy
domains and in 1993 embarked on a major enlargement process, mainly by wel-
coming Central and Eastern European countries as new Member States. At the same
time, the EU remained predominantly intergovernmental in nature regarding mat-
ters that lay beyond the remit of the internal market (the first pillar of ‘Maastricht’)
and associated areas such as the environment and consumer protection. While it is
true that politically sensitive policy domains, such as asylum and justice, became
EU matters, they were initially decided by unanimity (the third pillar). The
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was also added, but remained
intergovernmental in nature (the second pillar).
The Maastricht Treaty thus represented a major step towards diversifying the
methods of integration. In addition to integration in accordance with the
Community method—in which the Commission functions as a supranational
institution, initiator of legislation and guardian of the Treaty organisation, the
Council of Ministers takes decisions by majority, and the European Parliament
(EP) serves as co-decision-maker—other forms of integration emerged: multi-speed
(e.g. regarding EMU), intergovernmental alternatives, and new hybrid forms of
supranational and intergovernmental governance, such as the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC, the process of coordinating policies without resorting to the
harmonisation decrees based on the Treaties).
In many respects—and certainly with regard to the first pillar of the EC Treaty—
the process initiated in Maastricht can be viewed as a completion, refinement and
constructive amendment of the traditional integration process begun by ‘the Six’
with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, which from 1957
onwards came to focus on the common market of the European Economic
Community (EEC, later EC). In addition, the Maastricht Treaty kick-started emu
(including the UK’s and Denmark’s opt-outs) and, from 1993 onwards, a package
of harmonisation measures introduced the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices and capital on a Community-wide basis (including opt-ins by Norway and
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other non-EU Member States as participants in the European Economic Area
(EEA)). Thus did de facto varied cooperation commence.
The Maastricht Treaty amended the Community Treaties and established the
European Union, including the new pillar structure. Although the EU’s
politically-tinged ambitions became institutionalised in this way—asylum, justice
and other more sensitive policy domains became European matters and the aim of a
CFSP was made explicit—the general attitude in Europe remained largely one of
‘business as usual’. In other words, despite being confronted by new challenges and
unforeseen historical events, such as German unification, European unification, and
the emergence of a multipolar world with greater independence for Europe, the
process of European integration continued as if there was little need to alter
(Western) Europe’s self-image or the political and democratic embeddedness of the
integration process.
In short, in the new reality following the Cold War, the Europe of integration
continued to place its trust in the Europe of the European Communities as it was
shaped in the post-War period. Given the success of the European Community and
what many considered the historic victory of ‘Western’ societies over their com-
munist rivals, this was not surprising. Even after 1989–1991, the Europe of inte-
gration continued to define itself on the basis of the old Cold War order, the order to
which the Treaty of Rome had given birth. It sought solid footing in policy pro-
grammes, institutions and practices inspired by the West European order of the
second half of the twentieth century.6 As mentioned above, there were under-
standable and valid reasons for this, but it did so in an altered international context
in which the EU was forced to address more politically controversial issues,7 and in
an integration process characterised by a growing level of diversity. This growing
diversity was fuelled, among other things, by:
1. treaty-related and institutional changes associated with the structure of the new
EU (such as the UK’s and Denmark’s partial opt-out in the Maastricht Treaty),
of which the European Community—in conjunction with the European Atomic
Energy Community, still a legally distinct entity established by the Euratom
Treaty, the second Treaty of Rome alongside the Treaty establishing the EEC—
was now part8;
2. the enlargement from 12 to the present 28 Member States, which led to much
greater economic, cultural-historical and administrative disparities within the
process of European integration;
3. the widening and deepening of European integration.9
At the same time, an important step was taken in the Maastricht Treaty to
connect the European project with the citizens of the Member States by establishing
European Union citizenship, in addition to national citizenship. The Treaty not only
consolidated existing rights relating to the free movement of persons, but also
highlighted civil and political rights (the citizen as voter and electoral candidate)
and their relationship to other fundamental rights. It was not until 2009 that the EU
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in 2000, became fully legally binding,
albeit with many reservations with regard to fundamental social rights.
In the period following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, confidence in the
traditional approach to European integration remained high. This confidence may
have also been underpinned by the assumption that time would do its job: European
integration would crystallise further, the basis was solid, and whirlwind changes
were unnecessary and probably unwise. Considerations of this kind fostered a
‘muddling through’ and ‘wait and see’ approach, even with respect to extremely
far-reaching new projects such as EMU, and the unprecedented enlargement of the
Union with Central and East European states.
In short, the changes affecting European integration were enormous, but the way
they were handled remained much the same as in the past. The EU staked its future
on tried-and-tested formulas. There was frequent discussion of the need to radically
reconceive the institutions of the ‘Rome order’—with a view to aligning them more
closely to the process of deepening and widening European integration in the
post-Cold War world—but only some of these discussions resulted in action.10
Core elements of the integration process clearly remained in place, such as mutual
recognition as a basis for market access, convergence (of economies) and the
Community method as the driver of integration.11
2.3 After ‘Maastricht’
The inclination to rely on familiar formulas of integration after ‘Maastricht’ does
not mean that there were no signs that such reticence would eventually lead to
problems.12 Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, pressure mounted,
slowly but surely, on the famed ‘permissive consensus’ (implicitly assumed support
for the EU project),13 long regarded as the solid democratic basis underpinning
European integration. Latent support for integration burgeoned into mistrust among
ever larger groups of citizens.
That emerging mistrust found expression in public debate and in the results of
the elections and referendums held since 2005. De sociale staat van Nederland14
reveals that support for membership of the European Union is higher in the
Netherlands than in any other EU Member State.15 However, the share of the
population who believe that Dutch membership of the EU is a good thing has fallen
significantly in recent decades, from 75% in 1996 to 58% in 2016/2017.16 In 2017,
45% felt that European integration was going too far.17 According to Dekker, Dutch
attitudes towards the EU are generally multidimensional and ambiguous.18 That is
why the SCP19 has concluded that ‘Dutch public opinion appears to regard mem-
bership above all as something unavoidable’.
This shift in the public mood may well have decelerated the functioning of the
Community institutions,20 in turn possibly reinforcing apolitical reticence and
institutional caution in European policymaking, which reinforced the ‘muddling
through’ and ‘wait and see’ approach.
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These mutually reinforcing forces produced a paradoxical result: as the 1990s
marched on, the political challenges facing the EU grew more and more acute even
as it was less and less able to cope with those challenges. Of course, the EU
engaged in politics despite this inability, but it did so in the disguise of depoliti-
cisation, thereby creating a widening breach between institutional structure and
reality.
Alongside the traditional, rather apolitical issues of functionality in European
integration (e.g. regarding economies of scale and oversight), urgent matters of
justice, distribution, transparency and humanity required more and more attention
(e.g. to deal with the Yugoslav Civil Wars, the structuring of the monetary union,
and the enlargement). The issues that arose in this second category were, in essence,
politically and morally charged, making them hard to resolve within the existing
policy rationality and corresponding instruments.
In cases where a functionalist rationale is absent as a grounds for transferring
competences and when solidarity is not self-evident, it is difficult to legitimise
possible European-level solutions democratically. Such a situation manifests itself
in political inertia, leading in turn to a loss of confidence. This dilemma has now
reached the point that even attempts to solve apolitical problems are often met with
great resistance. The acute nature of this dilemma shows that the focus on extending
European integration in the direction of a ‘regulatory state’,21 rooted in the func-
tionalist rationale of the common market, has prevented more political and
democratic mechanisms of legitimisation from developing to the point that they can
function with sufficient credibility in the present day. Perhaps there was no
immediate need for this, in fact.
Box 2.1. The Effect of Historiography
How can we explain the fixation on the status quo? To an important extent the
explanation probably lies in what one might call the notion of ‘progressive
functionalism’.22 This notion is one of the most important underpinnings of
the ‘Rome order’. It has also long been a driving force in academic research.
For decades, the historiography of European integration was overshadowed
by functionalist explanations and their theoretical challengers.23 As a result,
academic debate was confined to theories of utility maximisation and rational
choice (focusing on the economic and/or geopolitical considerations of the
actors in the integration process).
Once researchers began in the 1980s to gain access to more archives, they
found that such theories did not adequately explain why things were going
the way they were. Less rational, more historical-political or identity-inspired
forces frequently played a defining role too, as did coincidence.24 For the time
being, these insights have not yet broken the surface of political and public
debate. The functionalist narrative still dominates, not least because the
success of EU market integration has lent retroactive cogency to ‘rational
actor theories’, which appeared to provide evidence mainly for various
functionalist or rational choice development concepts (see also Sect. 2.3).
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The persuasiveness of these theories in fact may distort history, leading
ultimately to incomprehension and alienation.
In the past two decades, the public debate on European integration has
been marred by problems associated with an overly functional approach. In
many respects, these problems have revived the existential struggles of the
early stages of European integration in today’s EU. In the decade following
the end of the Second World War, the credibility of the whole enterprise
rested on an idealistic European movement—the UK’s former Prime Minister
Winston Churchill advocated the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’—but
that movement had to win over the suspicion and reluctance of national
movements in a battle for priority.
Today, the political debate about European integration is taking place in a
completely different historical context, as well as in a much wider and more
diverse integration process. The grave problems facing the EU increasingly
raise the question of whether European integration is sustainable at all at a
time when prosperity is stagnating or declining, or outside the borders of a
core West European group of highly integrated, similar societies. Viewed
from a historical perspective, the ‘Rome order’ and the ‘Maastricht order’ are
not necessarily aligned.
The paradox between change and inertia that became manifest in the relationship
between the EU’s internal and external space (profound change within and around
the EU, but at the same time a growing reluctance to respond to it) also emerged in
the way the EU dealt with the institutional order of European integration. While
diversity became increasingly central to European integration, and ‘Maastricht’
even forced the issue within certain policy domains (by permitting multi-speed
integration, for example with regard to EMU), the Community method and the
notion of reciprocity between all Member States remained the undisputed frame of
reference, including a firm expectation of convergence.
All this obscured the fact that, after ‘Maastricht’, various forms of differentiation,
i.e. lead groups and opt-outs, gradually became possible outside the traditional
domain of the internal market. Such flexibility remained almost invisible in the
public and political domains, however. In those instances when flexibility was
openly accepted, it was usually as a last resort, after every possible attempt had
been made to reach a solution ‘together’ through the Community method. Variation
thus took the form of ‘ad hoc dealmaking’, often in an attempt to limit damage. As
late as 2015, the Dutch Government responded with extreme reticence to the
aforementioned advisory report by the Advisory Council on International Affairs
(AIV), which recommended making more extensive use of the options for internal
variation.25
The ad hoc approach has exceeded its sell-by date, a point driven home by the
White Paper on the future of the EU published by the European Commission
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(EC) in early 2017. In it, the EC sketches five scenarios for Europe by 2025 in an
attempt to steer a debate on the future of Europe. Variation is the key concept in
these scenarios, with the need for change being paramount.
Box 2.2. The Way Ahead According to the European Commission
The European Commission’s input for the Rome Summit of March 2017 is
contained in a White Paper in which it presents five scenarios for how the EU
could evolve by 2025, against a backdrop of structural changes in Europe’s
international position. The main point is that Europe’s place in the world is
shrinking as other, emerging, economies beyond its borders grow. Europe’s
relative economic power is waning. In the EC’s view, this accentuates the
need for Europe to speak with one voice on behalf of its own interests.
These changes have fuelled doubts about the ability of the EU’s social
market economy to ensure that every generation will be better off than the
previous one. Such doubts have been felt most strongly in the euro area.
The EC believes this highlights the need to complete emu and strengthen the
convergence of economic and social performances. The EC also cites a
number of major challenges of our time: Europe’s ageing population, the
growing pressure on its social protection systems, the changing nature of
work, and climate change. It is difficult to close the gap between expectations
and the EU’s capacity to deliver. That challenge is made all the greater by the
complexity of the EU, i.e. the Member States and institutions such as the EC
and the ECB combined; it is, for example, by no means easy to understand
who does what.
In its White Paper, the EC states that the EU must choose: it can let its
future be shaped by unexpected events, or it can try to carve out a different
future for itself. The EC considers that the five scenarios presented in the
White Paper can help steer the debate on the future of Europe.
The starting point for each scenario is that the Member States will move
forward together as a Union. The five scenarios are not detailed blueprints or
policy prescriptions; form must follow function. The EC recognises that all
too often, the discussion on Europe’s future comes down to a binary—and
misleading—choice between more or less Europe. It is up to the EU27 to
decide together which combination of features from the five scenarios will
best help advance the European project.26
Scenario 1: Carrying on (‘muddling through’)
In this scenario, problems are tackled as they arise. The speed of
decision-making depends on overcoming differences of views. The unity of
the EU27 is preserved but may still be tested in the event of major disputes.
Decision-making remains complex and the capacity to deliver does not
always match expectations.
The internal market is strengthened, including in the energy and digital
sectors. The EU actively pursues progressive trade agreements. The
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functioning of the euro area and management of external borders will
improve. There is also progress towards a common asylum system and
improved coordination on security matters. Progress is expected on closer
defence cooperation and on speaking with one voice on foreign affairs.
Scenario 2: Nothing but the internal market
The functioning of the single market becomes the main raison d’être of the
EU27. Rights derived from EU law may be restricted. Decision-making may
be easier to understand but the capacity to act collectively is limited. This
may widen the gap between expectations and delivery at all levels.
Progress is easier to achieve for the free movement of capital and goods
than in other areas, such as the free movement of persons and services, which
can no longer be guaranteed. Given the sharp focus on reducing regulation at
EU level, differences persist in consumer, environmental and social standards,
leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. Cooperation in the euro area is limited.
There is no common migration or asylum policy; as a result, there are more
systematic internal border controls. Coordination on security is dealt with
bilaterally.
Scenario 3: Those who want more do more (multi-speed Europe, ‘lead
groups’)
The EU27 proceeds as today but certain Member States that want to do more
in common work together in specific policy areas. As was the case for the
Schengen area or the euro, such cooperation can build on the shared EU27
framework. The status of other Member States is preserved, and they have the
option of joining those doing more in time. Citizens’ rights derived from EU
law vary depending on whether or not citizens live in a country that has
chosen to do more. Transparency is an issue because the different layers make
decision-making complex.
At the very least, the EU27 follows scenario 1 by acting in unison in all
policy areas. As in scenario 1, the internal market is strengthened and the
EU27 pursues progressive trade agreements. Regarding EMU, a number of
Member States deepen cooperation in areas such as taxation and social
standards. They also do so with regard to security, defence and justice
matters.
Scenario 4: Doing less more efficiently
In this scenario, there is a consensus on the need to better tackle certain
priorities together. The EU27 decides to focus its attention and limited
resources on a reduced number of areas, allowing it to act much quicker in a
number of policy domains while doing less in other fields. In choosing its
new priorities, the EU27 seeks to better align expectations and delivery. This
clearer division of responsibilities helps European citizens to better
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understand what is handled at which level, helping to close the gap between
promise and delivery.
The EU has real difficulty in agreeing which areas it should prioritise,
however. The EC in any event proposes dealing with trade exclusively at EU
level but setting common standards in the internal market to a minimum.
Several steps are also taken to consolidate the euro area to guarantee its
stability, but the EU27 does less in employment and social policy.
Cooperation on border management, asylum policies, counter-terrorism
matters, foreign policy issues and defence (the creation of a European
Defence Union) are further examples of deepening integration, according to
the EC.
Scenario 5: Doing much more together
In this scenario, all the Member States decide to do much more together
across the board. As a result, decisions are agreed faster at European level.
Citizens have more rights derived directly from EU law, but there is the risk
of alienating parts of society that feel that the EU lacks legitimacy or has
taken too much power away from national authorities.
The internal market is strengthened through harmonisation of standards
and stronger enforcement. Trade is dealt with exclusively at EU level.
Economic, financial and fiscal Union is achieved as envisaged in the Five
Presidents’ Report. Cooperation on border management, asylum policies,
counter-terrorism, foreign policy and defence is deepened.
2.4 An Historical Perspective on the Present
It is not only the present uncertainty and astonishing succession of recent crises that
explain the situation as it stands today. The problems of inertia and credibility that
have come so sharply to the fore also have long historical roots.
We have only a limited understanding of what perhaps lies at the very heart of
the integration process: the political processes that led governments to set up
multilateral and supranational institutions, thereby placing unprecedented restric-
tions on their own freedom of action.27 Those restrictions are most visible when
Member States must face the fact that they have transferred authority to institutions,
such as the EC and the ECB, whose competences eclipse those of their own
national governments in certain areas. When the ECB takes interest rate decisions
that are contrary to the position of the President of the De Nederlandsche Bank
(Netherlands Central Bank) (DNB) but nevertheless binding on the DNB, then it
becomes clear that certain matters are no longer national affairs.
On top of this, since ‘Maastricht’ these self-imposed restrictions have become
much more visible, not least for the Member States in the euro area. When that is
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combined with a limited understanding of the political ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the
transfer of powers, a loss of confidence in European integration becomes almost
inevitable. This is particularly true at a time when circumstances are driving the EU
to pursue crisis intervention policy, as in recent years. Its responses to the euro
crisis and the tensions surrounding the arrival of refugees are striking examples.
Almost by definition, European crisis intervention policy involves interfering rad-
ically in national policy autonomy, and it forces the Member States to take ad hoc
decisions on grounds that many consider obscure. This is at odds with democratic
legitimacy and public support in the national political arena.
In the current uncertainty, the question of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the political
processes that drive integration will only grow louder and echo far beyond the
boundaries of policymaking and academia, for decades the only arenas to have
addressed this question. In the meantime, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of European inte-
gration has become a central issue in elections in the EU Member States. ‘Why
have things gone the way they have?’ ‘How did “we”—a sovereign state—get
ourselves into this situation?’ ‘Can the tide still be turned?’ Questions such as these
are now setting the tone in public debate in almost all EU Member States, but
politicians and policymakers have yet to follow up on them in any concrete way.
As more research is conducted into the history of European integration, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the outcomes of European politics and rulings of
the Court of Justice have frequently defined the integration process in ways
unanticipated by the participating Member States and institutions.28 In other words,
no one conceived of the integration process in its present form. In fact, the form that
European integration took was, in most cases, entirely unforeseeable. It was
something unexpected that belonged to everyone and no one, depending on the
circumstances and the zeitgeist—which does not mean that the result is necessarily
wrong, of course.
The unpredictable nature of European integration becomes obvious in the
Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty was an attempt by the ‘Europe of the Twelve’, as it
was known, to respond to the unexpected challenges posed by the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the end of the Cold War. Its response, however, revealed the two faces of
European integration. On the one hand, the Treaty appeared to confirm the rele-
vance of European integration and its capacity for change in the post-Cold War era.
In that respect, ‘Maastricht’ provided a promising practical basis for a constructive
approach to German and European unification in a radically new context. The EU
was forward-looking. On the other hand, the same Treaty responded to the new
challenges of the post-Cold War world with tried-and-tested, somewhat
old-fashioned forms of European integration. The most obvious example is how it
presented the monetary union as the completion of the common market, with the
‘Maastricht order’ hailed as the crowning glory of the ‘Rome order’. The EU
sought justification for such a radical change mainly in the past.
In the twenty-five years since its signing, the Maastricht Treaty’s inherent ten-
sion has, slowly but inevitably, fuelled a growing strain between the EU’s
self-image (based on the wildly successful apolitical ‘Rome order’, whose aim was
social and economic convergence between the Member States) and a fundamentally
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different European and international reality, which left scope for greater diversity
within the EU and assigned an increasingly important role to (geo)politics within
and around Europe.
It has become clear in recent years just how stubborn this paradox between
self-image and reality has become in today’s Europe, but also how aptly the same
paradox describes what has often been characterised as ‘European impotence’, from
‘muddling through’ and a belief in convergence on the one hand to the disruptive
events of international politics on the other.
2.5 The Concept of Functionalist Development
The tension between the EU’s self-image and its reality becomes even more evident
when we juxtapose the unforeseen outcomes described above with the ‘traditional
form’ of socio-economic and legal convergence, as described in detail in social
sciences research. Such research is based on a functionalist concept made up of
three closely interwoven, highly principled components: (1) the sui generis
momentum of market integration, (2) spill-overs between sectors, and (3) their
consolidation by supranational institutions.29 These three components are inter-
linked and therefore mutually reinforcing.
It was this functionalist concept that was also used to justify the construction of a
supranational legal order.30 In that sense, it served as a political spur for the transfer
of competences from the Member States to the supranational level.
(1) Market integration
The mechanism of market integration works in the following way. The first phase in
creating and optimising a ‘level playing field’ is negative integration. This is meant
to remove national barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital. For example, import and export duties are prohibited between
Member States, and Member States are not allowed to impose quotas or other
obstacles to free movement. In practice, however, merely removing such barriers is
often not enough. After all, each Member State sets its own requirements and
upholds its own standards for products, services, diplomas and the like. Only when
the Member States agree on the ‘mutual recognition’ of one another’s requirements,
or when the EU introduces its own standards, is there truly a level playing field
within a single European market. Even when standards are harmonised, however,
differences—for example between the general economic or monetary policies of the
Member States—can have an impact on the ability to operate successfully in an
internal market. A recent example of this phased process is the attempt to create a
capital markets union and a banking union in the euro area following the elimi-
nation in the 1980s of restrictions on capital movements, meant to promote a
European capital market.
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(2) Spill-overs between sectors
Spill-overs between sectors happen when market integration in a small number of
economic sectors (such as Coal and Steel or Atomic Energy) induce new integration
processes in adjacent sectors. This process has gained additional momentum
through the internal market. The four freedoms that are the essence of the European
market and stimulate harmonisation processes (see above) also create incentives for
far-reaching spill-overs between sectors. Examples include European integration
processes in the areas of traffic and transport, climate, consumer protection, the fight
against crime and—in association with the free movement of persons—migration
and asylum.
(3) Consolidation by supranational institutions
The third functionalist development is the establishment of supranational institu-
tions as guardians of the order created in the internal market and by spill-overs. In
this phase, harmonisation and spill-overs are consolidated by supranational bodies.
Examples include the High Authority of the ECSC, its successor the European
Commission (EC), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In turn, however, these
supranational institutions serve not only as ‘guardians’ but also as ‘drivers’ of
spill-over processes, thus giving rise to an independent functional development that
often has a basis in the law. This process is visible in the discourse concerning the
approximation of laws in policy domains not directly covered by the Treaties. The
harmonisation process is undertaken at supranational level and takes the form of
what is primarily a technical operation in pursuit of the economic objective of
market integration.
One significant form of consolidation is the legal materialisation of the above:
the confirmation of the functionalist concept in European case-law. Here, it is the
supranational court, the Court of Justice (ECJ), that is the supreme authority in
matters concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and their enforcement. This
judicial practice has gradually developed its own powerful momentum, in tandem
with the momentum of market integration and spill-overs, which are more eco-
nomically driven. The Court has contributed in two decisive ways to this whole.
First of all, it supports an often fragile political will to regulate matters at European
level with the doctrine of supremacy of European law over national law and the
doctrine of direct effect. Second, it is extremely flexible about the nature and scope
of Europe’s legislative powers (thereby facilitating Europeanisation). The supre-
macy of European law over national law, confirmed by the Court in its established
case-law, has bestowed a quasi-constitutional higher rank on the numerous oper-
ational provisions currently set out in the TFEU.31 That has greatly narrowed the
scope for variation in applying EU law and in amending it in the light of experience.
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2.6 Conclusion: Integration Through Variation
and the Politics of Circumstance
The political processes that underpin European integration have not traversed a
straightforward, preordained path; instead, they were forged by the pressure of
circumstance, the result of what Van Middelaar32 calls ‘event-driven politics’—a
form of policymaking that was decisive for European cooperation from the outset.
The functionalist concept sets the tone for the integration process, but the image it
leaves us with is distorted; in the real world of political cooperation, there was much
more variation and flexibility. Functional theories can also be mutually reinforcing,
which is why they remain a dominant force in the process of European integration.
The dominant nature of this image means that the ‘credible reflection’ of real
needs and requirements emphasised at the beginning of this chapter falls short.
There is very little interest in the possibility of flexibility and variation and their
actual implications, leaving them unknown and unloved. It also means that flexi-
bility and variation are only used in emergencies, when all the functionalist routes
have been exhausted. Using them merely as damage limitation mechanisms,
however, is unhelpful in the ongoing ‘politics of circumstance’ so typical of
European cooperation.
The legitimacy of ever-closer integration based on the interplay of the func-
tionalist concept is now under growing pressure in the societies of the EU Member
States. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult to apply the functional
rationale that was transferred wholesale from the ‘Rome order’ to the ‘Maastricht
order’. As the next chapter will reveal, that has implications for the civil and
political embeddedness of the European project and the confidence that citizens and
peoples have in it.
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Since the early years of the common market, the Community legal order has
focused on removing obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital; in other words, on creating a single market.1 Social protection remained
in place in national legislation; harmonisation was sought where politically feasible,
but ‘Europeanisation’ has remained limited in this domain. Free competition was
promoted through a European-level anti-trust policy and by counteracting prefer-
ential treatment by national governments. As a Member State of the European
Union, the Netherlands is part of an internal and external economy of unprece-
dented power, with more than half a billion consumers and a combined Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of 14,714 billion euros (2015), the largest GDP in the
world. Two thirds of the EU’s trade in goods takes place between EU countries,
with a volume of 3070 billion euros (2015). Approximately 72% of Dutch goods
exports (measured in terms of their value) go to EU countries, and more than half of
its imports come from EU countries (2015).2
With the removal of barriers as the starting point, the Netherlands, like its
neighbouring countries, is closely intertwined with its European biotope. Dutch
legislation is embedded in European legislation in almost every area, and in fact it
must be, because differences would be susceptible to exploitation in the single
market. Even technical requirements for appliances must not differ too much from
country to country, as they would otherwise create an obstacle to European trade or
give one or other country an undesirable competitive advantage. Since the reforms
of recent decades, virtually all relevant legislation is the result of joint
decision-making by the European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union, at the initiative of the European Commission. The Member States are
represented in the Council by a minister; decisions are taken by qualified majority,
which means that for a decision to pass, at least 55% of the Member States,
representing at least 65% of the population, must be in favour of it. The weekly
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publication of important new rulings in the Dutch case-law reports Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie (NJ) almost always begins with the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Union, for example on fraud prevention or the abuse of transac-
tions carried out in another Member State.
In a striking contrast to this everyday reality, the people’s trust in politics has
plummeted, causing some—a minority—to argue in favour of leaving the European
Union. It is difficult to fully explain why, in part because public opinion fluctuates,
and preferences remain unclear, but we can certainly identify a number of frictions
associated with changes in the international context and the way in which the
European Union is socially embedded. That is what this chapter addresses.
3.2 The Western Context of ‘Embedded Liberalism’
The international context in which European integration has advanced in recent
decades differs considerably from the decades of recovery in which it began
immediately after the Second World War. In those initial stages of European
integration, there was a broad consensus among the main political movements that
the social dimension should be an integral part of the European market economy.
This ambition was no illusion, as it turned out. The more international coordination
(e.g. in the Bretton Woods Institutions) and European integration took shape in the
post-War period, the clearer it became that economic integration need not obstruct
the growth of national welfare states.
Gradually, a system developed internationally that the American political sci-
entist John Ruggie described in 1982 as ‘embedded liberalism’. The promotion of
free trade and multilateral coordination was ‘embedded’ in a large measure of
autonomy for the participating states. Within their own borders, they were free to
create a welfare state as they saw fit and shape the social policy most appropriate to
it, in line with the views of their national, domestic democracy. Regarding the first
decades of the post-war West, we can describe this system as ‘Keynes at home,
Smith abroad’: welfare state within one’s own borders, free trade outside. Western
Europe explored and developed this system extensively within the institutional
frameworks of European integration. In this model of embedded liberalism, the
philosophy of ordoliberalism (as developed by the Freiburg School, initially in the
1950s) was influential on certain critical points.3
Ordoliberalism maintains that the market should operate with as few restrictions
as possible within statutory frameworks that are enforced by independent institu-
tions. The core principles of those frameworks are the protection of property rights,
free and fair competition, and monetary prudence. Social policy is essential as a
complementary and corrective measure, with due respect for the principle of sub-
sidiarity. In Europe, this means that social policy is largely a national affair. The
free movement of workers within Europe is facilitated by arrangements indicating
which state is responsible for social security.
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There are sound reasons for the importance that Ordoliberalism attaches to
subsidiarity. It is preferable for different institutional models of socioeconomic
organisation to co-exist within the space created by framework agreements; not
only is it then possible to accommodate regional circumstances, but it also reveals
which models set a ‘good example’, which the other members can then follow.
Reinforcing the weakest links in this way benefits the entire community or union.
The influence of Ordoliberalism is still visible today in Article 3 of the TEU, which
describes the EU as a ‘social market economy’.
3.3 Social Protection Gives Way to Market Liberalisation
As the decades wore on, the social dimension of European integration, despite
frequent references to it in EU documents (for example in the preambles to the
Treaties), remained a national affair and the responsibility of the Member States. At
the same time, the market became increasingly integrated. From the 1980s onwards,
this led to a trend that cast the European Community, and later the EU, into the role
of European guardian of market liberalisation. Viewed from the perspective of the
Member States, then, the institutions of European integration increasingly emerged
as yet another external force favouring the reform or retrenchment of their welfare
states. In brief, this also meant that the ‘Keynes at home’ element of the system that
had prevailed in the initial decades of European integration was slowly undermined,
with the EU’s institutions regularly featuring as one of the driving forces behind
this development.
European responsibility for social cohesion and for assuaging socioeconomic
demands was thus relegated to the background. The image of European integration
as a mere project of market integration, and the EU as the ‘liberalisation engine’
driving it forward, became much more powerful and realistic. That image has only
gained force since the financial and economic crisis, in part because the crisis put
the ‘promise of convergence’—which was meant to replace the promises of the
national welfare state to some extent—under so much pressure that suspicions of
misrepresentation were roused.
The European promise of convergence embraced the notion that deeper eco-
nomic integration would shrink differences between the Member States, while care
would be taken within the national welfare states to distribute the benefits of
economic cooperation fairly. In the first decades of the integration process, this
promise yielded genuine benefits, in the form of unprecedented stability and eco-
nomic prosperity. Indeed, the European model acted in many respects as a ‘con-
vergence engine’ during that period: the poorer, less-developed Member States
were pulled along by the economic growth of the richer Member States, resulting in
prosperity growth in all Member States and making the aim of progressive social
cohesion, both within and between Member States, appear feasible in this manner.
That period has come and gone, however.
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The emphasis shifted between 1986 and 1993. The completion of the common
market was given greater priority at that time, for example by privatising public
utilities. The climax of this trend was the heated, protracted European debate on the
Services Directive at the start of the twenty-first century. Europe shifted emphasis in
many respects; it was less interested in harmonising legislation and more interested
in abolishing it, in the expectation that free competition would undoubtedly produce
the best possible results. This is precisely why the EU has not produced restrictive
legislation but has instead weakened a number of protective rules and structures
(such as those protecting companies providing services of general economic
interest, in disregard of Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union4). ‘Free movement’ has become the main touchstone of the
institutions of European integration. In many decisive moments, the EU in fact
seemed to be focused on the liberalisation of the international market.
Customs tariffs, and later customs and border checks on persons, have been
abolished at the internal borders, with some exceptions in the latter case. External
trade relations are also necessarily a Community matter. However, there are many
cases where it is precisely the desire to prioritise market forces that has led to
detailed new rules and oversight procedures. After all, market imperfections can
originate anywhere. All the Member States have established market authorities,
often giving them far-reaching powers of investigation and sanctioning. There are
thus two faces to liberalisation.
Convergence between Member States is waning in the EU and the euro area of
the twenty-first century,5 whereas social inequality appears to be increasing. Large
numbers of Europeans see this as the ‘downside’ of the policy as actually imple-
mented, undermining confidence in European integration. The tensions induced by
the threat of terrorism, the persistent problems with the banks in the wake of the
financial and economic crisis, and the inability to collectively manage the arrival of
larger numbers of asylum seekers are, for many, proof that the EU is incapable of
taking effective action. Moreover, large numbers of Europeans no longer feel that
they are in control of their own lives—a feeling that they did appear to have in the
era of embedded liberalism.
3.4 Globalisation and the Problem of Alienation
The imbalance between economic growth and social protection is contributing to
the crisis of confidence. The malfunctioning of the ‘convergence engine’ and the
laborious efforts required to combat the financial crises have undermined the
credibility of the euro area and the EU. The response to the crisis, the bank bailouts
and nationalisations, confirms that the financial sector behaved irresponsibly and
has aggravated people’s sense of vulnerability.
For large groups of Europeans, then, ‘euro’ and ‘EU’ have become synonymous
with austerity, the decline of the welfare state, and more uncertainty about the
future. Market integration and the removal of economic barriers have a growing
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negative association with globalisation.6 One typical example is the polarised
debate about the trade agreements with Canada and the United States, CETA and
TTIP, the latter having now proved unfeasible.
In addition, terrorist violence and foreign political crises, such as the tense
relationship with Russia, the war in Syria and the related destabilisation of the
region, raise doubts about peace and security. The EU’s inability to formulate a
collective response to these issues is, for many, proof that it is failing—even if the
same facts also furnish arguments in favour of strengthening it.
The loss of confidence has consequences. Support for European integration goes
hand in hand with a willingness to show solidarity at European level. The responses
to the major crises that the EU has faced in recent years show, however, that mutual
solidarity has waned considerably. On top of the financial and economic crisis, the
climate crisis and the migration crisis, there is now also a European solidarity crisis,
and this latest crisis has furthermore arisen in a context in which problems of
legitimacy and ‘democratic alienation’ are setting the tone.7 Even though the out-
come of the Brexit referendum was partly because Britain’s feelings of remoteness
from the ‘Continent’ had never been overcome and because the electorate was
misled about the consequences, it seemed indicative of a more widely felt, and
growing, sentiment. As the negative impact of Brexit became clearer in the UK,
support for the EU began to grow again on the Continent.8
3.5 Solidarity and ‘Demoicracy’
The international context has continued to change in recent years: after the UK’s
decision to trigger the exit process under Article 50 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU), a political tidal wave in the United States threw the European Union
back on its own resources to a greater extent, with the expectation that France and
Germany together would bring new élan to the integration process. In this new
context, there is, seemingly, a tendency to make greater allowance for real
socio-economic, socio-cultural and administrative differences between Member
States and for the need for a familiar and protective national context.
This points to more varied cooperation within the EU. More specifically, this
would mean that the EU would no longer do everything with all its Member States
in the same way (see the paper by the European Political Strategy Centre of
September 2017, Two Visions, One Direction. Plans for the Future of Europe).9
Such an approach would also allow Member States to maintain or regain more
policy autonomy, and give them more clear-cut choices as to whether they should
join in efforts to deepen their cooperation.
The big question, however, is what this will mean for EU solidarity. More varied
cooperation would probably put that solidarity to the test even more than is pre-
sently the case. After all, will it not become more difficult to find common ground if
the notion of communality were to be further abandoned as a guiding principle?
Some argue that a ‘European polyphony’ could actually work in favour of
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integration. The idea is that polyphony promotes harmony because it leaves
somewhat more room for diversity.10
Such notions of polyphony are also compatible with calls to cease regarding the
European ‘demoicracy’ (a democratic system encompassing various demoi, i.e.
peoples) as incomplete or as a ‘half-way house’ (something that an overarching
demos at European level would transcend), but instead accept it as established
practice or even as a guiding principle.11,12 This would entail seeking grounds for
European legitimacy in the diversity that is, rather than in a unity that has yet to be.
Difference comes first in this approach, not as an end in itself but as a feature of
European reality. It may refer to a difference in social and cultural-historical cir-
cumstances and backgrounds, a difference in the public sphere and the media
landscape, a difference in the problems that arise, but also to a difference in the way
groups of citizens are affected by such matters, both favourably and unfavourably.
In this way, diversity becomes a guiding principle in the fulfilment of public tasks,
rather than an obstacle to be overcome.
A demoicracy should address those issues that affect not only Member States but
also Europeans in differing formations; in a certain sense, the demoicracy that is the
EU already does this. This reality, which is trans-European in nature, gives rise to
the need for European public tasks. The plural of demos, demoi, therefore refers not
so much to the co-existence of Member States’ electorates as to the cross-border
issues affecting citizens in differing Member States. Such cross-border issues are at
the root of the public tasks that Europe must take up, as are global risks, which are
equally cross-border in nature and concern such matters as financial stability,
security and mobility. One of defining traits of such issues is that they can both
unite and divide Europe.13
The diversity and variability of these issues imply that variation (both in the form
that cooperation takes and in differences in each policy domain) can be regarded as
a permanent feature rather than as a temporary gateway to closer cooperation or
integration. What remains decisive is to show mutual solidarity, even—and perhaps
even more so—when undertaking more varied methods of cooperation. The
question is which notions of cooperation, integration and solidarity would apply in
scenarios that allow for more variation. Whatever the answer to this question may
be, it is clear that this is primarily what Habermas14 refers to as a political form of
solidarity. This ‘political solidarity’ distinguishes itself from other forms—such as
moral (obligatory) and legal (enforceable) solidarity—through the ‘joint involve-
ment in a network of social relations’, a situation that can perhaps best be described
as a form of institutionalised solidarity.
That involvement fosters greater confidence that the other members of the net-
work will continue to respect the principle of reciprocity in the future. Such
‘benefits’ of joint, institutionally embedded involvement are crucial to its survival.
Political cooperative relationships operate in a context that must be actively
reproduced, over and over again, if they are to endure. In other words, to be
sustainable, political solidarity must help preserve the precarious social alliance that
supports joint involvement. This implies that political solidarity can only be sus-
tained if it is rooted in a subtle feeling for relationships and mutual dependencies.15
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Throughout the history of European integration, political solidarity came about
because political parties broadly supported the principles that (1) people are bound
together by mutual dependencies, (2) social cohesion is the aim of European
cooperation, and (3) the state is there to offer protection to individuals (and not the
other way around)16. Christian democrats, social democrats and social liberals were
united in the conviction that market integration and multilateral coordination of
trade, financial, economic and monetary policy should go hand in hand with
maintaining social cohesion at national and regional level. This conviction dovetails
with the concept of the ‘social market economy’ discussed above.
In parallel with the ‘social embeddedness’ of post-war multilateralism in the
construction of national welfare states, however (see Sects. 3.1 and 3.2), this same
multilateralism was also ‘embedded’ in the construction of an international and
European legal order. European integration was a constantly evolving part of this
post-war multilateralism and its ‘double embeddedness’ (in national welfare states
and in a special type of international legal order).
3.6 Conclusion: Social Embeddedness Under Pressure
The European social market economy developed in a context in which an inter-
national and European legal order was being constructed, based on human rights,
including fundamental social and economic rights; it was ‘embedded’ from the
outset in the construction of that legal order. This second ‘embedding’ took its cue
from the ‘Four Freedoms’ presented by President Roosevelt in 1941 (freedom of
speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear). Among
other things, these ideas offered firm foundations for creating the Council of Europe
and the European Communities and a basis for establishing structures that would
protect fundamental rights in the Member States of these European organisations.
Social and economic rights were also included, as they are in some national con-
stitutions, and were reinforced by the protective structures of fundamental rights.
It should be noted that, in the early years, the safeguarding of human rights was
the task of the Council of Europe alone. Since then, this task has been defined in
greater detail in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) and in the intensive scrutiny of the European Court of Human
Rights; it was also gradually taken up by the European Communities and later by the
EU with the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Besides the tensions that have now arisen within this ‘second embedding’ of
European integration in human rights (for example concerning the refugee issue),
the ‘social embeddedness’ of market integration has also been under pressure for
some time. In the 1990s, the ‘Washington Consensus’ (the name given to the IMF’s
neoliberal economic reform programmes) became increasingly popular within the
EU, and in particular within the emu. It manifested itself in the European Treaties,
in the governance of the EMU, and in a selective and market-driven penchant for
negative integration (by removing barriers to trade and privatisation). Article 36 of
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the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ‘recognises and respects
access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and
practices…in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union’.
Nevertheless, in the policies as actually implemented, market forces often out-
weighed social cohesion.
In this context, the dividing line between public and private interests grew fainter
within the EU itself, for example, and issues such as the level of social protection or
the ‘social dimension’ of European integration faded increasingly from view.17 The
pursuit of peace, security and social and economic stability was superseded by a
narrow focus on market forces and globalisation. For a growing number of
Europeans, then, European integration became a risk rather than a source of
protection.
This development is now putting political solidarity in the EU under severe
pressure. In the euro area, for example, it is now doubtful whether political soli-
darity can be attained at all, for instance between northern and southern countries.18
It is an observation that raises important questions about the state of European
integration. Integration and disintegration sometimes go hand in hand. Both are
typical of the integration process. The crucial question, however, is to what extent
they fall under the heading of common purpose and joint protection of shared
public tasks. Where do the fracture lines appear? To answer these questions, we will
outline an analysis framework for describing and explaining these developments in
the following chapter. We do so based on the premise that harmonisation and
growing uniformity do not exclude variation. This framework will be applied in
Appendix 1 to analyse some of the EU’s most urgent issues.
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to prohibitions, i.e. ‘negative’ integration, meaning that barriers to the internal
market must be removed, or it can issue European standards or jointly for-
mulated principles. The latter, known as ‘positive’ integration, is achieved by
means of European laws. The provisions banning discrimination on the grounds
of nationality and thus protectionism or barriers to intra-Community trade
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Chapter 4
Beyond the Institutional Form:
Motivations for Collective Action
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter described how globalisation, the erosion of embedded liber-
alism and social protection, and pressure on mutual solidarity between Member
States have led to growing frictions in the European Union. These frictions have
usually had a combination of causes: external events, internal choices, or the
unforeseen consequences of compromises that turned out better for one country or
one segment of the population than for another.
While such frictions have become almost a fixed pattern, they have undermined
Europeans’ support for the project of integration in its current form. For a more
complete picture of the sources of these frictions and how they affect European
integration, this chapter surveys the various different motivations for cooperation
and the variety of institutional forms within the EU. The factors that cause the
frictions are multifaceted and ambivalent, after all. To understand the differing and
sometimes opposing trends, this chapter examines what goes on behind the insti-
tutional forms of European integration. Anyone who looks beyond these forms will
discover that motivations for collective action play a crucial role. Examining them
will give us a better understanding of what is happening in the EU today and the
sources of its current problems. In this chapter, we visualise this approach in the
form of a matrix that, besides the dimension of the institutional order, also considers
what lies behind it: the dimension of collective action and the motivations for such
action. Our visualisation is not meant to offer explanations or solutions. It should be
regarded as a tool that acknowledges the underlying motivations of Member States
when charting the possibilities and impossibilities of public tasks. Our approach
also allows for a more precise assessment of where changes in European integration
might be appropriate, where scope for further variation exists, and how it should be
effectuated.
The appendix includes an exposition showing how the matrix presented in this
chapter can be applied ‘dynamically’. It places several urgent European issues, such
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as the free movement of services, the resettlement of asylum seekers and European
border surveillance, within the matrix, using concrete examples of policy instru-
ments to identify the push-pull forces at work. For example, it examines the
content-based positions of these issues in the European field of influence by
emphasising the ‘why’ behind them and by relating them to obstacles to and
opportunities for other institutional approaches. This will help us to better under-
stand the current discussions on the EU and to explore, more consciously and
proactively, other approaches to cooperation.
4.2 Introduction to the Matrix: Two Axes
We often have high expectations of the EU. For example, we expect it to protect the
Community against external threats, protect individuals against the negative aspects
of globalisation, and take action in response to migration and climate issues.
Our projection of what the EU should or can do assumes that it can deliver
public goods that the Member States are unable to produce on their own, for
example a stable and fair socio-economic order, a sustainable living environment,
or international security and freedom. It is not necessarily a given that the EU
should take over its Member States’ tasks, however. The point is to produce the
desired public goods reliably, not to confirm European institutional structures.
However, producing those goods often requires a level of organisation and team-
work beyond that of intergovernmental cooperation. This means that the EU’s
institutional structures should be derived from European public tasks (linked to
desired public goods), and not the other way around.
Despite this, we often see the institutional order at the heart of European policy.
Policy discussions focus on the form of cooperation—which Member States are
participating and which are not and what is the corresponding transfer of compe-
tences? The European public tasks that are to be fulfilled—i.e. the content—are thus
relegated to the background. It is only when the process of European integration
shifts focus from form to content, in other words from institutional order to
European public tasks, that the ‘why’ of collective action becomes apparent. That
then provides the basis for considering which institutional forms are or are not
possible.
This book uses the matrix below to illustrate the possibilities and impossibilities
of a number of European public tasks. The purpose of the matrix is to cross the
possible institutional order within European cooperation (horizontal axis) with the
motivations for collective action (vertical axis) and to investigate how they relate in
the production of public goods. We begin by providing theoretical underpinnings
for the concept of European integration as a collective action. The following
paragraphs explain the axes and cells in greater detail.
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4.3 European Integration as a Collective Action
According to Olson (1965),1 the more members there are in a group, the less likely
that they will be able to spontaneously advance their common interests through
collective action. This is true even where the group is unanimous about the public
good and the method to be used to produce it. In the world of European integration,
this conclusion—that spontaneous collective action is virtually impossible—implies
the following.
As the number of Member States increases, it becomes less and less likely that
individual Member States will be prepared to help achieve the EU’s official,
established goals. In other words, Member States will aid in achieving those goals
only if the EU offers them enough selective incentives. Specifically, this means that
European integration must hold out the prospect of penalties and rewards to each
Member State from which non-members can be excluded.
One important qualification here, however, is that an organisation—like any
other form of collective behaviour—can also achieve official goals without any of
its members aiming to achieve those goals through its actions. The same can be said
of the EU. It is quite conceivable (and there is empirical evidence in specific cases)
that the EU can attain the official goals of European integration without its Member
States themselves pursuing such goals. For example, the history of European
integration offers us frequent examples of Member States that, despite unequivo-
cally putting their national economic interests first, promoted prosperity by opening
up their national economies to one another and accepting supranational enforce-
ment of such reciprocity. Individual considerations and official organisational goals
are not, by definition, at odds with one another.
Since the 1990s, a distinction has been made in the literature on collective action
between the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequences’ in inter-
preting individual modes of action.2 In this book, an actor or group of actors—here,
EU Member States—that adhere to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ will take decisions
that follow rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour. In such behaviour, nor-
mative considerations outweigh cost-benefit considerations.
Institutions that refer to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ add an ethical or moral
dimension to their practices and the expectations that they raise. In the reality of the
EU, they see an idealistic level of solidarity as the desired mode of action for
fulfilling European public tasks. But this mode of action has its downside as well.
When put forward as a decisive argument for cooperation, the ‘logic of appropri-
ateness’ has certain moral and ethical overtones that risk its being perceived, at
some stage and within a certain institutional order, as a straitjacket without adequate
democratic underpinnings.
The alternative is ‘the logic of consequences’, i.e. cost-benefit analyses based on
individual self-interest or the collective interest. When this highly rationalistic mode
of action prevails, the institutional order that emerges is regarded as an aggregate of
individual interests achieved through processes of negotiation and coalition
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formation—and not much more than that. Cooperation is based on rules governing
these processes, rather than on norms and values.
The two ‘logics’ need not be mutually exclusive. They can be regarded as the
extremes on a continuum of modes of action. This continuum runs from a
laser-sharp focus on national interest or autonomy at one end to idealistic interstate
solidarity at the other, with hybrid forms such as ‘situational or ad hoc solidarity’ in
the form of ‘reciprocity’ in between. The two logics can also reappear in very
different types of agreement, ranging from mandatory rules to calls for more soli-
darity, which together create a framework of checks and balances for cooperation
(see for example the work of Ostrom3 and the WRR report Publieke zaken in de
marktsamenleving4). Issues of European integration, which are by definition
complex and multi-faceted, require the Member States to constantly consider this
entire spectrum of options, although it is scarcely visible as such, if at all. Its
breadth and significance almost always fades from view when officials attempt to
explain the course of events and the decisions taken. That is often counterpro-
ductive, because it narrows the debate on European integration to one of ‘more or
less Europe’, rather than focusing on the question of ‘why?’ and ‘what kind of
Europe do we want to live in?’ It also obscures our view of the public tasks that
are ultimately at stake (see the first section of this chapter). The problems that this
creates have become more and more obvious in recent years.
The creation of the European Communities, and subsequently of the EU, was
based on the understanding that vital public tasks can be better, or in fact only,
fulfilled by a permanent alliance that has its own political legitimacy. Although the
supranational nature of European legislation, governance and court rulings was
accepted in the 1950s and 1960s, direct political legitimacy took longer to achieve.
Important steps have been taken towards democratisation: a European Parliament
whose members are elected directly by the people was founded in 1979; European
citizenship was established in 1993; and the European Parliament was given almost
full co-legislative competences in 2009. Nevertheless, the results of various refer-
endums—most recently on the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in the
Netherlands and on Brexit in the UK—show that alienation and centrifugal forces
are impairing the European project more than ever before.
This experience is yet another reason why the EU should avoid once more
embarking on an institutional reconstruction, as it did when it founded the European
Convention that produced the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Nor is institutional destruction recommended; the United Kingdom is already
experiencing major difficulties as it cancels its membership of the EU. Far too little
thought has so far been given to the possibility that the dissonance between the EU
and its citizens is caused precisely by its failure to fulfil its public tasks. After all,
when citizens feel abandoned, the authorities with which they are least familiar—in
this case, those of the European Union—are the first to bear the brunt of their
mistrust and rejection.5
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4.4 Motivations for European Collective Action
It is important to acknowledge how diverse the expectations, interests and prefer-
ences involved in European integration are. After all, the motivation, public interest
or normative framework that colours how Europeans view integration determines
which policies will and will not have their support.
The motivations for European collective action differentiated in this book form
a type of continuum. In the matrix below (Fig. 4.1), they are shown on the vertical
axis.
(1) National autonomy: Self-governance is critical.
Motivation: Cooperate with other countries only when unavoidable.
In this approach, the aim is to be as independent as possible from other states or
other actors, and to retain as much power as possible to make one’s own laws and
rules. A state that takes this approach to European cooperation does not, in prin-
ciple, think cooperation offers enough advantages to relinquish some of its power of
self-governance. It will therefore minimise European cooperation and only coop-
erate if there is no other option. It is difficult to reconcile this approach with
structural cooperation, interstate solidarity and supranational institutions.
Fig. 4.1 Introduction to the matrix
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Example: Agreements on cross-border issues, such as inland shipping on rivers that
transcend national borders.
(2) Calculation based on national interest: Recognising that cooperation can
be advantageous.
Motivation: The advantage is immediately evident.
In this approach, European cooperation is accepted if it is advantageous to the
individual state. That means that the state has estimated or agreed in advance what
cooperation will yield. The advantage may be short-term or long-term in nature, but
the state is more likely to go after short-term goals and associated advantages, as
they are generally more predictable. The behaviour of the cooperating partners must
also be stable. Predictability and quantifiability are crucial in this form of cooper-
ation, but solidarity is not required.
Example: Pooling of defence equipment.
(3) Reciprocity: One good turn deserves another, playing by the rules to create
a level playing field.
Motivation: Surrender policy autonomy in favour of market access and expected
convergence.
In this approach, states decide to cooperate in Europe based on the notion of
reciprocity. They are prepared to delegate their autonomy in a policy domain to
supranational institutions because it will ultimately benefit them to do so. This
means that certain ‘losses’ (material or in terms of autonomy) are accepted in the
expectation that they will be compensated in the long term. In anticipation of this
positive result, they invest in long-term cooperation. Sahlin (1972)6 refers to this
form of reciprocity as ‘balanced’ or ‘symmetrical’ reciprocity. It requires all the
participating partners to comply with the rules as they have been agreed.
Compliance and enforcement are crucial and are (in part) entrusted to supranational
institutions, to avoid ‘free riding’ problems. After all, collective standards lose
credibility as soon as certain participants cease complying with the agreements.
Situations are conceivable in which a certain degree of solidarity is required to
correct distortions in reciprocity.
Example: Opening the market to goods and services from other Member States and
mutual recognition.
(4) Calculation based on European interest: Absorbing possible individual
losses for the good of the greater whole.
Motivation: The collective advantage is immediately evident.
In this approach, European cooperation is taken a step further on the assumption
that it is advantageous to all the partners as a group. The expectation is that the
collective benefits of cooperation will ultimately accrue to the individual states as
well, even though it may be detrimental to national interests in the short term.
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Example: The European Commission negotiates in the WTO on behalf of its
Member States. A single, strong economic bloc is better than several small
European states on the world stage. Another example is the asylum quota proposed
by the European Commission in response to the refugee crisis.
(5) Solidarity: Interstate solidarity as a principle. Making sacrifices for a
higher purpose.
Motivation: Idealistic solidarity and values.
In this approach, the larger whole serves a higher purpose than merely meeting
national or material goals. Individual losses are accepted, and the losses of one or
more partners are also borne by the others. The transfer of autonomy is inherent and
may be necessary to enforce idealistic solidarity. The general, overarching aim is to
maintain cooperation in anticipation of the tangible and intangible benefits that it
will bring, including peace, human rights and social cohesion.
Example: Structural and cohesion funds to reduce disparities in prosperity between
Member States and regions.
4.5 Institutional Order
Multiple institutional orders co-exist in the process of European integration. We go
through them in this section to clarify our matrix. It is important to note that these
are institutional forms whose basis lies in the decision-making method and the
participating Member States. In other words, a categorisation of institutional orders
offers a simplified version of reality. It serves to illustrate existing tensions con-
cerning European public tasks and to show that such simplification does not lead to
solutions. We have omitted various types of legislation (regulations and directives)
as parameters from the categorisation.
This approach makes it clear that other issues play a role in the background, for
example different (interpretations of) motivations for collective action, but also that
variations are possible which are not immediately obvious. In the matrix above
(Fig. 4.1), the various institutional orders can be found on the horizontal axis. We
begin our description of this axis with the two idealised extremes on the left and
right. We then look at the intermediate forms.
The two extremes:
(1) Intergovernmental: Agreements are reached by consensus or unanimity.
In this framework, agreements are made between governments to advance coop-
eration on a particular issue. There is no interference from institutions to which the
cooperating states are subordinate; competences are not transferred and are retained
at the national level at all times. Decisions can thus only be taken after full
agreement has been reached, and they require the consent of all participating
4.4 Motivations for European Collective Action 47
countries. States therefore have a right of veto on each issue, guaranteeing their
full policy autonomy.
Example: Past cooperation within the EU’s second and third pillars (and prior to
that, within the framework of TREVI)
(2) Supranational: Only supra-state agreements and supra-state enforcement.
This institutional form involves the complete transfer of national policy autonomy
to the supranational institutions of the European Union. In a hypothetical variant
where this framework would apply to all policy domains, there would be a feder-
ation into which the Member States, as federal states, have been absorbed.
Enforcement, initiation, democratic legitimacy and oversight of European policy
implementation would be entrusted to supranational institutions, regulatory bodies
and a supra-state parliament. Variations whereby Member States would or would
not participate are not possible in this form of cooperation.
Example: The competences of the Commission in certain matters, such as com-
petition policy or international trade, and the ECB come closest to this institutional
framework
The intermediate forms:
(3) Community: Member States play a greater role in concluding supra-state
agreements.
All EU Member States participate.
The cooperation established within the Community framework applies equally to
all participating Member States and is based on (1) supranational institutions as
initiators and guardians of the Treaty order, (2) qualified majority voting in the
Council as the representation of the Member States and (3) co-decision-making by
the European Parliament. As such, it is the same as the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure. Community cooperation differs from the supranational institutional
framework in that it is possible for Member States to form blocking minorities, for
example in the Council. It differs from the flexible arrangements (described below)
in that all EU Member States participate in the Community. Variations whereby
Member States do or do not participate are impossible in this form of cooperation.
Example: Internal market
(4) Flexible: Differentiated arrangements based on participating Member
States and decision-making.
The flexible institutional framework allows states to decide, by policy domain,
whether or not they wish to participate. Decision-making can take place both
through intergovernmental arrangements and under the ordinary legislative proce-
dure. This framework accommodates differentiated cooperation, such as opt-outs in
certain areas, differing degrees or speeds of integration (variable-geometry and
multi-speed Europe), lead group or sub-group formation, or closer cooperation.
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Example: Common European Asylum System (CEAS)
(5) Hybrid form: Encompasses all of the foregoing institutional elements.
The institutional framework described here as a ‘hybrid form’ has intergovern-
mental, supranational and Community elements, and is also flexible, with opt-outs
permitted in certain areas. This institutional framework comes closest to the
description of the current EU as a whole.
4.6 Conclusion: Community Cooperation and Its
Limitations
The institutional order that has traditionally been appropriate for European inte-
gration differs from other forms of international cooperation. This difference is
particularly noticeable in how the EU institutions cooperate with one another in the
ordinary legislative procedure (the European Commission, the European Parliament
and the Council). Adhering to the Community method of cooperation reinforces a
tendency to seek solutions through deeper integration and uniformity, by having all
Member States participate. It is a tried-and-tested formula in the history of
European integration. Based on this ‘policy rationality’, motivations for collective
action are then identified, often by appealing to an overarching European interest
and interstate solidarity (see the vertical axis).
There is growing public and political resistance to closer European integration
based on this policy rationality. Increasingly, political circles at national level
advocate moving away from the EU (seeking solutions in the institutional orders
located more to the left on the horizontal axis of the matrix). These new arguments
correspond with a shift in the motivations for collective action towards more
national autonomy, evident in the politics of almost all Member States (see the
vertical axis).
Applying the matrix to the current reality reveals a critical fault line in European
integration. If we take Community cooperation and the associated policy rationality
as our basis, then we soon arrive at the following motivations for collective action:
‘calculation based on European interest’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘reciprocity’. These
motivations are often based in part on ‘the logic of appropriateness’ and correspond
with the Community and supranational institutional orders, or possibly a hybrid
form. In Fig. 4.2, the blue arrows pointing to the bottom right-hand side of the
matrix visualise the trend induced by Community cooperation and the associated
policy rationality.
The phenomenon of ‘democratic alienation’ in response to European integration
is the opposite of this, in a certain sense (see Chap. 3). It manifests itself as a desire
for maximum autonomy on the part of the national state. The Brexit campaign’s
‘take back control’ slogan was a poignant example. ‘Calculation based on national
interests’ can also serve as a motivation for collective action when political
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legitimacy is perceived to be lacking because it involves cooperation solely in the
pursuit of individual short-term interests, something that is usually easier to justify
in the domestic politics of the Member States. These two motivations are based on
the ‘logic of consequences’. They can usually only be advanced through an insti-
tutional order that takes the form of intergovernmental or flexible cooperation with
a number of like-minded Member States. In Fig. 4.2, the red arrows pointing to the
upper left-hand side of the matrix visualise the trend towards greater autonomy.
The original concept behind the European Communities involved the pursuit of
free competition and a level playing field in a European single market. This
European legal order would make it possible to remove obstacles to the common
market without completely dismantling social protection in national legislation
associated with the movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Social pro-
tection would also be guaranteed by harmonisation. Within this legal order as
established by the Treaty of Rome, the notion of reciprocity (and hence the
expectation of convergence), combined with Community cooperation, guided the
evolution of European cooperation. See Fig. 4.3 for the visualisation.
The transition to the Maastricht order in 1993 cast European integration into the
shape of the European Union. In the EU, the main institutional order increasingly
evolved into a hybrid form that now includes supranational, Community, inter-
governmental, but also flexible elements. The overall approach of reciprocity
Fig. 4.2 Matrix of opposing trends
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remained unchanged, however, and is still at the heart of Europe’s self-image and
how it handles policy measures.
Figure 4.4 shows that, in its present form, the EU is positioned precisely in the
middle of the diverging trends described above. The opposing forces are at their
strongest there, largely because EU Member States have a range of different
motivations for collective action, often due to differences in how they prioritise
public interests. Oftentimes, the motivations are neither recognised nor acknowl-
edged, however. Instead, they are forced into the straitjacket of mutual recognition
(in the expectation that this will encourage ever greater harmonisation and con-
vergence) and ‘playing by the rules’. All the while, the EU’s institutions remain
focused on Community cooperation with all the Member States. The frustrating
inertia to which this leads may, in the long run, be detrimental to EU unity, as
Brexit has recently demonstrated (Fig. 4.5).7
There are alternatives, however, that become possible by consciously allowing
for more variation.
The matrix introduced in this chapter explains (1) the motivations for collective
action and (2) the existing forms of institutional organisation within the process of
European integration, and shows how the two relate. As we cautioned, this is a
simplified version of reality. Significantly, what the matrix does not show is that
even if different Member States choose the same motivation for collective action,
they may have based that choice on completely different interpretations of the
Fig. 4.3 Matrix showing the position of the European Communities
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Fig. 4.4 Matrix showing the position of the European Union
Fig. 4.5 Matrix of fault lines
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situation in question. This is particularly important with regard to motivations
suggesting a constructive attitude towards European solutions. For example, two
Member States that have the same motivation may be pursuing two different public
interests or have different priorities within those interests.
In such a case, even when Member States share the same motivation for col-
lective action, it may be impossible to arrive at a constructive European policy
because the underlying interpretations differ too much. If we include such differ-
ences in interpretation in our analysis, then we get the following new option on the
vertical axis of the matrix: Member States have the same motivation, but based on
different interpretations of the situation. This is the third possibility alongside the
more obvious ones in the matrix, namely ‘Member States have the same motivation
for collective action (and therefore interpret the situation in the same way)’ and
‘Member States have different motivations’.
When the motivations for collective action differ, scope for cooperation can be
created by allowing variation in membership and/or the decision-making procedure.
This is already apparent in the various ‘flexible’ and ‘hybrid’ institutional orders on
the horizontal axis of the matrix and fits in with its set-up (which is based on
membership and decision-making procedures as defined for the various institutional
orders). However, variation in membership and/or decision-making is not enough in
the third option, in which the motivation is the same but the underlying interpre-
tations (which Member States use to defend their chosen motivation) differ. In that
case, variation must be sought along a third dimension, in addition to membership
and decision-making, namely the content of the relevant policy. One way to do this
is to work with minimum standards and allow variation beyond that minimum
(instead of seeking harmonisation). Even in the current quest for methods to
strengthen the euro area and emu, variation in policy content offers scope for
arriving at innovative solutions within the existing Treaty frameworks. The
appendix provides a number of examples illustrating the above.
The EU’s current problems thus demand that we not only break away from the
notion of reciprocity and Community cooperation, but also that we examine the
option of ‘flexible’ arrangements more closely by exploring the possibility of
variation in policy content. The following chapter will reveal that ‘policy variation’
has existed since the founding of the European Communities, but has not always
been recognised as such. We see this at the very heart of the Union, the internal
market. There are no opt-outs there, no lead groups being formed, but rather—
thanks in part to national discretion in policymaking—a continuous balancing of
European public interests, for example between the four freedoms and other fun-
damental values arising from the embeddedness of European integration in social
and human rights. The following chapter explores the theme of variation in more
detail and analyses what forms of diversity in cooperation already exist in Europe. It
examines existing variation practices in the internal market from a legal perspective,
in particular with regard to the political legitimacy of variation in policy content and
its significance for the four freedoms.
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2. March and Olsen (1995).
3. Ostrom (2009, 2010).
4. WRR (2012).
5. In three areas crucial to European societies, integration stalled halfway and came
to a juddering halt. The introduction of the euro led to deeper economic and
political entanglement than the institutional structure of the time could bear.
Complementary to the free movement of persons was a Common European
Asylum System, the details of which were put into place procedurally between
1999 and 2013, but which lacked genuine cohesion: the Reception Conditions
Directive allowed for extreme differences in national policies and a common
refugee return policy was never agreed. The Common Foreign and Security
Policy was established in 1993 but has never got off the ground. As a result,
following earlier disagreements about the wars in former Yugoslavia and the
Iraq War, the European Union has been unable to play an effective role either in
the civil war in Syria or in the Ukrainian crisis.
6. Sahlins (1972).
7. In March 2017, during a discussion with Emmanuel Macron and Sigmar
Gabriel, Habermas described this state of affairs as ‘a furious standstill’ (see:
https://www.blaetter.de/archiv/jahrgaenge/2017/april/europa-neu-denken).
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Chapter 5
Variation and the Internal Market
5.1 Introduction
The internal market, which encompasses the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital, is at the heart of European cooperation. The Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits Member States, and in some
cases private organisations, from introducing measures that impede free movement.
In addition, there are provisions in the Treaty that prohibit companies from
obstructing competition in the internal market. Legislation, including directives and
regulations, completes its legal architecture1 and is meant to eliminate differences
between national rules that might disrupt the internal market process and to set
common standards for the 28 Member States.
Ever since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU has had a ‘social market
economy’ as its aim. The crucial question is what that means and to what extent
variation is compatible with that aim and with attempts to meet the needs of
different groups of citizens. More specifically, how divisible (or indivisible) is the
internal market? Is it politically and legally conceivable and beneficial to society to
separate the four freedoms from one another and thus for each Member State to no
longer guarantee all freedoms? But also, how conceivable and beneficial is variation
within each of the four freedoms? For example, concerning the precise definition of
the free movement of persons: to what extent can national exceptions be permitted?
The question of the divisibility or indivisibility of the internal market is crucial
because it is important for the overall direction of European integration, and
because it must be settled at Treaty level with the agreement of all the Member
States. Variation within the individual freedoms has more to do with everyday
political practice, where the emphasis is much more on how European legislation
should be fleshed out in specific terms, depending on the policy objective. The
questions this involves include what sort of European standard or level of protection
is required, how much discretionary scope can be left to the Member States, and
what kind of legal or policy instruments are appropriate.
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Three phenomena come to light repeatedly when analysing such questions.
We will come across them time and again in this chapter.
1. First of all, the process of European market integration is constantly disrupted
by various factors. Those factors include national legislation and rules that are
meant to protect national public interests but that may simultaneously create
obstacles to free movement within the EU. In other words, there is tension
between Europe’s interest in market integration and national public interests.
For example, safeguarding market integration may have negative consequences
for the national social domain.
2. Second, while harmonisation of national rules is important for eliminating
market distortions while protecting national interests at European level, it does
not always require homogeneity and convergence across the full breadth of
internal market rules. On the contrary, allowing for national differences can also
strengthen support for the EU, for example because it is more in keeping with
the temporary—and constantly evolving—nature of many EU arrangements or
with special circumstances in a particular Member State. The internal market is
not based on a simple ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach but instead leaves scope for
divergence. In fact, the way in which the single market deals with distortions
and allows for variation in national public interests can also provide interesting
insights into other policy domains.
3. Third, market integration and the enactment of European legislation in the
internal market can also be distorted from the outside, for example by non-EU
countries. The internal and external worlds of European market integration are
inextricably linked. The completion of the internal market therefore also
depends on the arrangements and rules agreed with the outside world.
5.2 A Social Market Economy: Work in Progress
It is clear that not everyone benefits to the same extent from the free market and
sees their standard of living improve as a result, even if the economic added value
of the European internal market is widely acknowledged.2 By estimates, almost a
quarter of the EU’s population is currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion.
Employment levels and living standards vary widely not only between Member
States but also between regions within Member States. There are also major dif-
ferences between Member States in terms of working patterns, education, health
and social security.3 Many people are therefore worried about how the EU is
tackling the social problems associated with an open (labour) market. According to
the 2017 Eurobarometer, more than eight out of ten Europeans see unemployment,
social inequality and migration as the three most important challenges facing the
Union and expect a free market economy to go hand in hand with high levels of
social protection. Seven out of ten feel that social and unemployment policies are
poorly managed and support decision-making at both national and EU level.4
56 5 Variation and the Internal Market
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, Article 3(3) TEU
provides that the EU shall work for the sustainable development of Europe, based,
among other things, on a ‘highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full
employment and social progress’. Other objectives mentioned in Article 3(3)
support these aims, namely combating social exclusion and discrimination and
promoting social justice and protection and solidarity between generations. These
passages flesh out the more general aim of Article 3(1), namely that the Union’s
objective is ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’. But
well-being goes beyond safeguarding the social dimension in the above sense; it
also implies protecting other public interests, for example the environment, sus-
tainable development and consumers. Ancillary policy of this kind is therefore also
important in shaping the internal market.5 The Union is founded6 on the values of
‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and
men prevail’.
However, opinions differ considerably as to the form that the social market
economy and related aims and values should take.
Article 26 TFEU defines the internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’. This definition says nothing about
how the internal market should be shaped, the intensity of EU regulation, the
relationship between national and European public interests, or the idea of a social
market economy. It is also unclear exactly what the relationship is between the four
freedoms and whether there may be a hierarchy between them.7 Article 151 TFEU,
on the objectives of Europe’s social policy, also refers to the internal market.
Objectives such as the promotion of employment, improved living and working
conditions, proper social protection, lasting high employment and the combating of
exclusion are linked explicitly to the internal market.
The task of developing the social dimension of the internal market and safe-
guarding other public interests going forward is literally a work in progress. The
two defining factors in this context are the existing principles of market organisa-
tion (e.g. the fundamental rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union), but also the possibilities and impossibilities arising from ‘po-
litical will’.
Two factors: Principles of market organisation and political will
The first factor is that the Member States are not entirely free to define the Union’s
socio-economic objectives and core values. Specifically, we can identify a number
of market organisation principles in EU law that constitute important legal and
political benchmarks for their further elaboration. In the first place, there are the
fundamental rights of citizens and other residents of the Union as now enshrined in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter includes
provisions on human dignity and freedoms, solidarity, citizenship and justice.
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These not only guide the Union legislator and—in the policy domains covered by
Union law—the Member States, but also the Court of Justice in its judicial reviews
of the relationship between the internal market and national public interests. We
will discuss this in the sections below.
What is important here, however, is to take a closer look at solidarity as a key
principle for the Member States and its possible significance for citizens. It is not
yet clear what this principle encompasses or precisely what it requires of them,8 but
what is clear is that it is acquiring growing political and legal relevance. In terms of
the Treaties, it is not only identified as one of the core values of the Union but is
also referred to in Article 3 of the TEU, i.e. in terms of ensuring solidarity between
generations and between Member States and promoting economic, social and ter-
ritorial cohesion. In practical terms, the EU pursues the latter aim by redistributing
funds through the Structural and Investment Funds, including the European
Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund.9 However, the
importance of solidarity between Member States is also reflected in the Union’s
external policies,10 the common foreign and security policy,11 migration and asy-
lum policy,12 and in the internal market, even if the Treaties do not refer to it
specifically in this context.13 There, solidarity is referenced indirectly in the Court’s
judgments on the free movement of services and persons, but also in the political
assessment that takes place in the legislative process. Solidarity can also be
regarded as an important factor in loyal cooperation, not only between the Member
States and the Union’s institutions, but also between the Member States
themselves.14
The TFEU also contains a number of ‘mainstreaming principles’ (Articles 8–13)
that oblige Union institutions to afford public interests other than purely economic
ones a high level of protection when adopting any European legislation, rules or
policy. Article 9 TFEU specifically provides that:
In defining and implementing its policies and actions, the Union shall take into account
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education,
training and protection of human health.
The other provisions concern combatting discrimination and promoting equality
on various grounds, integrating requirements to promote sustainable development,
and taking consumer protection requirements into account.15 Regarding the single
market, the main legal basis for internal market legislation (Article 114 TFEU),
which we will discuss further below, states that ‘any proposals must take as a base a
high level of protection concerning health, safety, environmental protection and
consumer protection’.
These socio-economic aims, core values and market organisation principles
together constitute the framework for the second factor: determining precisely what
level of social protection and progress is being pursued in the context of European
decision-making, how much guidance that requires of the EU, and how much
discretion is left to the Member States is above all a question of political assess-
ment. The initial expectation, i.e. that establishing the common market would
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improve standards of living, implied that there was no need to transfer significant
national competences in the social policy domain to Europe. When reality proved
otherwise, however, the political will to make social protection an essential element
of the internal market expressed itself through other channels in legislation,
including directives derived from the legal basis for the internal market set out in
Article 95 of the EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU). Examples are the Directive on
the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of under-takings,16
the Directive on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their
employer,17 and various directives on equal treatment of men and women.18
Although the EU’s legislative power to implement social policy was and still is
limited, for example in relation to employment policy and social security, the Union
legislator has interpreted its competences in internal market matters broadly so as to
guarantee the social rights of workers as well. In that sense, we can say that the EU
has a certain social acquis.19
The political guidelines for the social acquis are set by the European heads of
state or government, together with the President of the Commission and under the
leadership of the President of the European Council, while the legislative and
regulatory details are negotiated by the Council of Ministers together with the
European Parliament upon proposals from the Commission. As our discussion of
various cases below will make clear, amendments or adjustments to European
legislation may also be deemed necessary as insights into the downsides of market
forces change. In other words, the EU’s legal framework leaves plenty of scope to
weigh up the interests of the economic market and other public interests politically,
and so the matter of how to flesh out the social market economy is, above all else, a
question of political choice.
The European Commission’s recent proposal to establish a European Pillar of
Social Rights reaffirms the importance of both factors in achieving a more ‘social’
internal market.20 On the one hand, the twenty principles and rights covered by this
pillar deploy the principles of market organisation in a legal and policy-related
sense. On the other hand, the joint adoption by the Commission, the Council and
the European Parliament of the European Pillar of Social Rights at the Social
Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth in Gothenburg on 17 November 2017 expresses
the political will to implement the principles and rights under the pillar. The pillar is
about delivering on equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair
working conditions, and social protection and inclusion.
The courts play a reactive role in the internal market in that they review national
laws and rules in the light of the EU Treaties’ free movement provisions whenever
the public or companies are disadvantaged by them. The Union legislator has a
proactive role in that it creates rules and policies to protect various public interests.
Coordinating policy measures are also needed, however, and are now provided for
in the European Pillar of Social Rights, for example concerning employment policy
in relation to the European Semester for economic policy coordination and the
convergence process within the EMU.21
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Assessing public interests in the internal market
The EU Treaties have various provisions prohibiting rules and conduct that impede
free movement. The Court of Justice, which plays a major role in interpreting more
general Treaty provisions, stipulated early on in the history of the European
Communities that these provisions must be applied and enforced by Member States
through their own courts. The Court described European law as an autonomous
source of law, binding Member States and citizens alike to the rules governing the
common market. As a result of this ‘normative-functional’ integration method,
which emphasised market liberalisation and the removal of barriers to movement,
the law governing the internal market, in which the four freedoms play a crucial
role, has proliferated and extended into virtually every domain of economic and
social life.22 These market rules thus provide normative frameworks for national
measures and actions, even when they pursue public objectives and guarantee social
rights.23
Although they are applied broadly, the four freedoms are not absolute in nature.
The Member States may restrict freedom of movement to a certain extent to
safeguard non-economic interests, for example the fundamental rights of citizens,
including social rights, which may be guaranteed under certain conditions and
within the boundaries of the four freedoms. Case law has recognised that Member
States may restrict freedom of movement to safeguard non-economic interests,
provided that the relevant national measure is proportionate. It therefore makes
allowance for certain public interests, typically national values or ethical or polit-
ically sensitive issues such as the protection of vulnerable groups of consumers, a
regional language, or the regulation of gambling.
The scope that is created in this way makes a balanced assessment possible that
can be used to protect social rights and interests. There are, however, certain situ-
ations in which the Court’s judgments subordinate social rights to the rules of free
movement. In the Viking and Laval cases,24 the Court restricted the trade unions’
right to strike, something for which it was criticised.25 Its approach here conflicts
with the underlying principle of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, which requires a balanced assessment between economic freedoms and the
fundamental rights of citizens. After all, the Charter implies that the freedoms of the
internal market are no more important than fundamental rights or public interests.26
The economic freedoms and the guarantee of social rights are by no means mutually
exclusive, however, but complementary, something that became apparent in the
1968 Regulation on freedom of movement for workers within the Community,
which stipulated that workers employed in the territory of another Member State
must enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers.27 In its judg-
ments, the Court has interpreted the term ‘social advantages’ broadly to include
non-financial advantages, such as the right to require the use of a certain language
in court proceedings28 and the right of residence for the unmarried companion of a
worker who is a national of another Member State, which the Court asserts must be
regarded as social advantages within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the
Regulation.29
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The Court of Justice has also issued key rulings on the importance of the free
movement of persons versus that of maintaining national social security systems,
i.e. between transnational and national social solidarity. It has, in fact, promoted
transnational solidarity between citizens by increasingly granting them access to
national social security rights, based on the notion that Member States must treat
their own nationals and the nationals of other EU Member States as equals. It has
used the principle of proportionality to interpret social solidarity in a way that
affords citizens the right to social assistance, but within the limits of the available
resources.30, 31 The Court requires Member States to show solidarity towards the
nationals of other Member States, depending on the length of time an individual has
resided in the host Member State—an indicator of his/her level of integration—and
on the condition that the individual does not become an unreasonable financial
burden on the host Member State.32 A similar dilemma between transnational and
national solidarity can be seen in case law concerning the free movement of ser-
vices in relation to access to medical care in other Member States, where the Court
has guaranteed individual citizens access to such care under certain conditions.33
On the one hand, we can say that the Court’s approach to citizens’ rights has added
a dimension of social solidarity to the economic internal market paradigm that
extends beyond the customary beneficiaries of the free movement provisions.34 On
the other hand, its championing of individual rights has been criticised for weak-
ening the social solidarity that underpins the national social security systems.
Newdick refers meaningfully in this connection to ‘citizenship, free movement and
health care: cementing individual rights by corroding social solidarity’.35 It is, in
any case, clear that the free movement of persons and services has impacted the
guarantee of public interests through social security systems grounded in national
social solidarity.
Negative integration is thus based directly on the norms of the Treaties and
involves assessing national public interests within the framework of EU law, with
the Member States being obliged to take the interests of free movement into account
in that assessment and not to interfere disproportionately with the four freedoms. By
interpreting internal market law, the Court of Justice plays a guiding role, and that
role is decisive for the discretion that remains to protect national public interests.
The fact that the Member States are largely in charge of creating social policy and
that the Union legislator has little or no input gives the Court of Justice the final say
in assessing how national social interests weigh up against the EU rules on free
movement. After all, whenever the exercise of national competences affects free-
dom of movement within the internal market, a private individual can invoke the
free movement provisions of the Treaty and challenge the social law provisions in
court. It is then up to the Member State to show that its policy is meant to safeguard
social interests.
The situation is different when the Union legislator takes the initiative. It is
empowered to assess public interests within the context of the internal market
(positive integration). The fact that it possesses such legislative competence already
implies that the internal market is about more than simply removing barriers to
trade. That is why legal specialists and other researchers have now come to regard
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the internal market as a ‘battlefield of values and interests’.36 As noted above, the
Treaties require the Union legislator to take other interests into account, for example
a high level of protection for health, safety, the environment and consumers (Article
114(3) TFEU). The question then is how the various interests are weighed up and
accommodated in the practical sense. Our analysis of two key pieces of legislation
that concern interests other than the elimination of internal market barriers, i.e. the
Posting of Workers Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
has given rise to a number of findings. The following questions are central to the
analysis:
1. How does the EU weigh up public interests against the removal of barriers to
free movement?
2. How is this assessment made manifest in legislation?
3. How much discretion do individual Member States have to vary policy content?
Sometimes the importance of removing barriers to the four freedoms of the
internal market is diametrically opposed to other public interests. In the original
proposal for the Posting of Workers Directive, the Commission stated that it was a
question of ‘finding a balance between two principles which find themselves in
contradiction’.37 On the one hand, there is the free competition between companies.
That requires a ‘level playing field’ eliminating unfair competitive advantages
under national rules. On the other hand, Member States wish to protect workers—
for example by setting minimum pay levels—in a way that takes the relevant
country’s circumstances into account. In the directive as ultimately enacted, the free
movement of services is mentioned explicitly as one of the objectives of the
Community (in recital 1).
We also see another tension in the assessment of public interests in the Posting
of Workers Directive. Not only is the protection of free competition and the free
movement of services at odds with the protection of workers, but there is also the
related issue of the level at which that public interest should be protected: the first
two interests require the Union legislator to take action, whereas the protection of
workers—as interpreted by the Commission—requires action on the part of the
Member States.
The interests involved in data protection are not diametrically opposed. At stake
here are the protection of privacy on the one hand and the free movement of
personal data on the other, the latter being viewed as an aspect of the internal
market (indeed, some argue that the free movement of knowledge and data should
be considered the fifth freedom of the internal market).38 Whether enshrined in the
GDPR or the old Data Protection Directive, these interests remain the same
(although the wording is slightly different). The reason for the new Regulation lay
mainly in the rapidly changing social and technological context, referred to as the
‘datafication’ of the economy,39 which has made the exchange of data within the
EU crucial for prosperity growth.
The legal system also assumes that protecting privacy does not necessarily
undermine the free movement of data. On the contrary, the Commission’s argument
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was that a uniform system of privacy rules would boost confidence in personal data
protection and thus ease the free movement of data. While this belief is not based on
any empirical evidence, the new Regulation is designed in such a way that if
organisations comply with a range of privacy safeguards, the free flow of data will
be guaranteed by the absence of diverging national regimes.
Similar trade-offs between free movement and other public interests can also
be found in other legislation. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive40 strikes
a balance between free movement and cultural interests, for example. The
Directive’s preamble states that the growing importance of audiovisual media
services for societies, democracies, education and culture justifies the application of
specific rules that restrict the operation of the internal market. It follows from the
Directive’s articles that other interests are also at stake, such as the protection of
minors, the right of those with visual or auditory disabilities to access media, and
the diversity of television programming.41 The revised Payment Services Directive
(PSD2) weighs the free movement of payment services against the protection of
individuals (data protection).42 The Directive opens up the market for payment
services but at the same time improves consumer protection—although there are
doubts about how effective that protection really is.43 Finally, in its public pro-
curement law, the EU now (since a review round) gives contracting authorities
more leeway to include environmental and social aspects in contract award
criteria.44
The political assessment of public interests is fleshed out in European legislation.
The content of EU legislation answers the question of how the Union legislator
weighed up public interests, what weight it assigned to each of those interests, and
what balance it ultimately struck between them. Our analysis of the two legislative
case studies shows, however, that other factors also play a role in this assessment.
Two of these are of critical importance for the above questions: the chosen legal
basis, and the role of the Court of Justice.
The legal basis and the role of the Court
The Union legislator does not have a general mandate but must rely on the legal
basis laid down in each sector in the Treaties. With regard to the internal market, the
Treaties provide a broad legal basis for action, in particular in Article 114 TFEU.
The question is: to what extent does the chosen legal basis influence the assessment
of public interests at stake?
Our analysis of the two legislative cases reveals that the Court considers free
movement very important whenever the Union legislator refers to one of the legal
bases of the internal market as justification for a directive or regulation (see also the
Court of Justice’s Laval judgment below). This is understandable: as a legal basis,
free movement is intended precisely to create an internal market. The fact that the
Treaties define these legal bases in terms of broad, general objectives has led to
major problems and allowed economic interests to prevail over non-economic ones.
Nevertheless, the importance attached to free movement is not indisputable. The
Court of Justice has ruled that a measure grounded in such a legal basis may
certainly serve other public interests, as long there are guarantees that it will also
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have a positive effect on free movement. In fact, pursuant to the principles of
market organisation identified above, other interests and principles must also be
taken into account. The Court has even accepted that the primary objective of
internal market legislation may concern a public interest other than the improve-
ment of conditions for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In
a judgment concerning the Tobacco Advertising Directive, which was clearly meant
to protect public health, the Court ruled that this was acceptable as long as the
measure also contributed to improving the conditions for the functioning of the
internal market.45 If legislation grounded in the legal bases of the internal market
does indeed contribute in such a way, then it is valid. Such legislation may also be
applied in domestic situations. For example, individuals may invoke the rights
stemming from the Data Protection Directive (now the GDPR) even if they reside in
the same Member State as the person against whom they are invoking those rights.
Legislative practice reveals, however, that the legal basis does influence the
assessment of public interests. The GDPR makes that clear. The legal basis of the
old Data Protection Directive was the internal market (Article 114 TFEU), whereas
the new Regulation has a special, new legal basis (Article 16 TFEU)46 leading to a
different assessment of the interests of free movement versus those of privacy. The
Regulation imposes new obligations on data processors (e.g. on data portability,
how to respond if citizens wish to exercise their ‘right to be forgotten’, how to act in
the event of data breaches, etc.), extends the conditions under which organisations
appoint data protection officers, increases organisations’ responsibility for demon-
strating compliance with the law, and inflicts severe penalties in the event of
non-compliance. These and other elements show that the balance has shifted in
favour of privacy protection.
The current Posting of Workers Directive also shows that the chosen legal basis
can advance the interest of free movement—because it is given greater weight than
social interests—especially when combined with the role of the Court of Justice
(see below). However, a new Posting of Workers Directive has now been agreed
that will tip the scales towards the protection of workers, in response to criticism
that the current Directive focuses too much on free movement. The Sociaal-
Economische Raad (Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands) (SER) ar-
gued that the current Directive failed to strike the right balance in this respect.47 It
saw opportunities to broaden the basis of support for the internal market with a
‘trust offensive’ consisting of measures intended to eliminate the unequal treatment
of labour migrants. The revision envisaged by the SER was meant to create a level
playing field for companies and workers, in particular by addressing ambiguities in
the period of posting and the concept of remuneration. Its proposals have now been
incorporated into the agreement concerning the revised Posting of Workers
Directive. The revised text emphasises the temporary nature of posting by imposing
a 12-month cap on posting (with the possibility of a six-month extension).
Regarding the concept of remuneration, the principle of equal pay for equal work
will prevail; before, it was the minimum wage. The Directive will also be extended
to all sectors of the economy, with special conditions applying in the transport
sector, thus creating a level playing field there too. These changes are meant to
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restore the balance between the freedom of companies to provide services and the
protection of posted workers.
Both legislative case studies show that, in the context of the internal market,
public interests are assigned different weights over time and that the relevant legal
bases also provide leeway for this. While free movement is clearly subordinate to
other public interests in these case studies, that is not always so, as the Services
Directive demonstrates.48 Even there, however, the interests of the internal market
were undoubtedly set off against social interests at the time, with the Commission’s
original proposal undergoing a major revision as a result. For example, the country
of origin principle was eliminated during the negotiations for that reason, and
certain sectors and services excluded from that principle.49 It is therefore difficult to
draw general conclusions about the direction of this trend. Legislative and other
decision-making processes and their outcomes are often impenetrable. Not even the
objectives targeted by EU legislation are always made explicit, for example.50 The
data protection case also shows that other actors can significantly influence these
processes in ways that are not equally clear to all. In this instance, the Article 29
Data Protection Working Party (WP29)—a group composed of representatives of
the national supervisory authorities and two EU representatives—played a role. The
Working Party’s official task was advisory in nature, but in fact it exercised con-
siderable influence on the interpretation of data protection law.51 The Working
Party has now been superseded by the European Data Protection Board. In addition,
data and privacy considerations within the context of European law are also
influenced by other parties, notably the United States.
From a legal point of view, then, there is leeway in the internal market for the
pursuit of other public interests. There are no restrictions on the type of public
interest that can be protected under internal market legislation. At the same time, it
should be noted that this leeway is not yet being exploited to its full potential.
In many cases, it is unclear how much weight has been assigned to the various
interests, an ambiguity that could very well undermine the political and democratic
underpinnings of the assessment.52
The Posting of Workers Directive is a particularly good example of the way in
which the Court of Justice protects the interests of free movement. First of all, the
Member States must interpret the Directive in the light of the free movement of
services. This means, for example, that legitimate limitations provided for in the
Directive must be interpreted restrictively. As regards the application of EU law, on
the other hand, the Court is inclined towards a broader interpretation, for example
of the key concepts of the Directive. The Court has also ruled that only the country
of origin (and therefore not the host country) may offer more extensive social
protection than the minimum provided for in the Directive.53
The role of the Court of Justice is exceptional for another reason. The Court does
not always adhere to the intentions of the Union legislator (in so far as they can be
ascertained). A gap may therefore arise between the Court and the Union legislator
in the interpretation of EU law and its underlying aims. After all, the Union
legislator’s intentions are only one factor among many considered by the Court. At
least as important is the position of the directive in the larger body of EU law, in
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particular the Treaties, ‘the objectives pursued by the legislation of which they form
part’. The Court, moreover, sometimes describes those objectives in its own unique
way. The Easycar and Brüstle cases, for example, offer striking examples54 in that
the Court’s interpretations of provisions and key concepts do not necessarily cor-
respond to what the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament had in
mind. But the Court’s role may go even further. It may even invalidate legislation
that it regards as contrary to fundamental rights, for example. The Schrems case is
notable in the area of personal data protection. The Court ruled that the Commission
was wrong to assume that the United States provides sufficient safeguards for the
protection of personal data in the event of data transfer from Europe. The ruling had
enormous consequences: data transfer to the US was prohibited and the EU’s
political institutions were forced to negotiate entirely new agreements with the
US.55
The Court regularly comes under fire for its judgments, such as in the afore-
mentioned Laval case in which it ruled that an employer who employed posted
workers could not be forced to agree on a minimum wage with the trade unions, the
customary procedure in Sweden. Although most legal specialists understood the
ruling, others were fiercely critical. Many commentators felt that the Court had
allowed the free movement of services to take precedence over the social protection
of workers.56 The proposal for a new Posting of Workers Directive shows, how-
ever, that the Union legislator need not take note of the way in which the Court
weighs up the interests at stake. After all, the Court’s role is limited to interpre-
tation; it cannot disregard explicit provisions in Union legislation concerning the
scope of concepts, or the inclusion of specific rights to protect employees.
More recently, the Court has been much more vigorous about protecting fun-
damental rights, particularly in the context of the internal market.57 Fundamental
rights became more firmly embedded in the constitutional structure of the Union
when the Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding on the Union legislator on
1 December 2009. As a result, the Court has taken to assigning more weight to
fundamental rights when they are at odds with the four freedoms.58 In doing so, it
applies the rule-of-reason analysis, also used in assessing conflicts between free
movement provisions and public interests. In addition, it interprets internal market
legislation in a manner conducive to fundamental rights. For example, it interpreted
the old Data Protection Directive in a ‘privacy-friendly’ manner.59 It is less inclined
to do this when other public interests are at stake, however; in such cases, the
Court’s protection depends more heavily on the way in which the Union legislator
has made those interests explicit in the relevant legislation.60 The Union legislator
bears more responsibility in such instances.
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5.3 Variation Within the Internal Market
The foregoing implies that Member States have the discretion to protect public
interests in the context of both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration. National
variation is therefore possible, but the question is how much variation the system
can take, because national differences that result in the restriction of free movement
will be disruptive to the market. In other words, how homogenous must the internal
market be and how much heterogeneity is allowed to create a European social
market economy while protecting national public interests at the same time? How
can we reconcile the conflict between economic freedoms, public interests and
fundamental rights? In the following, we first consider the possibility of variation
after EU legislation has been enacted, and then explore variation within the wider
context of the internal market and the EU’s external trade policy.
By applying a combination of deregulation and re-regulation, the law has always
played a crucial role in the completion of the internal market.61 The single market
must be guaranteed by removing national barriers and by establishing common
rules that are interpreted and applied uniformly. After all, ‘unilateral action by the
Member States leads to fragmentation of the market and affects the Community
legal order’.62 We must, however, rethink the idea that Member States’ hands are
tied by the rules once EU legislation has been adopted. In reality, this is by no
means always the case. Although the Member States now have less room for
manoeuvre in certain areas, such as consumer and data protection, most EU leg-
islation does give them some discretion to make their own choices. The best-known
example is minimum harmonisation; in fact in some domains, the Union legislator
is prohibited from going beyond the minimum. That is not the case in the internal
market, but even there, the Union legislator frequently limits itself to establishing a
certain minimum set of rules. This is one way to resolve the tension between free
movement and other public interests.63 It means that public interests are assessed
partly by the EU and partly by the Member States themselves. It should be noted,
however, that the Member States must explicitly take the interests of free movement
into account in their assessment.
Policy discretion can also be the outcome of open standards and concepts in EU
legislation, which identifies general objectives but not the means to achieve them,
and of legislation that allows Member States to decide on the precise scope of
certain standards.64 The legislative case studies that we have analysed also feature
different forms of policy discretion. The proposal for the new Posting of Workers
Directive, for example, creates greater leeway for collective agreements and thus
offers the Member States more tools for regulating their own labour markets.
Replacing the concept of ‘minimum wage’ by the broader concept of ‘remunera-
tion’ also gives Member States more latitude to protect employees.
In the data protection domain, on the other hand, policy discretion is being
restricted. Article 5 of the old Directive allows Member States to determine the
conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful, within the limits
of the Directive. The new GDPR is much more restrictive because it raises the bar
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with respect to protecting privacy. It also contains detailed rules that establish the
legal relationships between parties directly (i.e. without the intervention of the
Dutch legislator). Nevertheless, it still offers the Member States some discretionary
powers, not only to supplement the rules but even to derogate from them in specific
situations or to restrict the rights of data subjects (for a comprehensive analysis of
the various forms of policy discretion provided by the Regulation, see the Dutch
Data Protection Authority’s Opinion on the Personal Data Implementation Act
(Uitvoeringswet Algemene Verordening persoonsgegevens).65 Examples include
the possibility of providing for more specific rules to protect personal data in the
employment context (Article 88), and of permitting further conditions to be
introduced for specific types of personal data, including data concerning health
(Article 9). As is often the case in EU legislation, the Member States have dis-
cretion with regard to regulating oversight, enforcement and legal protection
(although the Regulation also contains rules regarding key aspects in this respect,
such as the power of supervisory authorities to impose fines). The GDPR is thus a
good example of the way in which the Union legislator combines mandatory rules
with the discretion to interpret certain elements of the law.
Differences in the way countries deal with the policy discretion provided for in
EU legislation can lead to national variation. In the case of the GDPR, for example,
the Dutch legislator has opted for the principle of ‘policy neutrality’, i.e. main-
taining existing national law as far as possible, unless the Regulation disallows this
(see the Dutch Data Protection Authority’s Opinion referred to above). As a result,
the previous regulatory framework (in this context, the 2001 Dutch Personal Data
Protection Act) continues to set the tone in discretionary policymaking as provided
by the Regulation. Member States regularly choose a relatively ‘bare-bones’
implementation of EU legislation, thereby avoiding the delays in implementation
that could arise if they were to extensively rethink the policy discretion available to
them. In doing so, however, they may be overlooking an opportunity to allow for
changes in circumstances (in the case of the GDPR, technological advances) or to
express their policy preferences in the way that they deal with their national policy
discretion. With reference to the GDPR, the Dutch Data Protection Authority cites
the possibility of regulating the processing of the personal data of deceased persons.
In cases where the Union legislator allows the Member States discretion, it accepts
that the applicable law may vary from one Member State to another. This may
impede the creation of a ‘level playing field’ between Member States, but it is a risk
that the Union legislator is prepared to accept in the light of Member States’
interests. It is therefore important that Member States do not simply choose,
automatically, to interpret their policy discretion in a way that alters as little as
possible in their own legislation.
As the number of objectives and competences has grown and fundamental rights
have been included, variation is becoming more of a possibility—or is the internal
market already so heterogeneous that bilateral arrangements between Member
States are also conceivable? We consider this below in connection with the four
freedoms and how they relate to other policy domains, i.e. competition law, social
policy, and external trade policy.
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The four freedoms: coherence and divergence
One important goal of the four freedoms and European competition law is to ‘unite
the national markets into a single market reproducing as closely as possible the
conditions of a domestic market’.66 The unity of the market is critical here; it must
be safeguarded by common rules that are applied uniformly.
If we consider the relationship between the four freedoms, we see that the case
law of the Court of Justice is largely consistent.67 The freedoms granted under the
Treaties apply only in cross-border situations and in reference to an economic
activity, a concept that the Court interprets broadly.68 The Court also embraces the
‘market access test’ in the enforcement of all fundamental freedoms. According to
this test, both discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures are basically pro-
hibited if they result in restrictions on free movement. And, as noted above,
Member States may justify the imposition of restrictive measures by invoking a
wide range of exceptions, either in the Treaty or in case law. The rule of reason
doctrine introduced by the Court with regard to all fundamental freedoms has been
applied consistently. This doctrine asserts that restrictions on the freedom of
movement may, by way of exception, be justified if they are designed to satisfy
urgent requirements in a public interest that have not already been provided for
explicitly in the Treaty. In its case law, however, the Court of Justice recognises
that, although a Member State may safeguard such public interests, the validity of a
national measure depends on whether European harmonisation legislation already
exists that takes such interests into account and whether the measure meets the
requirement of proportionality. The implication is that a Member State must be able
to demonstrate that a national measure is both appropriate and necessary to safe-
guard the interest that it invokes, and therefore does not go beyond what is
necessary.
Nevertheless, there are differences between the four freedoms and the prohibi-
tions with regard to their scope of application. For example, unlike the other
freedoms, the free movement of goods basically does not apply to legislation
concerning such market conditions as shop closing times or advertising. It is also
not possible to simply invoke the free movement of goods when challenging the
trade-impeding measures of trade unions, banks, online companies and other
organisations, whereas the other freedoms have been recognised as valid grounds.
The Court’s case law is erratic when it comes to accepting horizontal direct effect in
the free movement of goods. The free movement of capital also extends to liber-
alisation of free trade with third countries. In terms of the free movement of persons
and, more specifically, provisions concerning EU citizenship, the Court has come
up with its own method of assessing whether the rights of EU citizens are not being
undermined, even in internal situations under specific circumstances.69 Moreover,
the fundamental legal dimension that underpins the free movement of persons is
obvious, and that affects the scope of these provisions.70
We also see that, when applying the principle of proportionality, the Court of
Justice examines some cases more scrupulously than others, depending on the
interest that has been invoked and the procedure followed.71 There is very extensive
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case law in which the Court has applied only a limited test of proportionality to
allow for characteristic national values or ethical or politically sensitive issues, such
as the protection of vulnerable groups of consumers, a regional language, or the
regulation of gambling.72 In other judgements, however, the Court has applied the
proportionality principle more scrupulously, thereby limiting the discretion of
Member States or private parties to safeguard consumer or social interests.73
Regarding the activities of the Union legislator, we see that variation is possible
within the context of the internal market either because the legal basis itself permits
Member States to adopt more far-reaching measures, for example concerning the
environment (Article 193 TFEU), or because the Union legislator has a range of
harmonisation methods at its disposal, such as minimum harmonisation or total
harmonisation. Variation is also possible under Article 20 TEU and Articles 326–
334 TFEU, for example, which allow for closer cooperation between some Member
States. Such cooperation must not undermine the internal market, however,
emphasising the importance of market unity. The question is how seriously this
prerequisite is applied.74
Although the foregoing instruments thus permit variation and national policy
discretion, and although the case law is erratic, consistency between the freedoms
remains crucial. The political wish not to separate the four freedoms is also con-
sistent with the Treaty’s aim of establishing a social market economy that not only
liberalises trade but also creates an area founded on the principles of equality,
freedom and solidarity.75 This area is changing constantly owing to social trends
and technological advances that blur the dividing lines between production factors
and make it even more difficult to separate the four freedoms.76 Some even favour
the introduction of a fifth freedom, the free movement of data. However, data—also
known as ‘digital gold’—has certain characteristics that make it unlike goods or
services. As we explained above, the legal framework for personal data has largely
been set by the GDPR. The Regulation does not cover ‘non-personal data’, i.e. data
in general, nor is there a clear-cut legal framework in this regard. A Commission
proposal for a new European regulation appears to remedy this77; it aims is to
ensure the free movement of data—i.e. data mobility—for non-personal data.
Article 3 of the proposal defines such data as data other than personal data as
referred to in the GDPR. This would include facts and statistics collected for
purposes of reference or analysis. Non-personal data cannot be used to identify
individuals. Since the Commission proposal does not provide a definition of
non-personal data, the Court of Justice may be asked to provide clarification.
Introducing the free movement of non-personal data is regarded as an important
step in the completion of the digital single market and is particularly important for
businesses. In a press release, the Commission says that it will achieve this by
removing ‘unjustified or disproportionate national rules that hamper or restrict
companies in choosing a location for storage or processing of their data’.78
Examples include professional secrecy rules that imply local data storage and
supervisory authorities advising financial service providers to store their data
locally. The prohibition on such data localisation requirements curtails national
differences with regard to non-personal data, with variation between Member States
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only being permitted if public security is at stake—a concept that the Court nor-
mally interprets narrowly in its case law.
The four freedoms and competition rules: coherence and divergence
The four freedoms, EU competition rules, and harmonisation of laws are among the
building blocks of the internal market. There is considerable coherence between
competition law and all other areas of substantive European law. That coherence is
expressed in various ways, for example in the territorial scope of the freedoms, in
the ‘effect on trade’ as a necessary condition for the application of competition
rules, in the concept of economic activity, and in such principles as
non-discrimination and market access. The broad applicability of the four freedoms
and competition law means that virtually no socio-economic policy domain escapes
the effects of internal market law.79
Of further note are the efforts made within the context of competition law to
allow for public and social interests that are safeguarded by companies. For
example, collective agreements between the social partners do not, in principle, fall
within the scope of the prohibition on restrictive agreements (Article 101 TFEU) if
they concern wages and working conditions.80 The Court of Justice has also ruled
in a number of cases that specific interests defended by companies, for example in
sports, may constitute a justified exception to the prohibition on restrictive agree-
ments.81 In the Wouters case, the Court even ruled that public interests defended by
the Bar of the Netherlands [Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten] constitute a justified
exception to the competition rules.82 These rulings are not so broad in their
interpretation that they carve a path to a blanket exception for public interests in
competition law, however. In addition, the Treaty includes an exception for ‘un-
dertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest’
(Article 106(2) TFEU).
There are, nevertheless, significant divergences from the free movement provi-
sions. For example, the Court of Justice’s case law suggests that the requirements of
environmental protection may outweigh the economic importance of a free
movement provision.83 This is much less the case in competition law. In the
CECED case, the European Commission granted an exemption to washing machine
manufacturers that had made a restrictive agreement for environmental protection
purposes.84 Its decision, however, depended on the environmental benefits arising
from the agreement resulting in a quantifiable economic benefits, which, moreover,
had to accrue to consumers. That is because consumer welfare is at the heart of EU
competition law, alongside the interests of the internal market. The aim of consumer
welfare is often interpreted narrowly, leaving the European Commission and the
Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) little leeway to pursue
general interest aims in their practices. This limited view of competition law has
come under increasing fire85 and is not compatible with mainstreaming principles.
Although the European Commission has put environmental and social policy
objectives at the heart of its long-term strategy, Europe 2020,86 it apparently does
not yet see a broader interpretation of the concept of consumer welfare as an
effective means of achieving this.
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The question, then, is to what extent European competition law can encompass
both national public interests and a social market economy. There have been pro-
posals to introduce the ‘capability approach’ in competition law, with more
emphasis on the role that companies play in achieving environmental objectives or
reinforcing social cohesion in cities.87 Fundamental rights and social welfare would
then play a more significant role in how competition rules are applied. That is the
strategy put forward in the Dutch government’s coalition agreement, but because
Dutch competition law is based on European competition law, the legal latitude is
very limited.88
The four freedoms and social policy: coherence and divergence
The Treaties, and in particular Article 151 TFEU, assume that the functioning of the
internal market will contribute to convergence between national social welfare
systems and thus help improve living and working conditions, provide adequate
social protection, achieve lasting high levels of employment, and combat exclusion.
In reality, however, such ‘spontaneous’ convergence or harmonisation has proven
much more problematic; in addition, the EU lacks legislative competence to impose
harmonisation. This is, in part, the reason behind the ‘open method of coordination’
(OMC), which emerged in the 1990s as a ‘third option’ midway between inde-
pendent national policy and harmonisation within the Union, initially in the field of
employment policy. The open method, now laid down in Article 153(2)(a) TFEU,
implies that policy objectives are set jointly at EU level, but that it is left to the
Member States to achieve them. It is also used for other aspects of social policy,
such as combating social exclusion. The point is not to harmonise national legis-
lation but to only use ‘soft law’ mechanisms to coordinate national policies and
steer them towards convergence. The first aim of coordination is to identify com-
mon policy objectives and then to achieve real policy convergence by sharing
expertise and success stories and by using peer reviews and applying peer pressure
to detect, criticise and change bad practices. One of the basic assumptions of the
OMC, then, is that convergence between the Member States’ social policies can be
achieved through many different national measures, as long as such measures
contribute to attaining the policy objective set at EU level.
The four freedoms and the common commercial policy: coherence and
divergence
Based on the assumption that the EU’s internal and external areas are connected—
as we emphasised in the introduction to this book—we must also consider how the
internal market relates to the EU’s common commercial policy vis-à-vis third
countries and other international organisations. The common commercial policy is
one of the Union’s areas of exclusive competence (Article 3(1) TFEU), and the
most critical element of its economic relations with the world outside and its
external actions in general.89 The EU’s exclusive competence in this policy area
implies that the European Commission plays a key role, for example in trade
negotiations with third countries and in international organisations such as the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). External trade policy is therefore often regarded
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as an external dimension,90 the external face,91 or a complement to the internal
market and as a logical consequence of the interaction between internal and external
trends and events in world trade.92 The Court of Justice ruled as long ago as 1975
that: ‘[s]uch a policy is conceived … in the context of the operation of the common
market, for the defence of the common interests of the Community, within which
the particular interests of the Member States must endeavour to adapt to each other.
Quite clearly, however, this conception is incompatible with the freedom to which
the Member States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent power, so as to ensure
that their own interests were separately satisfied in external relations, at the risk of
compromising the effective defence of the common interests of the Community.’93
The foregoing also explains the EU’s exclusive competence in external trade
relations. Unilateral action by Member States in this area would undermine the
economic foundations of the internal market.94 It should be noted here, however,
that European trade policy is based on a different institutional structure, uses dif-
ferent instruments and, to a certain extent, pursues different objectives than those of
the internal market. Moreover, the Union’s external trade policy has always been
closely linked to the multilateral system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (later WTO), concluded some ten years before the Treaty of Rome was
signed. The EEC framework was therefore inspired, in part, by the gatt model.95
That is why the Union’s external trade policy should not be seen as a simple
expansion of the internal market to outside the EU, but rather as a necessary or even
indispensable consequence of the internal market in the external sphere.96 Larik97
argues that European trade policy is ‘a necessary corollary for the maintenance of
its internal market’.
We can get a better idea of the evolving relationship between the internal market
and the common commercial policy by considering how the scope, objectives and
instruments of trade policy have developed over time, from a common customs tariff
to the dispersal of fundamental rights. The original reason behind the external trade
policy—which was related directly to the development of the internal market—was
the need to establish uniform rules for the customs union, in particular the intro-
duction of a common customs tariff for Member States’ relations with third countries
(now Article 28 TFEU).
The Treaty of Nice and, in particular, the Treaty of Lisbon have given the
external trade policy an extra push, mainly by increasing the EU’s powers and by
placing the entire policy within the framework of non-economic principles and
objectives. In particular, the Treaties have broadened considerably the principles on
which the external trade policy is based, as well as the associated instruments.
Those instruments now include trade agreements on services, the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property, and foreign direct investment.98 This means that the
EU is now also competent to conclude international trade agreements on certain
aspects of capital and establishment. In this respect, the EU’s competences in the
area of trade policy increasingly reflect the scope of the internal market. The precise
scope of those competences is currently the subject of fierce discussion, but that
subject is beyond the remit of this book.
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The most notable addition to the EU’s competences in the area of external trade
policy can be found in the final sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU: ‘The common
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives
of the Union’s external action.’ Article 205 TFEU clarifies the mandatory nature of
the general objectives and principles with which the common commercial policy
must comply.99 Since the Treaty of Lisbon, then, the Union has pursued its external
actions and, in particular, its commercial policy explicitly within the framework of
Article 21 TEU, basing them on the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and fundamental freedoms ‘which have inspired its own creation, develop-
ment and enlargement’.100 In addition, in its common commercial policy, the Union
pursues the various political and non-economic objectives enumerated in the second
paragraph of Article 21 TEU, for example to safeguard its values, fundamental
interests, security, independence and integrity and the principles of international
law, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to foster the sustainable
development of developing countries in order to eradicate poverty, to encourage the
integration of all countries into the world economy, and to improve the quality of
the environment and to ensure sustainable development.
Article 21 TEU thus reflects the content of Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty to a
certain extent, but adds its own unique elements. Formally speaking, however, there
is no hierarchical relationship between all the principles and objectives of trade
policy; they are all equally valuable and significant.101 That means that there is also
no hierarchical relationship between the economic and non-economic objectives of
the common commercial policy. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon stresses the need to
guarantee coherence between the Union’s external and internal actions.102 This
raises the question of how to address potential conflicts between trade liberalisation
and the non-economic objectives set out in Article 21 TEU. We should emphasise
here that the Union has already used external actions, and trade policy in particular,
to promote broader and non-economic objectives.103
With multilateral trade negotiations within the context of the WTO at a
long-standing impasse, the Union has sought alternative ways of fostering economic
cooperation with the world beyond. Increasingly, it has focused on concluding
bilateral and regional trade agreements with third countries. Free trade agreements
are certainly nothing new for the European Union.104 Within the context of its
European Neighbourhood Policy, for example, it has concluded partnership,
cooperation and, more recently, association agreements. The strategy published by
the Commission in 2010105 does not represent a break with the past, but does imply
a number of shifts in emphasis. The Commission proposes to focus more on
concluding bilateral free trade agreements, in particular with the EU’s neighbouring
countries, with the aim of gradually integrating these countries into the internal
market. A new generation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements has
been introduced in this context, the Association Agreement with Ukraine being one
example. This new generation of free trade agreements goes far beyond tariff
reductions and trade in goods and services and shows that this form of bilateral
economic cooperation has become the main instrument of the Union’s external
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trade policy.106 The Treaty of Lisbon and the Union’s expanded competences have
therefore given bilateral economic cooperation an additional boost.
The EU now has the widest range of free trade agreements in the world, with
considerable variation between them. Practically every agreement provides for a
different model of market integration. Often, they are part of a broader political
agreement, such as an association agreement. The EU also concludes economic
partnership or cooperation agreements that are more geared to its trade partner’s
development. For example, if we compare the EEA Agreement, CETA, the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the EU-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement, we see that liberalisation can take different forms across the four
freedoms. The EU’s values and principles, as well as its objectives and its social
market economy, are reflected in all these bilateral agreements, but to varying
degrees and with differing emphases. They are also underpinned by different pro-
cesses that vary in intensity and impact, with the third countries adapting their own
legislation to the EU acquis or confining themselves to dialogue and cooperation.
Ultimately, it seems, there is no hierarchical relationship between the different
principles and objectives.
5.4 Conclusion: Principles Leave Room for Manoeuvre
The European internal market is as politically and economically significant today as
it ever was. In terms of social welfare, however, the current structure falls short
because it does not offer a sufficiently solid safety net to the losers in an open, free
market. This chapter has considered whether EU law offers a framework for pro-
moting not only economic but also other public interests within the context of the
internal market, and how variation might contribute to this. In the light of the
aforementioned core elements of market integration, as well as the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequences’, we can draw the following
conclusions from our analysis.
First of all, we must question an approach that claims that national public
interests and fundamental rights can distort economic market integration. The
internal market is not an end in itself but supports a social market economy. Public
interests and fundamental rights should in fact serve as important indicators for the
completion of the internal market. That is something that the Union legislator but
also the Court of Justice must take into account when determining whether a
specific national measure is compatible with the internal market provisions. The
internal market’s legal framework is so flexible that both the legislator and the
Court can weigh economic market interests against other public interests, the for-
mer from a political and the latter from a legal perspective. It is even so that the
‘logic of appropriateness’ has, over time, become increasingly important as a basis
for the structure of the internal market. That is because the current organisation of
the internal market reflects the explicit pursuit of a social market economy and the
view that fundamental rights and the principles of solidarity, proportionality and
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‘mainstreaming’ (which mirror public interests) are important principles of market
organisation under the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaties assume that the functioning
of the internal market will contribute positively to the public’s well-being and
standard of living.
Given the close connection between the internal market and competition law,
limiting the assessment of interests under competition law to economic interests
versus consumer welfare is not consistent with the rationality of the internal market.
It would be more logical for competition law to place greater emphasis on other
public interests too, and to weigh them against the interests of the market.
Competition law still appears to be firmly rooted in the logic of consequences than
in the overarching pursuit of a social market economy and the safeguarding of other
public interests. These require a coherent approach in which the policy domains
closely associated with the four freedoms evolve in accordance with the same
guiding principles. On the other hand, one could argue that competition law is
geared towards companies and that such companies do not necessarily promote
public interests in the way that government institutions are obliged to do.
This brings us to the risks of greater variation. As the above shows, variation
between the guiding principles of the internal market and closely associated policy
domains raises problems when it comes to establishing a social market economy.
Variation in the way the Member States interpret the four freedoms would also pose
a major risk not only to the economic completion of the internal market but also to
the safeguards afforded to the associated social and public interests. The general
principles of Union loyalty and effectiveness of Union law limit such variation, in
any event.
At the same time, however, we also see that the broad spectrum of principles
underpinning the internal market does, in fact, offer more scope for national vari-
ation, especially where no EU legislation applies. These principles allow for vari-
ation by permitting Member States to apply certain rules and practices that protect
certain public interests in preference to the interests of the internal market. It should
be noted, however, that it is precisely when the Member States have more discretion
in policy-making that their responsibility for considering the interests of free
movement and the internal market increases. The assessment framework for the
four freedoms developed by the Court for such national rules has remained uniform
and therefore offers legal certainty. The absence of a ‘level playing field’ for
commercial parties and individuals in the Member States is a given in internal
market law, however. Coherence and divergence thus go hand in hand and a
sustained commitment to the internal market cannot be guaranteed without allowing
the Member States a certain degree of policy discretion. The problem now is that
the Court sometimes leaves little leeway for national variation with respect to social
rights and social policy, something that the Union legislator cannot always com-
pensate, given its limited competence in this domain.
Parallel coherence and divergence is an established feature of internal market
law in other respects as well. On the one hand, there is a large measure of con-
vergence in the interpretation and scope of the four freedoms, which contributes to
the uniform application of internal market law and to legal certainty; on the other
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hand, the Treaty has already recognised some variations in their scope of appli-
cation, for example, by providing for the free movement of capital not only within
the EU but also vis-à-vis third countries. In addition, variation is inherent to the
mechanism of harmonisation by means of directives for the purpose of completing
the internal market. These give the Member States room to exercise discretion in
various ways, for example by establishing minimum harmonisation measures,
allowing possible exceptions, and introducing concepts that are open to interpre-
tation. Finally, there is variation in the way Court interprets the scope of application
of the four freedoms, but also, for example, in the degree to which it recognises
their horizontal effect.
The rationality of the internal market also has implications for the institutional
dimension, i.e. the role of the various actors at both European and national level in
contributing to a social market economy and safeguarding public interests.
Thinking in terms of shared principles and responsibility rather than a division of
competences might help to mitigate the technocratic nature of European coopera-
tion.107 It is also the responsibility of the Member States themselves to ensure that
the European social market economy becomes reality; this depends on how they
formulate general policies within the context of the European Council and how they
fulfil their role on the Council as Union co-legislators with respect to the internal
market, competition law and trade policy. The same applies to the way they
exercise their powers in the context of European social policy. The Union is
competent primarily to coordinate policy, and so much depends on the Member
States themselves taking steps to achieve the policy objectives they have jointly set
at EU level. An open process of political and democratic decision-making and a
broad public debate about how public interests are assessed would also help to
mitigate the technocratic complexion of the EU. At the moment, it is not always
clear exactly how that assessment has taken place within the Council, the European
Parliament and the Commission, and what influence powerful lobbies have had, for
example on the protection of privacy. When it comes to sensitive issues such as the
protection of privacy and the posting of workers, or whether to ban agricultural
pesticides that may pose a threat to the environment and public health, a public
debate can help to assess the interests at stake, an assessment that will ultimately
find its way into European rules.
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Chapter 6
Variations in the European Union
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the existing forms of variation within the internal
market. The remainder of this book discusses forms of variation that fall both within
and outside the current framework of European Union Treaty law. This chapter
connects the various dots to reveal a broad range of variation options.
6.2 Three Dimensions of Variation
Variation has three dimensions, associated with: (1) policy content, (2) decision
methodology, and (3) the Member States. Based on these dimensions, the options
for variation can best be presented as a three-dimensional continuum whereby the
degree of uniformity in each dimension runs from minimum to maximum.
Variation in policy content
The first dimension concerns the scope for variation within the content of policy,
i.e. the leeway that each Member State has to interpret how certain public interests,
objectives and values are to be achieved. This means that Member States can have
different priorities and interpretations but continue to participate in a political form
of solidarity. More specifically, they are given more policy discretion in directives
involving minimum harmonisation or open standards. Such directives employ
concepts that allow the Member States to shape national policy as they see fit. This
form of variation also includes European ‘guidelines’ established within the OMC,
which afford the Member States maximum autonomy in their interpretation of
policy. At the other extreme are regulations that limit national policy discretion. The
chapter on the internal market offers examples of existing forms of variation in that
specific policy domain.
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The room for manoeuvre created in this manner prevents the tensions caused by
diverging aims from resulting in opt-outs, for example. Variation in policy content
makes it possible to incorporate the Member States’ diverse motivations into the
process of European integration without compromising unity. The process of pol-
icymaking must then reveal, time and again, how much room for manoeuvre there
actually is.
Trade-offs are also possible within a policy area. One example of this is ‘flexible
solidarity’ within the context of migration, asylum and borders. Variation in this
domain is not meant to ignore the basic principle of solidarity, but it does mean
paying greater attention to differences between countries. This means that those
regions where public support and opportunities for personal development are
greatest (Northwest Europe, the ‘destination countries’) can expand their asylum
policies. The impossibility of full harmonisation does not mean that solidarity
cannot be achieved in other ways. Allowing countries to buy their way out of quota
obligations with larger financial contributions is not the only alternative. In the
future, transit countries in the East and South could, perhaps, play a larger role in
circular migration, once their economic structures and employment rates so permit.
Variation in the decision-making method
This dimension concerns the way in which policy and legislative decisions must be
taken: in an intergovernmental context, via the Community method, or perhaps
even at supranational level.
Within an intergovernmental framework, there is no interference from institu-
tions to which the cooperating states are subordinate; competences are not trans-
ferred and are retained at the national level at all times. Decision-making thus
requires unanimity. In effect, states have the right to veto policy and legislation,
guaranteeing that their policy autonomy is preserved. The open method of coor-
dination (OMC), which does not involve legislative competences and in which
decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, is one example of this form of
variation.
Policies and legislation developed according to the Community method apply
equally to all participating Member States and are based on (1) supranational
institutions as initiators and guardians of the Treaty order, (2) qualified majority
voting in the Council and (3) co-decision-making by the European Parliament
(ordinary legislative procedure). The difference between this and a fully suprana-
tional decision-making framework is that, in the Community method, qualified
majority voting makes it possible to form blocking minorities, for example in the
Council. Unlike in the supranational method, a simple majority is not enough to
reach a decision.
Variation in membership/members
The third dimension concerns membership. If the Member States’ ‘motivations for
collective action’ differ too much to fulfil public tasks by means of the Community
method or variation in policy content, the Member States can switch to the most
extreme form of variation, i.e. variation in membership. In this form of variation,
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the Member States do not see sufficient reason to undertake collective action and
must pursue a different type of relationship with one another. Examples include
opt-outs, establishing lead groups beyond the EU structures, transition periods, and
close cooperation.
Figure 6.1 shows the three dimensions of variation in the shape of a cube. The
X-axis represents variations in decision-making, with the degree of uniformity in
decision-making rising from intergovernmental to supranational. The Y-axis rep-
resents variations in EU membership. The minimum form of integration here is the
‘lead group’ and the maximum form is ‘all EU Member States’, with opt-outs
positioned midway between the two. Finally, the Z-axis represents variation in
policy content. Examples include ‘policy guidelines’ within the OMC or
‘trade-offs’ within the same policy domain as a minimum form of integration. The
maximum form is far-reaching harmonisation (e.g. by means of regulations). In
between these two extremes, the Member States have more or less latitude to
develop their own policy within EU directives and other frameworks that are more
or less specific. We illustrate the variation options by positioning a number of
specific legislative and policy instruments within the figure.
For the Union to utilise the variation options in actual practice, it must keep an
open mind to the opportunities afforded by the existing Treaties by (1) considering
the relationship between motivations for collective action and the possible insti-
tutional orders, and thus (2) relinquishing its fixation on the Community method
and the resulting compulsion to rely on certain motivations for collective action.
Fig. 6.1 A three-dimensional representation of variation options in the EU
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6.3 A Guideline to Variation
The uniform model of integration—in which all Member States have the same
rights and obligations—has dominated the integration process, and in particular the
thinking about that process, since the end of the Second World War. The pre-
dominance of this model is largely due to the expectation that a single European
market would produce mutual benefits in terms of efficiency, growth and jobs.
The fact that these expectations were largely fulfilled in the decades following the
Second World War, but also the fear of being deprived of the benefits, boosted the
dominance of the uniformity model even more. Nevertheless, from the outset
European integration has also involved all sorts of variation in policy implemen-
tation, often based on and firmly anchored in the principle of subsidiarity, and
variation in membership. Gradually, the different forms of variation have developed
into instruments that can be used to find a solution to the central problem of
collective action, which we can describe as follows: although the outcome of
cooperation is clearly beneficial for all the participating states, one or more parties
still impede such cooperation because they consider their individual advantage
more important than the collective advantage. This is a constant struggle within the
context of European integration.
Relinquishing the fixation on greater uniformity also offers new opportunities for
a discussion on the future of European integration that does more justice to reality.
This new approach makes it possible to get beyond the simplified debate of national
state versus federation. This stylised juxtaposition, while simplifying the debate,
does not do enough justice to the multifaceted reality of cooperation, integration
and interdependence. Nevertheless, it is a juxtaposition that has dominated the
debate on the future of European integration, as if that debate ultimately involved a
stark choice between one ideal or another, and as if it were the institutional order of
cooperation alone that defined the reality of Europe. Both assumptions hamper the
pursuit of real solutions, something that is perfectly possible within the existing
frameworks.
Variation is not equally possible in all policy domains. Variation can create room
for manoeuvre, but it also has its limitations. There are also different forms and
degrees of variation, as the introduction to this chapter makes clear. We can now
use the analysis framework constructed in the previous chapters and the variation
options in the internal market that we have identified to produce a guideline that
prioritises variation in policy content in European integration, simultaneously
linking it to variation in membership/members, which can serve as a remedy in
extreme cases. The guideline for applying variation is as follows:
If the Member States’ ‘motivations for collective action’ differ too much to fulfil
European public tasks according to the existing variation options permitted under
the Treaties and the Union’s institutional order, i.e. variation in policy content or
trade-offs in a policy domain, the Member States can switch to the most extreme
form of variation, i.e. variation in membership/members.
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Applying this guideline may produce new insights, and in particular lead to a
reappraisal of the existing diversity in the EU. That is already a step forward, if only
because, in many respects, diversity has been at the heart of the process of European
integration in recent decades. Nevertheless, such diversity has not always been
sufficiently acknowledged. For us, this is the most important reason for recom-
mending that the matrix presented in the previous chapters be used to analyse the
tasks of the European Union. Doing so makes it possible to identify which insti-
tutional order and which grounds for collective action should be applied. In some
instances, this is likely to lead to a fundamental review of the choices that have
emerged from the negotiation process; in others, it will lead to improvements and
firmer arguments. These analyses heighten the value of variation and make its
implementation more precise.
In addition to variation within the European internal market as described in the
previous chapter, there are various other forms of variation in today’s EU. For
example, better-known and more striking forms of variation in membership/
members include the Schengen area, the euro area and the opt-outs of EU Member
States in various policy domains. There are, however, also many lesser-known
alliances within the EU that illustrate variation in membership/members, such as
EU Battlegroups,1 the G6 meetings on law enforcement and security matters,2 the
‘EU big three’3 or the target interbank payment system.4
The approach proposed here not only offers improvements in governance. It is
vital for politicians to abandon the old habit of presenting European
decision-making as an obstacle that must be removed purely in the national interest.
A proper analysis of the interests at stake will also allow politicians and others
involved in decision-making processes to explain variation in a different and more
convincing way, by arguing that, in the light of the EU’s internal socio-economic
and socio-cultural differences, variation in policy content and in membership/
members is and can be useful and in the interests of both the Member State and the
EU as a whole.
In the following two sections, we delve deeper into where variation in
membership/members stands (as the most extreme form of variation) and make
suggestions for dealing more constructively with it than has hitherto been the case.
6.4 Variation in Membership/Members
Variation in membership/members is by no means a new phenomenon in European
integration. Even before the Treaty of Amsterdam laid the foundations for ‘en-
hanced cooperation’, there were ways of downplaying uniformity in European
policymaking. When the European Communities were established, it was stipulated
that the Treaty provisions would not preclude the existence or completion of the
regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg or the Benelux (now Article
350 TFEU). Territorial clauses allow variation in the conditions under which the
Treaties are applied in the ‘outermost regions’ of the Member States and some other
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territories. This variation in membership/members has also existed since the
founding of the Communities, now provided for under Article 349 TFEU.
The main variation in membership/members can be found in the Title on
Economic and Monetary Policy (Title VIII of Part Three of the TFEU), which
distinguishes between Member States that do and do not have the euro as their
currency. The financial and economic crisis and the impending financial collapse of
some euro-area Member States led to a system of separate treaties and
decision-making structures being developed on that basis.5 The inclusion of tran-
sitional provisions upon the accession of new Member States has always been
established practice, although such derogations from the acquis have become much
more pronounced in the more recent accessions.
There are other examples of variation in membership/members, including the
limited participation of some states in the cooperation between police and judicial
authorities in the area of freedom, security and justice (Title V). Two Member
States (Poland and the United Kingdom) have even been granted a special status
with regard to the judicial enforcement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union,6 an exception that is at odds with the fundamental values of the
Union. Article 31 TEU allows a Member State to abstain from applying a decision
within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article 42(2),
second paragraph, accepts variations within the context of the Common Security
and Defence Policy depending on whether or not EU Member States belong to
NATO. The execution of military missions may be entrusted to a group of Member
States (Article 42(5) and Article 44). Article 42(6) and Article 46 permit a group of
Member States to establish permanent structured military cooperation with one
another.
The picture that emerges is further defined by the fact that some non-Member
States participate in elements of EU policy and the associated legal rules. We
illustrate this in Fig. 6.2.
The question, then, is not so much whether variation should be permitted to
ensure that the European project can continue successfully, but rather how variation
can best be used to revitalise the European Union in a meaningful and more
persuasive manner. That may be in existing policy domains, whenever uniformity
appears to breed too much tension, or in new areas of cooperation.
There are two routes to more variation within the existing structures of the EU.7
One is the enhanced cooperation procedure, put in place by the Treaty of
Amsterdam (1997) and revised several times since then. It is now set out in Title IV
of the TEU. Member States may establish enhanced cooperation within the
framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences, making use of its institu-
tions. The other route involves concluding separate agreements which, although
they operate outside European Union framework, are nevertheless linked to it, such
as the additional treaties on monetary cooperation. The Prüm Convention on
combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, which was con-
cluded by a number of Member States in 2005, was also adopted and remained
entirely outside the Union framework until 2008, when it was partially subsumed
into EU law.
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What is notable about the existing variation in membership/members is that it
usually arises from differences of opinion or differences in the speed of acceptance.
What then follows can be described as a form of ‘learning by doing’ whereby the
initial cooperation, which was not binding on all Member States, frequently leads to
closer and broader cooperation at a later stage, often within the normal framework
of the Union (with possible opt-outs). Examples include the Schengen treaties,
which were subsequently integrated into the main body of EU law under the Treaty
of Amsterdam.
6.5 Assessing the Desirability of Variation in Membership/
Members
As described above, variation in membership/members is an outcome of the
decision-making process. That is not the same as variation as a conscious choice.
Our analyses in Chaps. 4–6 and the guidelines provided in this chapter can be used
to develop variation ‘as a conscious choice’. Such analyses can also provide
building blocks for the necessary political arguments. The scope that these analyses
allow for changes over time is crucial, since circumstances and opinions are subject
to constant change. Approaching variation in this way makes it more proactive and,
above all, more conscious in nature. Although the free movement of persons
Fig. 6.2 European variation options in membership
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implied borders that could not be effectively closed, the 1980s saw a greater need
for more cross-border police and judicial cooperation, including cross-border ‘hot
pursuit’. Similarly, the Member States whose currency is the euro are more likely to
feel the need to develop common socio-economic policies. In both cases, the
dynamic nature of the policy itself made it possible to avoid the pitfall of untenable
institutional uniformity and come up with complicated solutions.
Variation in membership/members should imply that the participants embark on
cooperation—in terms of the speed or the objectives of a certain European policy—
not to circumvent stagnating decision-making procedures but rather to do justice to
real differences between Member States. Variation in membership/members
therefore needs to be addressed in the policy preparation stage. This will then
lead to formal and informal arrangements, either within or outside the Union
framework (variation in membership and accession as well as different types of
economic, trade and security relationships), giving the actors on the EU stage
different rights, obligations and perspectives on the integration process.
Member States may introduce some form of variation in membership/members
for a variety of reasons, for example: (1) to represent certain (geopolitical) interests,
(2) for its symbolic effect, (3) to establish a relationship with a certain region, or
(4) when widening the EU in terms of Member States, cultures, backgrounds and
wishes, to ensure that deepening also takes place. Such political motivations are not
necessarily consistent with the rationale—as derived from the motivations for
collective action (logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences)—for limiting
the remit of a particular policy domain or a particular piece of legislation. Further
variation in membership/members will therefore also need to be supported by
substantive arguments that are consistent with those put forward for other policy
domains. The most explicit and well-thought-out argument favouring variation in
membership/members dates from 1994 and comes from the German politicians
Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, who at the time were the leader and the
European Affairs spokesperson of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag.
Their proposal soon vanished from view, including in the Netherlands, but it has
remained extremely relevant to this day,8 so much so, in fact, that it is worth briefly
reviewing the main points (see Box 6.1).
Box 6.1. The Schäuble-Lamers Paper
Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, at that time the leader and European
Affairs spokesperson of the CDU parliamentary group in the German
Bundestag, penned their paper because they believed that the process of
European integration had arrived at a ‘critical point’ in 1994. In their diag-
nosis, ‘[i]f the causes of the current dangerous trend cannot be addressed in
the next two to four years, the EU will end up as little more than … a
sophisticated free trade area, incapable of tackling the fundamental problems
of European societies’. What causes and problems were Schäuble and Lamers
referring to?
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To summarise, they identified three main problems. First, there was the
problem of enlargement. The EU had grown from six Member States, the
founders of the integration process, to twelve when they wrote their paper,
and would welcome many more if former EFTA countries Sweden, Austria
and Finland were to join (which they did in 1995) and if former Warsaw Pact
countries came to be viewed as potential members—something that had
become increasingly plausible in 1994. Schäuble and Lamers believed that
the existing EU institutions were not equipped to handle this.
Schäuble and Lamers were not opposed to EU enlargement, quite the
opposite in fact. But they had noted that this process aggravated a second
problem. The growing number of members had led to more divergence
between the Member States’ interests, a logical result of the increasing gap
between the various economies in the EU. Moreover, the diverse interests and
strategic visions entering the EU in this way threatened to outweigh the
opportunities for compromise—the very essence of post-war European inte-
gration. This would be a major risk in the long run. Third, Schäuble and
Lamers saw a dangerous trend towards what they referred to as ‘regressive
nationalism’. This longing for the old nation-state was growing, slowly but
surely, fed by mounting fears of prosperity loss and declining well-being.
These fears were kindled by the erosion of old certainties. Unemployment, a
shrinking welfare state and immigration had fuelled a defensive reflex to
withdraw to within the borders of the national state. This also worried
Schäuble and Lamers. After all, that reflex was driven by denial of the
problems of the post-Cold War era and globalisation, potentially making
these problems impossible to solve.
In this context of fresh problems, the EU could only survive if the heart of
the new, extended integration process remained stable. The centrifugal forces
that had been unleashed could only be contained if they were counterbalanced
by a far-reaching deepening of European integration. According to Schäuble
and Lamers, that should have been top priority for Germany and Europe
because it was the only way to exorcise the ghosts of Europe’s dark past after
the Cold War as well. But the big question was: how to go about it? How
should a widening EU be stabilised?
Schäuble and Lamers’ plan was called ‘die weitere Festigung des Kerns’,
a ‘core Europe’. That core was to be built around a Franco-German axis, the
centre of successful reconstruction during the Cold War, i.e. Western Europe.
It should be noted that this proposal was far from self-evident in 1994.
After all, Western Europe’s exceptional position was rapidly dismantled in
the 1990s in favour of European integration. Schäuble and Lamers argued in
favour of preserving the essentials of that successful Western Europe, how-
ever. The core Europe they had in mind consisted of five countries: France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
A crucial point for Schäuble and Lamers was that their core Europe was
merely a means to saving the EU, not an end in itself. They believed that a
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core Europe was the best way to reduce the dangerous tension that had arisen
between EU enlargement on the one hand and deeper integration through the
currency union on the other. Only a strong core Europe could show that
widening and deepening could occur simultaneously.
The members of the core Europe that they envisaged were therefore the
Member States that had not only demonstrated the political will to integrate
but could also do so within the framework of the monetary union agreed in
the Maastricht Treaty—the latter being the decisive factor.
After all, in the post-‘Maastricht’ EU, deepening integration meant eco-
nomic and monetary integration. Italy was therefore not part of Schäuble and
Lamers’ core, let alone Greece. Only the five countries mentioned could
actually attain the far-reaching level of European cooperation in the relevant
socio-economic, budgetary and fiscal policy domains deemed necessary for a
robust currency union. And only this lead group of countries was economi-
cally fit enough and had the political will to ‘Europeanise’ the necessary
democratic control and ensure that the future currency union would remain
healthy through these channels (competitiveness, political will and demo-
cratic control).9
Schäuble and Lamers timed their paper so that their lead group scenario
could be incorporated into the Treaty texts as part of the negotiations leading
to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The key point was that a lead group willing
and able to embark on deeper integration based on hard criteria for a healthy
economy should not have its ambitions vetoed by other EU members.
The Schäuble-Lamers plan was quickly shot down in the run-up to
‘Amsterdam’. The Italians were angered and insulted and the French were
suspicious. One of the cardinal problems was that the plan made too blatant a
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Critics openly questioned the motives of
the German ‘European’ authors. Did their proposals not, after all, promote the
very fragmentation that they claimed to want to avoid? No one therefore
heard their most important message, which Lamers summed up years later as
‘a little more Europe isn’t possible’.
6.6 Conclusion: Dealing Proactively with Variation
The EU’s current situation forces us to rethink existing variation options and to deal
more consciously and proactively with them. In the forms of variation proposed
above, the focus is mainly on variation in policy content, but variation in
membership/members is also certainly possible. What is important here is that
making more conscious use of variation can contribute to a greater sense of control
and offer an alternative to relying on the ‘binding effect’ of the Community method
on all the Member States and the associated convergence. This has been
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underscored by the European Commission’s White Paper and the follow-up
Franco-German initiatives (see Chap. 2), which put the option of a ‘multi-speed
Europe’ back on the European political agenda.
There are also objections to variation, undeniably so. Variation can be a com-
plication. Embracing it too quickly and without the necessary critical examination
will not restore the credibility of the European project, and in fact could even
damage it. If it does not seem to matter who does or does not commit to European
policy, why is European policy important at all? Conditions must therefore be set
for closer cooperation, as well as for opt-outs and forms of cooperation created
outside the Union framework, to prevent the EU from becoming an à la carte menu.
The following chapters will examine which conditions may apply in which
situations.
Variation must be less ‘opportunistic’ than it has been so far. Instead, it should
be reassessed in line with the EU policy domains that can be deduced from the
Treaties. Not all Member States should be required to accept the EU’s intervention
in all these domains. Where they do, their legal order can be integrated using the
Community method, as before, ensuring that no hybrid situations arise for every
directive, regulation or policy measure.
Focusing too narrowly on the details of variation and the technique used—on the
‘how’—may distract from the question of ‘why’. That is why we proposed a
different approach in the previous chapters, one that responds to the need for
variation but explicitly interprets it in terms of content. That interpretation has
everything to do with the need to reassess, to consider the EU’s public tasks and
how it fulfils them within the context of public interests, objectives and values.
The following chapters examine the options for variation by considering a
number of topical issues: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Chap. 7) and
migration, asylum and border control (Chap. 8). Chapters 7 and 8 look in-depth at
variation and the different forms that it can take by examining its existing pluriform
nature and its potential. Our focus is therefore on both the form of cooperation (who
cooperates on what, and in what way) and the content of the variation: how does it
seek to balance the various public interests, what is the relationship between fun-
damental values and public goods such as stability and security. These chapters are
meant to illustrate the main arguments of this book.
Notes
1. EU Battlegroups are rapid response units within the armed forces of the EU.
They are made up of battalion-sized forces of about 1500 military personnel.
Many of the Battlegroups are multinational, with military personnel being
drawn from different EU Member States. Larger Member States sometimes form
their own Battlegroups, while smaller Member States form groups together.
Four non-EU Member States participate: Norway and Turkey (NATO members)
and Macedonia and Ukraine (non-NATO countries). EU Member States
Denmark and Malta do not currently participate in a Battlegroup.
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2. The Group of Six (G6) is an unofficial group formed by the six largest EU
Member States that deals with counter-terrorism, immigration policy and law
enforcement The G6 was established in May 2003 as the G5, initially made up
of France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Poland joined the
group, whose members are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in 2006.
3. The ‘EU big three’ refers to the informal partnerships within the European
defence and security policy between the three most powerful EU Member
States, the UK, France and Germany, which have jumped into fill a leadership
void. See C. Hill, in The EU presence in International Organizations,
Blavoukos, S., & Bourantonis, D. (2011). Routledge.
4. TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express
Transfer) was a European interbank payment system, replaced in November
2007 by TARGET2, a uniform payment system run by the European System of
Central Banks. Target was established to facilitate interbank payments between
the various participants in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
International payments between commercial banks are facilitated by the national
central banks, with the European Central Bank (ECB) being given the role of
clearing house.
5. Fabbrini et al. (2015).
6. The provisions of this Protocol read as follows:
Article 1
1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United
Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions,
practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with
the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.
2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the
Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom
except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such
rights in its national law.
Article 2
To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices,
it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights
or principles that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or
of the United Kingdom.
7. For a complete overview of the most important forms of variation in mem-
bership within the current Treaty frameworks, see De Witte (2018).
8. On the eve of founding the European Convention to draft a Constitution, the
debate on lead groups and differentiation resurfaced. At the time, prominent
voices (Fischer, Chirac, Delors) advocated setting up a permanent lead
group. Nevertheless, the Laeken Declaration and the European Convention
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focused on a new common framework for all in an attempt to avoid the
‘second-class Member State’ label.
9. It is no coincidence that the idea of a core Europe came from the German
Christian Democrats. The idea, as elaborated by Schäuble and Lamers, harkens
back to the ‘ordoliberal’ approach to economic integration. The proper func-
tioning of the market is central to that approach. This means, first and foremost,
that integration must be supported by the economies involved (which should
grow more similar) and that it must happen spontaneously, without the need for
a centrist bureaucracy of redistribution. In other words, economic integration is
like a chain. It can only be sustainable if the links are strong enough, social
security is adequate, and the individual economies are healthy enough. Each link
is responsible for its own prosperity and well-being, something it must earn by
means of price stability, economic prudence and a hard currency (monitored by
an independent central bank). Integration can be a tremendous help but it can
also frustrate these efforts, for example if it turns out to be a stepping stone to
common debt or debt union because the differences between the integrating
economies are too large and competition in the market is too fierce for some of
the members. While this ordoliberal-inspired logic has influenced European
integration, it has never been absorbed entirely, not even in the euro area.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
6.6 Conclusion: Dealing Proactively with Variation 95
Chapter 7
Variation and the Euro
7.1 Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro and euro area to
which it gave birth have often been presented as the definitive and irreversible
outcome of European integration, or even as a historical necessity at a crucial time
of major changes in world politics. Today, however, the story of deeper integration
and unification through the single currency is being called into question. New facts
have intensified doubts; for example, convergence has not lived up to its promise
for several years now.1 During the economic and financial crisis of recent years, the
euro severely tested political support for European integration. On the other hand, it
could be argued that, in weathering these many storms, the European integration
process demonstrated its resilience.
Stabilisation of the euro area is needed, financially, economically and to bolster
confidence. That will require more change. It is neither realistic nor desirable to
effectuate this change by taking a quantum leap in federalisation. It is equally
unrealistic and undesirable to dismantle the existing currency union, however.
Drastic overhauls are also difficult2 in the current political and social context,
despite arguments favouring Treaty revision.3 Allowing for this context, however,
there are a number of feasible and desirable options in which the notion of ‘vari-
ation’ can be helpful. It should be noted that the euro area itself is already a form of
variation within the European Union, as not all Member States participate (while
some non-Member States do). This chapter explores and elaborates on such pos-
sibilities, bearing in mind the history of the monetary union to date.
Starting in 2010, parties active in the financial markets have engaged in lengthy
and spirited speculation about the collapse or break-up of the monetary union, and
subsequently about ‘exits’ from the euro area. While fragmentation and departures
have so far not occurred, doom scenarios cannot be ruled out as yet, the most recent
risk factor being the formation of the Lega-M5S government in Italy. The instability
of the euro area has had severe consequences. Examples include disruptive
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divergence in interest rates, capital outflows and the bailout of transnational banks
using national tax revenues (highlighting the unhealthy interdependence between
governments and banks). The debate on how to safeguard the future of the euro is
also leading to polarisation in both domestic and European politics. There is con-
stant concern about the currency union’s vulnerability.4
Contradictions set the tone in the debate about safeguarding the future of the
euro. The objectives of financial stability and competitive advantage based on
economies of scale and deepening interdependence are at odds with concerns about
the loss of national and European control, dissatisfaction with the curtailment of
national fiscal discretion and fears that the social dimension will be neglected or that
‘free-riding’ and ‘moral hazard’ will become institutionalised (including through
the ECB, the European Stability Mechanism or ESM, and any funds that may be
established or filled, for example within the framework of the Banking Union).5
Ultimately, however, the debate on the future of the euro also revolves around
dilemmas related to the production of public goods, as they are defined in this book.
Normative considerations are often described in this context as reflections of the
general interest (‘the logic of appropriateness’) and contrasted with considerations
based on a cost-benefit analysis (‘the logic of consequences’). It is from this per-
spective that the current chapter looks in greater depth at the specific policy
dilemmas that define the debate on the future of the monetary union. The aim is to
point out possible directions for strengthening the euro area in line with recent
political and economic trends, based on the notion of variation. In doing so, it
refrains from making detailed recommendations on the complex issues related to
the future of the euro and EMU.
The problem of EMU has several different facets:
– a fiscal dimension (what do we do about out-of-control national debt and
associated bailouts, and what does this mean in terms of risk-sharing?);
– an economic dimension (what are the consequences of differences in produc-
tivity, economic growth, exports, etc. between Member States?);
– a financial dimension (what do we do to mitigate the potentially destabilising
effects of capital flows; what form of organisation is appropriate for the banking
system?);
– a monetary dimension (what monetary policy allows for (major) differences
between euro-area Member States?);
– and an institutional and political dimension (how can we improve the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the monetary union and euro governance?)
In this book, we discuss these dimensions as a whole, but puts greatest emphasis—
within the limited scope of this chapter—on the fiscal dimension, because this is at the
heart of emu and the euro as they have evolved since theMaastricht Treaty. That said,
we also touch on the other four dimensions at various points in this chapter.
In a general sense, exploring the potential for variation in the euro and EMU is a
highly complex exercise (more complex than in other policy domains). Readers
should therefore regard this chapter as a general survey of how variation can help to
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safeguard the future of the euro beyond the crisis. As such, it serves to clarify the
main message of this book (and is not a comprehensive, separate study into the
causes of, and solutions to, the problems of the euro, or a general economic analysis
of those problems). The starting point for this chapter is the (ad hoc) variation in the
monetary union that arose at the outset and that has been amplified in many respects
during the crises. The main focus, however, is on what variation can do to stabilise
the monetary union within the existing Treaty frameworks, both in the medium
term and in the steady state.
As we explore the potential to use variation to change and therefore improve the
monetary union, it is essential to bear in mind the loss of confidence caused by the
euro crisis. In other words, changes and solutions must contribute to restoring
mutual trust (between Member States) and to rebuilding support for and the
democratic legitimacy of the monetary union (in the Member States).
The critical question that then arises is: how can all euro-area Member States,
from Greece to the Netherlands, become and remain credible participants in the
euro? Inherent in the design of the monetary union as laid down in the Maastricht
Treaty is that the euro-area Member States must take responsibility for themselves.
The most visible evidence is the 3% of GDP ceiling (budget deficit) and the 60% of
GDP ceiling (public debt) introduced since the Maastricht Treaty and as such
fundamental to the monetary union.
Nevertheless, many of the plans proposing changes in the euro area tend to stress
the responsibility of the EU’s institutions—such as the European Council and the
European Central Bank—and that of the Member States.6 The question is, however,
whether confidence can be restored by transferring more competences to the EU’s
institutions in an effort to boost the euro. Although proposed solutions to the euro’s
problems often involve the transfer of even more competences, supported by pre-
dominantly technocratic arguments, it is precisely there—in that technocracy and
transfer of competences—that the road leading to restored confidence vanishes.
How do we find it again? Before we can answer that question, we must go the heart
of the current impasse.
Potential solutions within the existing frameworks are delimited by two
extremes. At one end of the scale is the effort to boost the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), the 3 and 60% ceilings mentioned above, with the Member States bearing
maximum responsibility. At the other end are proposals to transfer as many
euro-related powers as possible to the EC (with accountability to the EP), for
example by installing a European ‘Minister of Finance’. Both extremes soon lead to
a widening gap with the national democracies (maintaining SGP through supra-
national mechanisms, institution-building). Both have their fervent proponents and
opponents among the Member States. This is at the very heart of the impasse that is
gripping the euro area.
Section 7.2 takes the current impasse as its starting point and places it against the
backdrop of the history of the euro and the conflict between the ‘logic of appro-
priateness’ and the ‘logic of consequences’ that has coloured the euro’s evolution in
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recent years. On that basis, it takes a new look at the question: where, given the
current situation, are there opportunities for variation in EMU and the euro?
Section 7.3 answers this question by charting three possible routes for variation
in EMU and the euro. They are routes in which variation (the co-existence of
different arrangements) and unity (as formulated in the existing Treaties) can be
recombined and can reinforce each other. We look in particular at the problems
associated with the ‘no-bailout clause’—which states that countries do not cover
each other’s debts when they are in trouble—owing to its de facto annulment in
recent years. We also look closely at how IMF involvement might be continued,
whether a European Monetary Fund (EMF) could resolve the current impasse, the
importance of focusing on macroprudential policy, and whether all these elements
can be combined by leaving more room for variation.
Section 7.4 presents a brief conclusion. In general, this chapter seeks solutions to
the current EMU and euro problems in coordination or closer coordination within
the existing institutional frameworks, as well as in some of the emergency
arrangements rigged up during the euro crisis. This approach would allow the
Netherlands to bring the euro and EMU more into line with its own political
preferences, but notes at the same time that politicians and the public remain little
aware of such opportunities.
7.2 The Two Logics and the Current Impasse
The positions at both the national and European extremes of the debate on the
future of the euro are normatively charged. On the one hand, there are the
‘Eurosceptics’, who advocate for the primacy of the national state. On the other,
there are the ‘Europhiles’, who are fighting for European primacy. The views of
both groups are a matter of principle: depending on whether they support the
national state or a federation, their arguments are dominated by either a national or a
European ‘logic of appropriateness’ (although both groups often use the ‘logic of
consequences’ to substantiate their positions). The views, plans and ideas posi-
tioned between these two extremes are predominantly pragmatic, i.e. aimed at
reducing costs and maximising returns.
The tension between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences
has intensified in recent years. That tension is disruptive, all the more so because it
is growing in a context in which Treaty law and institutions have only limited effect
and in which the political support for changing the Treaties is inadequate.7 In other
words, the leeway for unifying solutions that reconcile both logics is limited.8 As
the current situation shows, moreover, the argument that the single currency is a
‘logical’ consequence of the internal market—the argument that underpinned the
run-up to and establishment of EMU (see also Box 7.1)—is no longer conclusive.
Powerful evidence can be found in the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the Brexit
referendum.
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In response to the Union’s management of the euro crisis from 2011 onwards,
which the United Kingdom (understandably) perceived as a move to border off the
euro area, the British government warned that this would jeopardise the ‘integrity of
the European Single Market’ and make its membership of the EU correspondingly
more problematic.9 British criticism of the euro echoed a broader, swelling chorus
of doubt regarding the merits of the single currency.
At the time of its introduction, the euro was seen as an instrument for prosperity,
growth and international influence. Progress in all those areas has been inadequate,
however. In fact, in view of the euro crisis, the underperformance of the single
currency has turned into a serious issue of multilateral coordination and political
credibility in virtually every euro-area Member State.10 At the same time, monetary
union has also raised all sorts of problematic side effects, for example unfair tax
competition, inadequate capacity for structural reforms, lack of fiscal discipline, the
ECB’s controversial policy of quantitative easing (QE), and distressing levels of
unemployment and impoverishment.11 These developments have put pressure on
stability and prosperity growth, the main public tasks that the members of the euro
area were attempting to fulfil through the single currency. A further question is
whether the crisis management efforts of recent years have in fact strengthened the
euro area. For example, the sovereign debt problem remains in many euro-area
Member States and there is, as yet, no solution in sight for the broader crisis of
confidence that has arisen between governments, EU institutions and citizens.
Even so, much has happened. Several adjustments have been made to EMU.
There is closer surveillance of fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances, such as
potentially harmful imbalances between the current account surpluses and deficits
of euro-area members (Six-Pack 2011). Fiscal coordination has also been extended
by boosting the budgetary competence of the European Commission (Two-Pack
2013), partly in the context of the ‘European Semester’ (2010), the cycle of eco-
nomic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU.12
Efforts to set up a banking union are also under way, the ECB supervises system
banks, there is a European directive on bank recovery and resolution, and a pro-
posal for a European deposit guarantee scheme. On top of all this, an emergency
fund has been set up for euro-area Member States that have experienced acute
financial difficulties during the euro crisis, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). There are also the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) for the Member
States that have received ESM support—a programme in which the ECB figures as
the de facto ‘lender of last resort’, even though the OMT mechanism has not been
activated to date—as well as the ECB’s (ultra-)low-interest-rate policy and its
aforementioned programme of quantitative easing.13
Many of these EMU adaptations have bolstered the role of the EU’s institutions
vis-à-vis that of the governments of the Member States. For example, the ESM
imposes far-reaching requirements on debtors, while the ECB, the ‘daily’ saviour of
the euro, has gradually assumed a key role as the guardian of euro-area stability, for
example by ‘Europeanising’ (banking) surveillance and expanding its balance
sheet. These moves give the ECB much more influence in the governance of the
single currency. They have, moreover, been accompanied by a certain ‘shifting’ of
7.2 The Two Logics and the Current Impasse 101
political responsibilities from the governments of the Member States to the EU’s
institutions, such as the ECB, the EC and the ESM, which are less subject to
democratic control.
The euro’s rescue, as it has evolved in recent years, has had far-reaching con-
sequences. Political decisions concerning dilemmas of solidarity, reliability (e.g.
with regard to fiscal discipline) and social cohesion are now ‘hidden’ to a greater or
lesser extent in the policy-related techniques employed by the EU’s institutions, for
example in the ECB’s balance sheets (TARGET2), in the ESM,14 or in the zero risk
weighting of government bonds on banks’ balance sheets. This is not only
increasing the power of the EU’s institutions in the EMU, but also raising growing
doubts about the independence of, for example, the ECB and concerns about
monetary financing through the same ECB (which is prohibited).15
One of the most drastic crisis measures to stabilise the euro area was the creation
of the ESM, an organisation that provides financial assistance to euro-area countries
struggling with excessive government debt, subject to their undertaking a pro-
gramme of reform. Where necessary, moreover, the ECB will buy government
bonds from Member States participating in an ESM programme (through the OMT
mechanism) to prevent destabilising speculation on sovereign debt. The OMT
mechanism has not been activated to date. Measures such as the ESM and OMT are
clearly a step towards more risk-sharing in the euro area,16 and are politically
controversial.
The controversies surrounding new moves towards greater risk-sharing reflect the
current impasse (mentioned above). In other words, the tendency to shift responsi-
bility in the euro area to the EU’s institutions—such as the EC and the ECB—and
away from the Member States is seemingly not the way to restore lost confidence.
That is precisely why EMU and euro reform is so difficult and regarded with con-
siderable suspicion and mistrust in the Member States.
The impasse has meant that, for the time being, the only progress being made
concerns the proposals for completing a banking union. These proposals are meant
to contribute to financial stability and to end the ‘deadly embrace’ between indi-
vidual governments and ‘their’ banks. The problem, however, is that the plans
establishing the banking union have not advanced far enough to actually navigate
the euro into calmer waters.17 It seems that more is required. This explains France’s
efforts to further ‘deepen’ and politicise the euro around the Franco-German axis,
but these plans, in turn, have led to the political impasse described above. Whether
they will, or will continue to, garner sufficient support and to what extent they serve
the interests of the Netherlands is therefore hugely uncertain. In addition, the
legitimacy of such plans remains problematic, in any case.
What we can conclude from the above is that there is a need for something else,
a prospect that calls for a firmer commitment from euro-area Member States than at
present. That prospect might also represent the only opportunity to genuinely
reinforce the basis of support for the euro area and its democratic foundations. It
must be sought in between the two extremes, i.e. bolstering the Stability and
Growth Pact by placing maximum responsibility with the Member States on the one
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hand and further centralising euro governance by transferring as many competences
as possible on the other.
Between these extremes are modalities of (greater) variation. In essence, they
suggest a certain ‘reversion’ to the governments of the Member States, and
therefore to their national parliaments. Instead of a stultifying focus on one or the
other extreme, the idea would be to mark time so that preferences and expectations
in each euro area Member State can become clear. A strategy of this kind would
address the urgent need for more democratic legitimacy in the way the euro is
managed.18 The key question then is whether these different preferences can be
expressed in (policy) variation between Member States, and, if so, in such a way
that each Member State pursues a credible policy that is appropriate to monetary
union. In short, can we allow differences between Member States that strengthen
the unity behind the single currency at the same time?
There is no simple answer to the question of whether such variation is even
possible within the monetary union. The pursuit of a stable monetary union between
autonomous states is, by definition, a complex affair owing to the patently large
interdependencies and externalities between Member States in the absence of an
overarching (political) organisation that has democratic legitimacy and a basis of
support among the inhabitants of those Member States. Nevertheless, that is the
situation as it now stands, because that is how the single currency was formed (see
box below).
Box 7.1 The Franco-German Deal and the Design of EMU and the Euro
Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a new boost to the EMU project long before
the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The presentation of the
Delors Report had made EMU the centre of attention that spring, but there
were fears in Paris that events in Central and Eastern Europe would slow its
momentum. It was the German Chancellor who took steps to allay French
concerns.
Kohl carved out a place for European Political Union (EPU) in his pro-
jections of EMU, partly with a view to popular sentiment in his own country
(EMU was not a popular topic in German domestic politics). EPU had broad
support among West Germans at the time, especially because it implied
giving the European Parliament (EP) more power. It also served to pacify the
‘EMU-sceptic’ Bundesbank. Frankfurt conceived of EMU merely as the
culmination of a process of peremptory economic convergence, the ‘crown-
ing theory’: first economic convergence and then EMU, and not the other way
around. The rationale behind this position was as follows: EMU partners had
to adopt German financial and economic best practices before there could be
EMU. In terms of financial policy, EMU was to be ‘German’ or not happen at
all. EPU fit right into this story. Something like an EPU would, after all, be
essential to enforcing the sought-after economic convergence.19
France, however, looked unfavourably on this. In the eyes of President
Francois Mitterrand, France had already made major concessions on two
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points. First, the EMU blueprint presented in the Delors Report was already
very ‘German’; it proposed an independent central bank, prioritised price
stability and imposed strict convergence criteria concerning fiscal discipline
and government debt. Second, in the 1980s France had reluctantly consented
to the free movement of capital in the European Community, a prerequisite
for further discussion of EMU put forward by Germany and the
Netherlands.20
Moreover, a Europe that allowed the free movement of capital had to
choose between a monetary union or floating exchange rates, but because
exchange rate stability was vital for the internal market, the second option
was not preferable. The concept of the monetary policy ‘trilemma’ states that
it is impossible to have free capital flow, a fixed exchange rate and sovereign
monetary policy at the same time. One of these policies always has to give
way, and since capital had been liberalised, sovereign monetary policy would
have to go.
After Mitterrand had agreed to the starting date of EMU negotiations, an
important point in itself, Kohl promised at the Strasbourg Summit that EMU
and German unification would be inextricably linked (December 1989).
Economic and monetary objections to EMU, which were prevalent in
Germany and in the Netherlands, were pushed to the background and
German-Dutch concepts failed to prevail in the EMU’s design. The crucial
element in that design was the sequence: first monetary union, then economic
convergence, and then perhaps EPU. Little or no attention was paid to
problems that might accompany a monetary merger between very different
national economies and the management of economic and financial interde-
pendence—problems that could grow more serious as EMU expanded.
EMU was launched in 1999. The large group of Member States partici-
pating at the outset was contrary to expectations, at least those of the Germans
and Dutch.21 Prominent economists had also explicitly recommended starting
out with a lead group, with Germany as its linchpin. They based their rec-
ommendation on Mundell’s theory of ‘optimum currency areas’,22 a system
for sizing up the costs and benefits of a monetary union.
The major advantage of monetary union is that it eliminates exchange rate
risks and shocks. This is particularly good news for the internal market,
which becomes stronger thanks to lower transaction costs. In addition, the
single currency also prevents governments from devaluing their currencies to
improve the competitiveness of their businesses. Market distortions of this
kind may be detrimental to the internal market and can trigger protectionist
countermeasures, but a monetary union makes them impossible.
The costs of a monetary union stem from the loss of sovereign monetary
policy instruments that can be deployed in response to country-specific
shocks. Therein lies a fundamental contradiction between theory and emu
practice. In general, the more countries trade with one another, the more
benefits they gain by eliminating exchange rates between them and the lower
104 7 Variation and the Euro
the cost of abandoning sovereign monetary policy instruments. The latter is
not always the case, however, because it depends largely on the production
structure.
In the early 1990s, various studies indicated that the group of countries
that had pegged their currencies to the German mark resembled an optimum
currency area much more closely than the larger group in the single currency
zone, which included the southern EU Member States.23 The outcomes were
inconclusive, however, and that is partly why the debate about optimum
currency areas increasingly became a question of faith.
The question, ultimately, was whether exchange rates should be regarded
as a source of potential distortions in the single market and should therefore
be eliminated. Mundell and others were increasingly inclined to say yes,
emphasising in particular the aforementioned benefits of monetary union.24
Consequently, Mundell and economists who supported his analysis
encouraged a pro-EMU trend, which paved the way to a remarkable phe-
nomenon: the accession criteria for EMU were not based on the theory of
optimum currency areas.25 Instead, they concerned macroeconomic policy
indicators such as low inflation, small government deficits and exchange rate
stability. They therefore did not acknowledge the core assumption of opti-
mum currency theory as an argument for EMU, i.e. a sufficient degree of
commercial integration. For example, they ignored the trade imbalances of
potential Member States. In addition, countries with trade deficits were
allowed to cover these with loans that could be raised on the recently liber-
alised European capital market, and the more likely an EU Member State was
to join emu, the better the terms. The financial markets had already factored
EMU membership into their interest rates and, for example, furnished
countries such as Greece and Italy with generous amounts of capital on that
basis.26
If anything became clear after the outbreak of the financial and economic
crisis, it was that EMU in its present form and with its current members is not
an ‘optimum currency area’, and that the European policy programme of the
1990s, which was based partly on this erroneous expectation, had diverted
attention away from the risks that were taken in setting up EMU.
An imperfect understanding of the ‘E’ component meant that EMU was
ill-equipped to commence with a large group of Member States, in other
words a larger group than the core group pegged to Germany. Why, then, did
it go ahead?
The Maastricht Treaty did not specify whether the third stage of EMU, the
introduction of the single currency, would involve a smaller lead group of
Member States or a whole pack. At the very last moment, France and Italy
proposed including starting dates in the Treaty. If no majority of countries
satisfied the emu criteria in 1997, then the third stage would commence in
1999 with the countries that did. That seemed to leave open the possibility of
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starting with a lead group with Germany as its core. That the group ultimately
became a pack is due mainly to two factors.
First of all, the recession in 1991–1992 threw public finances in the EMU
area off balance. Second, Germany’s public finances suffered as a result of the
high costs of unification. This made it impossible to launch EMU with a lead
group in 1997, giving the southern Member States more time to meet the
convergence criteria.
Italy’s Amato government (1992–1993) did everything possible to exploit
this opportunity, helped by the convergence game in the financial markets
described above. Interest rates on public debt fell significantly across the
whole area identified by the markets as the future euro area, which included
Italy. The steady deterioration of Germany’s public finances, which had to
bear the costs of unification with the GDR, also meant that Berlin had to use
every trick in the book to keep its budget deficit below 3% of GDP, although
gross government debt rose above the 60% ceiling. This prevented Germany
from playing any role in deciding which Member States would or would not
advance to the third stage. In the end, both the Treaty and the markets forced
EMU into a broad start in 1999. To understand ‘the way of further
strengthening EMU’,27 we need to know which strategic vision gained the
upper hand in constructing the monetary union.
After the Maastricht Treaty (1992), it was mainly the German Bundesbank
that stressed the importance of building a political union.28 Its argument was
inspired by the ‘crowning theory’, which held that EMU would ultimately be
unsustainable without political union. In fact, monetary union could only be
the ‘crowning glory’ of an existing political union. The ‘crowning theory’ is
diametrically opposed to its reverse, the ‘sequence’ described above, which
eventually gained the upper hand under pressure of the events in 1989–1991
and the momentum created by the Maastricht Treaty.29,30
Nevertheless, the ambiguous concept of ‘an EPU’ continues to hover over
the market as a possible, but very controversial, panacea for the problems of
the euro area. There has recently been a fundamental shift in the thinking
about EPU, including viewing it as a possible solution to the current problems
in the euro area. The origin of this shift can be traced back to 28 February
2013, when the then President of the European Council, Herman Van
Rompuy, gave a speech in the City of London on the future of EMU and the
euro area.
Van Rompuy was responding to the notorious speech by British Prime
Minister David Cameron earlier that year, in which he openly expressed his
doubts as to whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the EU.
Van Rompuy was clear about the way forward: ‘We are not witnessing the
birth pangs of a federal “Euroland”. Changing the EU treaties is therefore not
the priority.’ Van Rompuy had a different ‘top priority’ in mind, i.e. ‘deep-
ening economic coordination’, and in his view that meant ‘[e]volution, not
revolution’ in the subsequent development of the EMU.
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Nevertheless, Van Rompuy was preaching ‘revolution’ because, despite
his pragmatic modesty, he did nothing less than to write off the idea of an
EPU as a realistic prospect or a solution to the acute crisis in which the euro
area found itself at the time. The concept of political union that Van Rompuy
described in London was an elaboration of the ‘blueprint’ for an integrated
policy framework in the euro area and EMU that he had presented in the
autumn of 2012 and that has been developed step by step ever since. That
occurred in the following succession of documents: the Commission’s 2012
blueprint for a ‘deep and genuine’ EMU, the aforementioned proposal by the
President of the European Council in the same year, the 2015 Five
Presidents’ Report, and the proposals in the Commission’s 2017 reflection
paper referred to above. All these proposals recommend strengthening
‘Europeanisation’ in EMU and the euro area in the long run and greater
solidarity between the Member States in the monetary union—including hints
about debt mutualisation, with risks on public debt being shared.31 This
would not be on the basis of an EPU, but rather on the basis of Community
policy coordination.
What is crucial to all these proposals is that they take shape within the
existing Treaties. This is in line with Van Rompuy’s implicit obstruction of
the ‘all-out EPU route’ (by means of federalisation) in 2013, as described
above. The point in all these proposals is to improve the existing mechanisms
of policy coordination and their democratic legitimacy, not to change the
Treaties or come up with new treaties and institutions.
7.3 Variation as a Possible Solution to Coordination
Problems in the Euro Area: An Initial Exploration
Where, given the current situation, are there opportunities for variation in EMU and
the euro? Opportunities in which variation (the co-existence of different arrange-
ments) and unity (as formulated in the existing Treaties) can be combined and can
reinforce each other? That is the question that we must answer if we are to break the
current deadlock. This section explores specific variation options; it focuses on how
to deal with situations in the euro area in which the members’ fiscal policies have
negative effects. Our discussion takes into account the three dimensions of variation
described in Chap. 6.
A monetary union requires the advanced coordination of economic policies.
The purpose of the single currency policy is to cushion the adverse impact of
‘symmetrical shocks’, for example a change in the global economy. ‘Asymmetrical
shocks’ (which are country-specific) must be absorbed by labour market policies
and national fiscal policies, but these are constrained by the conditions imposed on
the size of the government’s debt and budget deficit.32 In the end, it is mainly
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adjustments in the labour market—including social security schemes—that must
compensate for the absence of the exchange rate mechanism in this set-up.33 This
is, in short, the logic behind the emu’s design, as laid down in the Maastricht
Treaty. The ‘no-bailout clause’ was essential in this respect.
The logic behind the EMU’s design as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty is that
countries must have their own fiscal policies in proper order. The ‘no-bailout’
clause was critical in that countries would not come to one another’s aid in the
event of problems, making it pointless for the financial markets to speculate on a
bailout. The purpose was to enforce sufficient fiscal discipline among the emu
members. There was a good reason for this: large budget deficits and the ensuing
public debt could jeopardise the value of the euro (and deposits in that currency).34
By now, it has become clear that the no-bailout clause did not survive the euro
area’s collective response to the crisis. In that respect, the ‘Maastricht order’ has so
far proved illusory (Box 7.2).
Box 7.2 The Problems of ‘No Bailout’ and SGP
If the dilemmas related to the production of such public goods as stability and
prosperity growth have become apparent anywhere in recent years, it is in the
no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty. During the euro crisis, the basic
principles underpinning the prescribed fiscal discipline of the euro area
Member States and the ECB’s mandate proved politically untenable, even
though these principles were referred to explicitly in the Maastricht Treaty.
They were also of huge importance in the Netherlands’ decision to join EMU
and the euro.
Much of what has happened in recent years, however, was already pre-
ordained in the Maastricht Treaty. While the Treaty’s ‘excessive deficit
procedure’ (Article 104c, now Article 126 TFEU) was based on quantified
reference values for Member States’ budget deficits and debt quotas (3% and
60% of GDP respectively), these reference values were made ‘dynamic’
during the final phase of the Treaty negotiations. This means, for example,
that budget deficits that exceed 3% of GDP are regarded as acceptable if they
can be defined as ‘temporary’ or ‘exceptional’ deviations. It also means that it
is the ECOFIN (Council of Finance Ministers) that determines this on a
case-by-case basis, by qualified majority. Member States therefore do not
have the right of veto. The Commission’s role is limited to measuring the
Member States’ performance against the quantified criteria, and to monitoring
the procedure. From the outset, then, the excessive deficit procedure,
including the imposition of sanctions, was the subject of political
decision-making between the Member States in ECOFIN. It has remained so,
even though the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was added during the
run-up to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) as extra inducement.
The conclusions of the Dublin European Council of 14 December 1996
were the prelude to the SGP: they announced that the excessive deficit pro-
cedure would be laid down in two directives and not in a supplementary
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treaty. In essence, Article 104C remained unchanged. At the Amsterdam
Summit on 16 and 17 June 1997, the European Council adopted a Resolution
establishing the SGP. In it, the EC pointed out the obligation under the Treaty
to avoid excessive government deficits, but also noted that the ‘Member
States remain responsible’ for meeting this obligation. The role of the
Commission and ECOFIN remained as defined in the Maastricht Treaty. It
was therefore still up to the Council of Ministers to take a final decision in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the Treaty and to decide whether
or not to impose the associated sanctions. ECOFIN may deviate from the
procedure if a qualified majority in the Council determines that ‘special cir-
cumstances’ exist in the Member State that has exceeded the reference value,
or if ECOFIN determines that the Member State has made sufficient efforts to
address the deficit—although a decision ‘not to act’ on the Commission’s
recommendation must be supported by sound arguments.
At best, the SGP was a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between euro area
Finance ministers, based on the realisation that free riding at the expense of
the single currency project—by taking advantage of the single currency’s
stability without linking it to national fiscal discipline—was unwise. There
was, however, great confidence in the unifying power of the market as the
foundation for monetary union.
The credibility of the SGP’s quantitative reference values ultimately
depended on a qualified majority. That changed dramatically in November
2003 when the German government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
invoked the ‘special circumstances’ clause, referencing the ongoing costs of
German unification (which had caused Germany’s budget deficit to exceed
the 3% of GDP ceiling). Germany managed to drum up a qualified majority in
ECOFIN, partly thanks to the support of France, which had also exceeded the
3% threshold. The SGP was suspended temporarily and would later be made
more flexible.35 In euro area Member States such as the Netherlands, this turn
of events was a blow to the credibility of the single currency as the key to
long-term stability and prosperity growth, and to the credibility of the crucial
no-bailout guarantee in the Maastricht Treaty. Doubts were further raised by
the manner in which the euro had taken shape since the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty, and in part by the large number of Member States that
appeared to qualify for admission at the euro’s introduction.
All these doubts were intensified by the course of events during the euro
crisis. It turned out that it was impossible to adhere strictly to the no-bailout
clause, that the rules for budgetary discipline were unfeasible, that the gov-
ernance of the monetary union had less-than-perfect democratic legitimacy,
and that yawning differences remained between the Member States. It became
clear that the monetary union’s design had certain consequences and involved
certain responsibilities and budgetary risks, and that change and adaption
would be unavoidable. That is where we are today. The general view is that
the measures taken in recent years have considerably strengthened the
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institutional structure of EMU. At the same time, there is a widely shared
awareness that the monetary union in its present form is ‘unfinished’ and a
‘lack of consensus about how the EMU should develop further’.36
The problems surrounding the no-bailout clause clearly illustrate the
dilemmas of collective action, for example the problem of ‘moral hazard’. In
essence, this means that when Member States can rely on assistance in the
case of excessive debt, they may incur more debt. Another question is how to
deal with debts incurred in the past. In other words, introducing debt sharing
as a stabilisation measure could very well undermine the whole point of the
single currency, namely (price) stability. This analysis helps us understand
why euro-area Member States such as the Netherlands find using European
debt mutualisation to prop up the euro area problematic.37 Germany, the
Netherlands and other Member States greatly prefer to bolster the single
currency by restoring the credibility of the no-bailout clause in the Maastricht
Treaty. This may not be impossible if the Union manages to make better use
of its existing variation options.
The potential for more variation is inherent in the current set-up of the euro. It is,
as it were, the ‘flip side’ of the Member States’ own responsibility for fiscal dis-
cipline and structural reform. Variation in this sense requires different, co-existing
arrangements. In exploring the actual potential for variation, we must briefly
indicate which elements in the current governance of the euro might be included.
There are at least three factors that need to be considered:
a. the extent to which euro-area Member States exercise market discipline;
b. whether the Member States want mutual insurance, and the status of a common
monetary fund;
c. whether the IMF should be involved.
Using the terminology of the dimensions of variation introduced in Chap. 6, this
list logically begins with variation in policy content, but it also considers variation
in membership and decision-making.
What are the options that arise working with the above elements (on the
understanding that we do not immediately assess their feasibility)? Below, we
discuss potential routes to variation, by which we mean different arrangements that
can co-exist. They are:
1. variation by means of market discipline and IMF involvement going forward;
2. variation by means of a European Monetary Fund (EMF).
Both forms of variation are geared primarily towards variation in policy content,
i.e. the type of variation appropriate in situations in which the Member States
concerned have the same motivation for collective action (in this case, reciprocity).
However, they may have differing interpretations of the situation that drives this
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action, i.e. socio-economic goals versus price stability and structural reforms (see
the concluding section of Chap. 4).
After surveying variation in policy content, i.e. creating leeway for national
discretion based on framework or minimum agreements, we can then consider
variation in decision-making and/or (sub)membership, for example with regard to
the development of existing or the establishment of new institutions, such as the
ESM or an EMF. What is the decision-making procedure on the appropriation of
loans (supranational, Community, intergovernmental)? Who are the members of
such funds and what does their membership consist of? In other words, is variation
in membership possible?
This approach—variation in policy content first and then variation in
decision-making and (sub)membership—forms the basis for our exploration of
variation in the EMU and the euro by means of the two arrangements identified
above.
There are, additionally, euro-related policy domains in which variation in policy
content is already facilitated. One current and evolving example is macroprudential
policy. We discuss this existing form of variation in more detail at the end of this
section. We also identify ways of making this policy integral to efforts to strengthen
EMU and the euro in the light of the arrangements that we will discuss first. The
aim at all times is to consider the budgetary, economic, financial, monetary and
institutional-political dimensions as a whole when taking further steps to strengthen
EMU and the euro (see the introduction to this chapter).
1. Variation by means of market discipline and IMF involvement going
forward
One option is for some Member States to exercise market discipline and submit to
the IMF’s recovery programmes in the event of difficulties while other Member
States establish a common fund providing mutual insurance. In both cases, rules
will be necessary, including the option of variation in decision-making and mem-
bership (of certain arrangements), the details of which are beyond the scope of this
(exploratory) chapter. The existing euro architecture provides the necessary leeway
for tightening up checks and balances through the exercise of market discipline and
for reducing the technocratic complexion of policy-making. This is feasible without
far-reaching politicisation at European level or Treaty amendments. Such leeway is
the starting point for our discussion of this first route of variation.
The market discipline/IMF arrangement is appropriate for countries that are
committed to taking responsibility for their own affairs. The fund arrangement, in
turn, requires a large measure of trust between the Member States that choose to
participate. In the toolkit of solutions for the dilemmas associated with bolstering
the single currency, one element has garnered considerable attention recently: the
creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which is not provided for in the
Treaty but is possible within its framework. An EMF may be of particular value as
an emergency fund in the event of exceptional asymmetrical shocks and as an
additional instrument alongside automatic stabilisers and temporary budget
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deficits.38 In such cases, however, Article 122(2) TFEU already provides for the
possibility of furnishing aid to Member States. As an interpretation of this clause, an
EMF could take the form of an ex ante fund and/or (mutual) borrowing capacity.
In the case of mutual borrowing capacity, variation is possible in policy design
(and possibly also in decision-making and degrees of participation). That would
certainly be true if such organised borrowing capacity can be applied in tandem
with pre-existing IMF funds (formed by euro-area countries). Moreover, the IMF
has traditionally extended funds to ease pressure on the balance of payments caused
by a policy of fixed exchange rates (of which the single currency is essentially a—
specifically European—version).39
Specifically, this could mean, for example, that euro-area Member States whose
government deficits regularly test the boundaries of the rules and agreements would
be more likely to request assistance from an EMF and/or the IMF, or do so more
frequently, than other euro-area Member States. This makes it possible to build
variation into the architecture of an EMF for example pegging risk premiums to
such fiscal behaviour by applying SGP criteria (as proposed on several occasions;
see, for example, CEPR 2018).40
Another option is to make the establishment of the emergency fund optional for
Member States. Those that want to arrange joint coverage contribute to the fund
(and can rely on it in crisis situations). Those that do not want such an arrangement
do not contribute and must rely on themselves (and the IMF) in crisis situations. As
a result, the basic fund, in which everyone participates, may be limited or very
limited. The Member States that do not participate in the fund will no longer receive
assistance if they get into financial difficulties but will instead be forced to
restructure their debt, with the expense then being borne by the private sector.
Variation in this sense implies less integration, for example with regard to fiscal
rules.41 In the latter case, that would mean a reshuffle of the responsibilities in the
monetary union by devolving responsibility (to the national parliaments), a move
that so far has seldom been considered. This could provide a more effective way of
addressing a key dilemma of policy coordination within EMU: on the one hand,
there seems to be a need for more coordinated action (to better guarantee resilience,
balance and growth, including bridging the investment gap42), while on the other
such action is at odds with the decentralised nature of EMU, as structured in the
Maastricht Treaty, and with the aim of minimising pressure on national and
European budgets on account of the euro.
The Dutch Council of State [Raad van State] has examined this approach in
information furnished at the request of the Dutch House of Representatives in
November 201743 and noted that if this more ‘decentralised’ trend were to be
continued, three elements would be important: (1) completion of the banking union,
(2) certain financial safety nets, (3) European enforcement of fiscal and economic
rules in special circumstances.44 This corresponds with the main outlines of our
examination in this section and the rest of the chapter in this book.
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2. Variation by means of an EMF
An EMF is another way to deal with the dilemma of stabilisation versus decen-
tralisation. It differs from the ‘variation by means of market discipline’ discussed
above (particularly in terms of (fund) membership), in which an EMF can be
combined with existing IMF instruments. As discussed in this section, ‘variation by
means of an EMF’ primarily involves creating a fund that could act as an additional
stability mechanism for the single currency, alongside market discipline. This
approach fits in with the history of European integration, which features an array of
‘fund structures’ meant to compensate for market frictions and to act as a buffer in
crises.45 It is driven by the ongoing quest to strike the right balance between
European intergovernmental or supranational buffers on the one hand and market
incentives that are deployed optimally to induce national responsibility on the other.
That quest requires a certain amount of institutional agility.
Institutional agility can be achieved by allowing variation in policy content and
(fund) membership. The single currency as it now stands offers starting points for a
move in that direction. For example, the European Stability Mechanism could form
the basis for a permanent stabilisation fund. The set-up of the fund can remain
intergovernmental in nature. At least as important, however, is that an EMF offers
certain advantages: (1) it would take some of the pressure off the debate about the
need for an EPU, and (2) it would create new scope for a stricter interpretation of
the ECB’s mandate (because the fund could serve as a ‘lender of last resort’)
Moreover, both of these would be consistent with the Dutch position on the future
of the euro in recent years.
There have already been various suggestions as to the form that such a fund
might take, some involving the installation of a ‘European Minister of Finance’.
Other suggestions include a European system of investment protection, a European
system of national unemployment insurance, or a ‘rainy day fund’ for euro-area
Member States in the event of major economic shocks.46 In the case of the latter
two options, all sorts of alternatives are certainly conceivable (variation in policy
content).47 In addition, they carve out more scope for democratic control and/or
economic ‘conditionality’ as prerequisites for such a fund. This can be intergov-
ernmental in nature or involve a hybrid blend of intergovernmental and Community
elements (variation in decision-making). It is also important to decide between ex
ante funding or the institutionalisation of ex post borrowing capacity.
An EMF can chart an alternative route to strengthening monetary union, namely
through variation in short, medium and long-term measures, as well as in overar-
ching conditions of democratic control and economic robustness. In particular, the
existing European Semester (which is essentially a policy dialogue between EU
institutions and Member States) could be used to achieve temporal variation in
policy content and variation in the overarching conditions of economic robustness
(and their application). The European Semester already involves a dialogue with
individual Member States, a country-specific approach (shown, for example, by the
country-specific recommendations that are central to this cycle). There is therefore
already considerable potential for (further) variation here.
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We can elaborate on this reality in relation to an EMF. For example, the set-up of
an EMF could be patterned on whether or not certain Member States implement
economic reforms. The EMF can thus assist the IMF by customising the IMF’s
instruments for the euro. It would exploit what is already a visible pattern of
variation between Member States by permitting those that are facing major struc-
tural economic reforms to derogate from the reference values.
It could also mean that euro-area Member States whose government deficits
regularly test the boundaries of the rules and agreements would be more likely to
request assistance from an EMF or the IMF, whereas others would not have to. It
then becomes possible to build variation into the architecture of an EMF, for
example by charging different premiums on high-risk fiscal behaviour. This could
also be reflected in the risk weighting of government-issued securities on banks’
balance sheets (to loosen the galling bonds between government debt and national
banks).
In addition, an EMF also clears a path to addressing the problem of the
no-bailout requirement. That path has already been described, in tentative terms, by
the Dutch Council of State in information that it provided at the request of the
Dutch House of Representatives in November 2017.48 The path mapped out by the
Council of State and the routes described in this chapter (in particular the first two),
which have the potential to co-exist, are very similar:
One possible way of further strengthening the emu is to place responsibility for policy and
for complying with agreements more firmly at the level of the Member States, along with
greater market discipline through the credible reinstatement of the no-bailout clause. This
would allow more scope for policy competition based on national preferences, placing
accountability for their performance within the emu squarely with the Member States.49
This is in line with the variation in policy content that occupies a central place in
the present report.
Like the present report, the Council of State also describes a variation route
involving an EMF:
At the same time, however, it would be necessary to increase a number of European
responsibilities so that it becomes possible to transfer more responsibilities to the national
level in other domains without jeopardising the survival of EMU… First of all, a new
division of responsibilities requires that Member States be goaded into complying with
agreements by other means than centralised enforcement (alone). This would require
greater market discipline through strict application of the no-bailout clause. That will only
be credible if financial markets are convinced that there are mechanisms in place that affect
them directly and that will be applied as soon as a Member State encounters difficulties.
Otherwise, financial markets will continue to speculate in the belief that other Member
States will eventually help out.
This could be a ‘European mechanism’ for ‘orderly debt restructuring’,50 in
which the Council of State notes that ‘one obvious option is to transfer this
mechanism to the ESM (by means of an amendment to the ESM Treaty) and
transform it into an EMF’.51 An important advantage of variation through an EMF
is that it could serve as a unifying factor in the euro area.
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A European Monetary Fund would be an outgrowth of the European Stability
Mechanism that is already in place. It would align with the institutional paths
trodden in response to the euro crisis: excluding Treaty amendments but including
the structural involvement of the IMF. After all, the ESM was created to support
vulnerable euro-area Member States and as such replaced the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF). It functions as a permanent defensive wall of euro 700
billion to fund bailout loans to euro-area Member States in the event of a solvency
crisis, provided that the Member State in question implements a programme of
economic reforms. It is important that the creation of an EMF complements the IMF
(which is often already the case when IMF support is supplemented by additional
support, e.g. from neighbouring countries); duplication of funds through the IMF
and an EMF must be avoided.
Facilitating long-term stability through the ESM could take the form of an EMF.
In certain respects, this would also fit in with the next phase of the programme to
strengthen the euro area—following the acute crisis management of recent years—
which will have to focus on reassessing national and European responsibilities for
the single currency going forward.
Macroprudential policy as an example of variation in policy content
For some time now, blueprints of what is known as the ‘fourfold union’ have
circulated in the French Ministry of Finance and various Brussels think tanks, for
example. This depiction elaborates on the path taken since the introduction of Van
Rompuy’s blueprint (see Box 7.1) by proposing four pillars that would shape the
monetary union going forward52:
1. financial integration (banking union, capital market union);
2. fiscal integration (funds, euro-area budget);
3. economic integration (macroeconomic balance, structural reforms);
4. political integration (European Minister of Finance, euro-area parliament,
Eurogroup as co-legislator).
These plans call for coherence between the four pillars, implying that they must
be created jointly. The components of the different pillars vary in terms of scope,
feasibility and degree of change, however. On the one hand, there are the ‘no regret’
measures identified by the Council of State,53 which mainly involve completing
what has begun, such as the banking union. On the other, there are measures so
far-reaching—for example setting up a euro-area parliament—that they in any case
imply a Treaty change. In between these two extremes are suggestions for reforms
within the current institutional frameworks, such as the creation of an EMF.
In the light of the above, it is important to consider the dimension of timing with
regard to the ‘fourfold union’. In other words, which suggestions can be prepared
now and which should be planned for the future? This makes it possible to size up
the various elements and, possibly, decide on their sequencing and conditions.
One option that merits further discussion in this book is to continue refining the
existing ‘macroprudential policy’, which is largely decentralised.54 In its current
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form, this is already a policy area in which a conscious choice has been made to
allow national authorities to chart their own course (variation in policy content),
given that financial cycles can vary widely between Member States, making a
one-size-fits-all policy undesirable. It would be better, however, to position this
policy alongside the existing macroeconomic imbalances procedure and the
enforcement of price stability, a task entrusted to the ECB. In addition, a clearer
distinction could be made between country-specific macroprudential policy (de-
signed to address country-specific shocks when monetary policy is ineffective) and
Union-wide macroprudential policy. The first has been elaborated in all sorts of
ways, the second much less so.
Neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the theory of optimum currency areas gave
much thought to this. The forces of global financial development and integration
have made them much more important, however. In addition, the greater impor-
tance of financial markets in the monetary union is creating new problems with
regard to managing the deeper financial and economic interdependencies. All these
factors have indisputable consequences for the ways in which the single currency
can be strengthened in the future55—ways that require further examination.
7.4 Conclusion: Ways Forward for Variations in Policy
It is already complicated enough to coordinate monetary, fiscal, financial and labour
market policies in a single country, let alone between different countries. In reality,
the quest to boost prosperity through common measures has proved to be very
difficult and has resulted in lengthy negotiations about how to distribute prosperity
gains, especially since some Member States ‘lose’ and others ‘win’, for example in
terms of trade surpluses or (emergency) loans. Matters are further complicated by
the fact that the shocks to emu only become apparent after the fact.56
At the same time, however, it is clear that the euro area needs to be strengthened.
How this should happen, however, remains far from clear (see also the information
provided by the Council of State on 7 November 2017). Some potential solutions,
such as far-reaching debt mutualisation or major leaps forward in centralisation and
federalisation, also entail consequences that will be interpreted as unfeasible or
contrary to Dutch interests. Nevertheless, it must be said that the euro’s current
situation leaves plenty of room for improvement.
The existing euro architecture and EMU offer scope for tightening up the system
of checks and balances without resorting to a Treaty change. That requires us to
view the conflicting short- and long-term considerations associated with the ‘logic
of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequences’, but also with individual,
national and European interests, from a longer-term perspective: beyond the crisis,
even, if possible, including the dismantling of a crisis policy that has stretched
EMU to the limit, in particular with regard to the no-bailout rule and the ban on
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monetary financing through the ECB.57 The basis for this approach could well be
the aforementioned ‘no regret measures’ meant to strengthen the monetary union.58
The institutional and political framework for a more gradual path of this kind
took shape following the introduction of initiatives based on Van Rompuy’s
‘blueprint’ (2012), which ruled out any ‘quantum leap’ in federalisation. This
framework creates leeway both for more centralisation and for more decentralisa-
tion (by enhancing the role of the national parliaments), as well as for refining
existing instruments, policy coordination and democratic accountability, including
through variation. The present report offers a frame of reference for constructing
such scenarios, including possible sub-variations in membership/members (of
which the euro area itself offers the most detailed example). Such scenarios can give
the Netherlands a better understanding of the opportunities and risks intrinsic to the
future of the euro area and allow it to anticipate them.
In the approach sketched above, an EMF (with the ESM as its possible basis)
merits more study (with regard to the scope for variation), for example by com-
paring it with alternatives such as continuing the current regime of ongoing IMF
involvement. There may be an additional advantage for the Netherlands in that
setting up an EMF would create scope for enforcing a stricter interpretation of both
the ECB’s mandate and the no-bailout rule (if the fund can be linked to market
discipline in varying arrangements that allow for the differing preferences of the
Member States).
We can conceive of all sorts of variations on an EMF, including mechanisms for
reallocating funds between Member States based on prearranged formulas, more
discretionary powers of assessment—which may imply more politicisation—and
linking disbursements from the fund to criteria, for example macroeconomic
‘conditionality’. All this implies seeking to strengthen the single currency along a
route which may not have been provided for in the Treaty, but which appears to be
possible under the Treaty in the current situation.
This route also offers new variation options, for example by establishing
framework conditions for democratic control per country and for financial, eco-
nomic and macroeconomic robustness and convergence (e.g. through variation in
risk premiums). One potential advantage is that this route may well create new
opportunities to use variation as a means of building closer ties to the national
democracies.
The euro and EMU need to change, but effectuating such change by making a
quantum leap in federalisation or by shattering the existing monetary union seems
neither realistic nor desirable. In other words, neither the straightjacket of federation
nor the straitjacket of the national state can drive the necessary change in the euro
area and EMU. There is another way, however, which involves making use of the
opportunities for variation offered by the current Treaty frameworks. This chapter
has outlined a few of these opportunities.
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Chapter 8
Variation in Asylum, Migration
and Border Control
8.1 Introduction
Human migration is an outstanding example of a policy domain in which the links
between European countries and their surroundings are revealed. The policy
domains of asylum, migration and border control touch on international mobility,
the protection of fundamental human rights, and international security all around
Europe and within it. They also provoke intense debate among populations. These
are policy domains where unexpected changes may arise (such as the sharp increase
in refugees and migrants from conflict zones since 2014), where cooperation within
Europe is clearly of added value (as in the case of joint surveillance of external
borders), but where policy harmonisation may also prove extremely complicated (as
in the case of asylum applications). Moreover, national politics may have an
enormous influence in these domains, such as the German decision in 2015 to
suspend a protocol that obliged Syrian refugees to apply for asylum in the EU
Member State where they had first arrived (if that could be determined at all), and
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s decision in the same year to close the southern and
eastern borders of Hungary.
International cooperation on migration is often undermined by obstructions, a
lack of solidarity, and an unwillingness to face problems.1 That is no different in the
EU.2 At the same time, policies in this domain give the EU an opportunity to make
its geopolitical position clearer, for example by using mobility management to try to
influence neighbouring regions.
International migration is a complex phenomenon, however, involving complex
relationships; simple push-pull models are inadequate.3 Migration is usually the
result of multiple factors, for example inequalities, conflicts, demographic trends,
scarcity and climate change, but very often also of a very human tendency to seek
out and explore opportunities and move on when prospects change. Moreover,
migration is not only exogenous to Europe; political choices made in the past also
influence people’s motives.
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The challenges are considerable and overlap with other issues, such as security,
human rights, foreign policy and the functioning of the internal market. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to describe how the different policy domains of asylum,
borders and migration are related, to survey the main trends and events, and to
analyse which topical issues merit attention in terms of harmonisation, integration
and policy variation. The focus here is on the movement of persons, not goods
(although that is obviously another important aspect of border control). As in the
previous chapter, we analyse variation in the issues of migration and in the posi-
tions and responses of the Member States, and explore other possible variations in
European cooperation. We also identify the conditions and limits of variation.
8.2 History of the Policy Domain
The history of Europe is one of individuals, groups and peoples moving across the
continent. Empire-building, the Great Migration, countless wars and, in the twen-
tieth century, the two world wars that erupted from European conflicts caused
people to drift from place to place, again and again. After the Second World War,
millions of people were forced to move elsewhere.4 Suppression of the uprisings in
Hungary in late 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of people in each case.5 The Yugoslav Civil War once again
displaced millions of people, with some 2.4 million fleeing to other countries.
As the European Communities and the European Union took shape, migration
gradually became a main focus of interest and (controversial) point of
decision-making. The free movement of workers provided for in the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (now Article 45 TFEU) was
transformed in the Single European Act of 19866 into the free movement of persons
(now Article 3(2) TEU). It is important to note that from 1986 to 1995, the
European Communities consisted of nine territorially contiguous Member States,
namely the six original Member States as well as Denmark, Portugal and Spain, and
three Member States separated from the others by seas, namely the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Greece. Although there were usually border controls between
these states, there were no fences or walls preventing border crossings (unlike in the
case of the Iron Curtain). Enforcement of admission and residence rules depended
to a large extent on domestic supervision of aliens. The continental part of the
European Communities had the most to gain from the free movement of persons
and therefore gave it the greatest level of support.
In 1995, the original Member States, with the exception of Italy, agreed to
abolish internal border controls while simultaneously introducing a common visa
system, closer cooperation in law enforcement, and external border checks
(Schengen Agreement). The system did not enter into force until 1995 and required
an Implementing Convention and a variety of practical facilities, such as separate
areas at international airports for intra-Schengen and extra-Schengen flights. In the
meantime, the other continental Member States had joined the system, although
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implementation in Italy was delayed until 1997. Greece had to wait until 2000,
pending the implementation of satisfactory measures at the external borders,7 and
the Scandinavian Member States until 2011, when the other states in the Nordic
Passport Union became part of the Schengen Area.
Parallel to implementing the Schengen system, all EU Member States agreed in
the 1990 Dublin Convention that, in principle, the Member State of first entry
would be responsible for examining asylum applications. This protocol was meant
to discourage asylum seekers from travelling on to those countries where they
expected to have better prospects. The Convention eased the workload for countries
such as the Netherlands and Germany, even though many asylum seekers continued
to arrive at airports. In the Netherlands, political opponents to the Convention
mainly argued that some of the asylum seekers who had passed through the country
should be taken in. The Convention entered into force on 1 September 1997.
The Schengen and Dublin systems were thus established in separate treaties,
outside the structure of the European Communities. The Maastricht Treaty (1992),
which became effective in 1993, merged police, judicial and migration cooperation
into a Third Pillar under the auspices of the European Union. The Treaty of
Amsterdam (1997), which became effective in 1999, subsequently integrated asy-
lum and migration into the Community structures so that the matters covered under
the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention could henceforth be governed
by EC regulations, supplemented by treaties with non-Member States. Initially, the
Schengen and Dublin systems were applied mainly by a socially and economically
convergent group of Member States, along with Sweden, Finland and Austria from
1995 onwards.
The situation changed dramatically when a total of 13 Central and Eastern
European states joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Socio-economic conver-
gence programmes were established for these new members, but their reorientation
in terms of the rule of law and citizenship required a cultural change that proved
difficult to organise. In their accession (although the three states that acceded most
recently were, temporarily, not accepted into the Schengen Area), uniformity was
prioritised over variation without considering the public tasks that needed to be
fulfilled in this case.
8.3 Tensions
The tensions associated with the policy domain of asylum, migration and border
control arose long before 2015, when large numbers of people arrived from the
Eastern Mediterranean and Africa. Ever since the EU’s major enlargement in 2004, a
discrepancy has been visible between the Community arrangements and the reality
of this policy domain. Internal and external changes have played a role in this.
Internally, the free movement of persons—not only of workers, but also of (quasi)
self-employed service providers—sparked an increase in migration, especially from
Poland. From a legal standpoint this was strictly a matter related to the functioning of
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the internal market, but in the Member States’ official statistics and in the eyes of
many of their people, these fellow European citizens were aliens. Externally, the end
of repression-induced stability in North Africa and the Middle East had huge con-
sequences. Against the background of terror caused by al-Qaeda’s attacks, many
people fled to Europe after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010–
2011 and, in particular, the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards, seeking refuge in
particular in the older part of the EU, where conditions for their reception and
integration were more favourable than in the Member States that had acceded since
2004. The stream of refugees reached its climax 2015–2016, aggravated by
migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa. These events were all the
more dramatic because many of the refugees had taken huge risks crossing dan-
gerous regions and seas and exposing themselves to exploitation by human
traffickers.
Western Europe thus quickly became part of a worldwide pattern of refugeeism,
migration and urbanisation that had been noticeable for much longer. In the public’s
view and in statistics used in policymaking, these very different groups of migrants
became one ‘flow’. The common area that was the aim of the Schengen Agreement
and the Dublin Convention was, in fact, divided into countries on the external
border struggling to cope with the many arrivals (mainly Italy, Spain, Malta and
Greece, which was also in the throes of a disruptive budgetary crisis), countries in
Central and Eastern Europe that were averse to immigration and that offered few
prospects to the refugees who came anyway, and countries in Western and Northern
Europe (in particular Germany), which absorbed the lion’s share of the refugees.
The European Union tried to stabilise this situation mainly by harmonising
procedures and criteria for admission and residence, building on the ‘acquis’ of the
Schengen and Dublin regulations. The European Asylum System, introduced in
1999, includes guidelines on asylum procedures and the reception, recognition and
return of asylum seekers that have gradually been clarified. Since the revised
Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) became effective, stricter requirements
have also been imposed on the quality of the judicial procedure. In addition, a
relocation and quota policy was instituted; although it was rejected by some Central
European Member States, it has now been approved by the Court of Justice (6
September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631). Surveillance of the external borders is
regulated in a series of European directives; some are implemented by the
FRONTEX, formerly the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the European Union, which in 2016 became
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
8.4 Intractable Realities
The Common Asylum System has smoothed out many of the differences in the way
Member States assess asylum applications and enforce decisions. Nevertheless,
discrepancies remain. Some of these are related to the effective implementation of
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the system. Without assistance from other EU states, it is impossible for Greece,
with its many islands, to carry out effective border surveillance involving the
registration of country of entry. Other Mediterranean Member States face similar
problems. And as long as registration does not take place, it is equally impossible
for the other EU Member States to invoke the Dublin protocol allowing them to
transfer asylum seekers to the country of entry.
More important, however, are the actual circumstances of reception, accom-
modation and integration into society. For many asylum seekers, these are the
deciding factors in their choice of destination, leading to a very uneven distribution
of refugees among the Member States. Council decisions in 2015 and 2016 con-
cerning the redistribution of asylum seekers, adopted on a proposal by the
Commission and with the advice of the European Parliament, were meant to
reaffirm solidarity between Member States at a time when vast numbers of asylum
seekers were arriving in Europe. A follow-up is a proposed revision of the Dublin
Regulation, now under negotiation after discussion by the European Parliament.
Instead of each Member State being responsible for reception and processing, a
pan-EU approach is to be taken to the issue, with implementation tasks being
divided between the countries.
The past two decades have raised serious doubts as to whether the system as it
stands is tenable. After all, the Member States have such differing attitudes to
asylum and migration that there is little prospect that a policy based on harmonising
procedures and on redistribution will succeed. These differences are both external
and internal in nature. Asylum seekers want to arrive in a country that not only
protects them from bombing and torture but that also allows them to start afresh.
That is why they want desperately to escape from the hopelessness of local refugee
camps or reception centres in Greece and other border countries. At the same time,
migrants have become less welcome in Western Europe, partly because social
cohesion based on traditional patterns has eroded, but also because in the same
period, neoliberalism undermined the protections afforded by the social democratic
state.8 The change in the political and social climate has been even more pro-
nounced in Central and Eastern Europe.9 An overly hasty transition from a
nationally motivated struggle against Marxism to a (hyper)liberal economic system
has raised acute fears of a loss of national ‘identity’ in the Member States that
acceded in 2004 and afterwards, making them even less willing to accept asylum
seekers.
8.5 Solidarity in Migration Policy?
The task of coordinating asylum and migration policy and European and interna-
tional law raises the necessary questions. Much of the current policy ignores the fact
that the group of irregular migrants from Libya, for example, is mixed. Although
the majority of people who cross over are economic migrants who do not qualify
for asylum status, some are refugees entitled to international protection.
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Recognising variation in legal status is essential to guaranteeing fundamental
human rights, both in European and African territory. This approach requires
policies that allow for an internationally legitimate assessment of individuals on
African territory, and not only after refugees have made the dangerous crossing into
EU territory. Legal access channels to Europe are important in this respect. There
must be further discussion of establishing external hotspots where asylum appli-
cations can be submitted, so that Europe can meet its international obligations.10
The policy for regulating the influx of economic migrants is also inadequate. They
constitute the vast majority of migrants arriving on European territory and do not
have the right to residence status. At present, the return policy of many EU Member
States is weak, despite the Return Directive (2008/115/EC). This means that the
majority of asylum seekers who have exhausted all the legal procedures do not
actually return to their country of origin, stoking public dissatisfaction and chipping
away at any public goodwill towards migrants who are entitled to asylum status.11
The issues facing the EU and the Member States are numerous: from the future
of Schengen and a possible Dublin IV or V to the geopolitics of international
migration management by means of mobility partnerships, and from the future of
the ceas and the EU Blue Card to the mandate given to the European Border and
Coast Guard and the design of data information systems. Instead of evaluating each
component, the aim of this section is to understand issues as ‘public goods’, with a
balance continuously being struck between the logic of appropriateness and the
logic of consequences.
A logic of appropriateness could be based on solidarity. Article 80 of Chap. 2 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, entitled ‘Policies on Border
Checks, Asylum and Immigration’, explicitly refers to the notion of solidarity.
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed
by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial
implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.
Does this provide a legal basis? Not necessarily. The concept of solidarity as laid
out in the Treaty also raises questions. Solidarity between whom? Commentators
have pointed out that the point here is not solidarity between the EU and other
countries, nor with or between individuals, but solidarity between Member States.12
Moreover, as the EU’s foreign policy with regard to border control has intensified,
there is the question of whether such solidarity can be limited to the EU. After all,
the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences extend to countries to the
east and south of the EU, far into Africa and the Middle East. There must be a
certain measure of solidarity in migration deals too if they are to last.
When solidarity has only limited usefulness as a starting point for policy, the
most sensible approach is to shift to strengthening the institutional basis for that
policy, as a mitigated logic of consequences. Examples include the transformation
of FRONTEX into a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, the endorsement
by the Court of Justice of the quota policy, and the Commission’s mandate to
continue building mobility partnerships.
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The question, however, is whether the rationality of the internal market—such as
setting quotas for the admission of asylum seekers—provides sufficient grounds for
an asylum and migration system that is sustainable in the longer term. In a keynote
address delivered on 20 March 2015, Prof. Guy Goodwin-Gill pointed out the
possibility of establishing an agency to oversee Member States’ compliance with
international obligations related to refugees and migrants. Such an institution may
be the answer to the ‘how’ of policy. But the ‘how’ in this case addresses the
balance between the two logics, of appropriateness and consequences. According to
Guild,13 such an institution’s most important contribution would be to improve
international solidarity within and outside the EU. And improvement is necessary in
that respect, despite there being a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The proposed institution should have more
far-reaching powers without being ‘coercive’, something that would not promote
solidarity.
This approach has received theoretical support from Rossi (2017), who, inspired
by a ‘public goods approach’, outlines a quota system, reinforced by binding cri-
teria for the rights of asylum seekers.14 Rossi15 described the European asylum
system as a ‘non-cooperative game’. Although the EU does have some of the
features of game theory and all its associated dilemmas when it comes to
burden-sharing, it is nevertheless based primarily on the ‘games real actors play’.16
This means that the playing field is ample and mobile: Member States that refuse to
participate in one round of negotiations, for example on the distribution of refugees,
may feel the effects later in another round on a completely different subject, for
example the distribution of agricultural subsidies. As a result, game theory does not
always apply in full to the practice of politics and policymaking.
Whereas institutionalisation points down a narrow path in navigating between
the two logics, the ‘public goods approach’ emphasises the content of the issues at
stake: protection of people and borders, national sovereignty and identity, security
and geopolitics. Institutionalisation should not lead to an instrumental management
approach to policymaking, in any event. As one Dutch commentator stated in a
now-famous essay, ‘A refugee is not a cod’.17 Quotas, distribution keys and relo-
cation mechanisms are internal market instruments that work very well in certain
policy domains, but their effectiveness is severely limited when they are applied
without further ado in the area of migration. Policy in that area must be based on a
certain measure of solidarity. The ‘trade-offs’ and ‘distribution mechanisms’ that
may subsequently prove necessary must in some way or another be sensitive to the
public goods at stake in this case: international mobility, security, and the protection
of people and borders.
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8.6 Conclusion: Ways Forward for Variations in Policy
Migration is a critical factor in Europe’s geopolitical position because controlling
international mobility is important to the exercise of sovereignty vis-à-vis non-EU
countries. The policy on asylum, migration and border control allows us to observe
just how far cooperation can go and at what point national preferences make a
difference. It should be noted, first and foremost, that issues of migration must be
considered from a variety of different perspectives: that of the migrant, that of the
citizens of the host community, and that of international economic and political
relations. The fundamental guarantees laid down in the Geneva Convention on
Refugees, Article 3 of the ECHR, and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union establish a legal minimum for the treatment of
asylum seekers: expulsion must not expose them to persecution or degrading
treatment. These obligations are incumbent on both the Member States and the
Union as a whole. In all further questions of policy and legislation, the point is to
assess the most appropriate model of action.
The policy domains of asylum, migration and border control already provide
several examples of variation that can be broken down into the different forms
discussed in this book (variation in policy content, decision-making method,
and membership). ‘Flexible solidarity’ with regard to the resettlement of asylum
seekers qualifies as an example of variation in policy content. The EU-Turkey
Statement of 18 March 2016 (the ‘deal’) is an example of variation in the
decision-making method, as it takes the place of a Treaty and does not adhere to the
usual procedure18 Instead of the Community method, intergovernmental
decision-making was applied within the European Council to reach this agreement.
Similar variations in decision-making method could be helpful in the event of future
refugee crises. Schengen is an example of variation in membership: not all EU
Member States are part of the Schengen Area, while some non-EU Member States
are part of it.
Arguments derived from the logic of appropriateness (such as encouraging
meaningful participation in society) and from the logic of consequences both play a
role in all these forms and examples, and they are not mutually exclusive. It would
be difficult to consider questions of border surveillance and admission as anything
other than shared questions, at least as far as the continental Member States are
concerned. By contrast, there is still a great deal of discretion for national labour
market policy, while matters of public order concerning foreign nationals who have
neither been legally admitted nor expelled tend to come up more at the local level.
Such considerations could lead to multiple variations in future migration policy,
possibly including a range of different choices as to the Member States covered by
the policy.
The concept of collective appropriateness is defined by Article 18 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which incorporates the asylum
guarantees of the Geneva Convention on refugees into European law. However, this
human rights standard does not necessarily imply a uniform migration policy and
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even leaves scope for variation in the way in which asylum is ensured; only
refoulement (forcibly returning people to a country where they are likely to be
persecuted) is in any case unlawful. However, there is also a need for European
unity stemming directly from the requirements of the internal market and its open
borders. In addition, certain dimensions of this policy belong more to the national
political domain, for example labour market policy and the integration of new-
comers. The latter dimension influences the destination favoured by asylum seekers
and migrants, who prefer to go where they and their families have the opportunity
to make a fresh start.
There is an urgent need to review the objectives and patterns of migration policy.
Public acceptance of current policies is eroding, while at the same time events in
Africa and, even more so, the longer-term effects of climate change will drive up the
pressure to admit migrants, whether or not as asylum seekers. The legal distinction
between refugees and other migrants is debatable if we consider migration driven
by exploitation and climate change19 and it requires that asylum procedures should
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The question is whether and how the EU and
its Member States will cope with these developments, and also whether the EU can
itself survive disruptive conflicts between Member States.
We must further assess any variation in fulfilling these European public tasks
with a view to strengthening democratic support for migration policy. Social and
political differences between the Member States suggest less unity, but the nature of
the problems may in fact require more. In terms of this book’s analytical frame-
work, this means that the choice of institutional order will be influenced in part by
different opinions concerning the motivations for collective action.
Variation can take many different forms. Migration policies are so closely
intertwined with other public tasks that different forms of variation may be required,
depending on the subject In 2016, the Advisory Council on International Affairs
(AIV) recommended creating more scope for variation in migration policy within
the circle of Schengen countries.20 The AIV drew attention to the possibility of
closer cooperation as defined in the EU Treaty (Article 20 TEU) between Member
States wishing to implement the Schengen Agreement within the framework of a
fully functioning common asylum system, including similar forms of reception and
integration, the acceptance of distribution keys, sharing information on abuses,
coordination with the UNHCR on resettlement, and agreements with safe countries
outside the EU regarding the return of migrants. Other Schengen countries would
maintain open internal borders under normal circumstances and share responsibility
for external borders and the common visa policy, provided that they agree to share
costs, jointly manage external borders and perform selective checks at internal
borders (for example verification of travel documents at airports and key sea ports).
This proposal allows for societal differences between Member States. After all,
there is little point in forcibly transferring a refugee to a Member State that does not
want to take in asylum seekers. In terms of the EU’s own development, it is
important that this variation does not jeopardise the socio-economically valuable
single market.
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The EU has placed restrictions on migration and border crossings from outside
Europe, which are meant to regain control of mobility, but has not yet moved to
give specific groups of people extra opportunities for migration. There has also
been little headway in setting up systems for commencing the asylum application
procedure outside the EU’s borders. The embassies of EU Member States could
play a more active role in this respect (‘diplomatic missions policy’).
Labour market policy associated with migration and the policy on knowledge
migrants enrolled in study programmes are not fully harmonised within the context
of the internal market. This discrepancy must be considered when the inevitable
follow-up question arises: can we prevent the asylum procedure being used for
economic reasons by lowering the threshold to legal labour migration? Such a move
would be advantageous for only a few Member States, among them the Netherlands
and Germany. Here too there may be an opportunity for variation at a fundamental
level: Member States would be offered the option of permitting ‘circular migration’
under an agreement concluded with other countries. The fourth Balkenende gov-
ernment had already experimented with this possibility in a pilot project. Admission
would be temporary, but upon returning to his or her country of origin, the labour
migrant would have gained enough experience and accrued enough start-up capital
to participate in economic life there. States that agree to such arrangements would
be expected to cooperate with the return policy.
One of the major issues in the EU’s foreign and security policy is how to prevent
an unmanageable flow of people to other countries and continents. It is an issue that
has been given little notice in migration policy to date, with the exception of
controversial attempts to conclude agreements with countries on the other side of
the Mediterranean that are tantamount to the obstruction of migration. Betts and
Collier21 came up with more sweeping proposals. They recommend putting more
emphasis on training and employing for the millions of people currently living in
refugee camps, as part of a coherent refugee policy. Their assertion is that partic-
ipation in the host country’s economy creates opportunities for refugees, whether
they gain long-term refugee status or return to their country of origin. The final step
for refugees who have no meaningful prospects would be a programme of reset-
tlement in EU Member States or elsewhere.
Fijnaut22 has also highlighted the importance of a ‘transnational political deal’ to
‘reimburse’ third countries that tighten up surveillance of their borders with Europe
by investing in their economies and setting up legal migration programmes. This
idea has been elaborated in the proposals published by the Centre for European
Policy Studies (CEPS) (12 October 2017). It advocates a ‘trade-off’ in that
European countries can fast-track the processing of asylum applications and permit
a broader, but targeted, work permit policy in exchange for African countries, in
particular, doing more to take in those whose asylum applications have been
rejected. To some extent, this idea is in line with Dutch proposals aimed at circular
migration as part of an overhaul of migration policy. The Commission’s European
Agenda on Migration already acknowledges the importance of returning migrants
to third countries and linking this to the need for legal migration channels that
permit temporary labour migration.
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The two logics, of appropriateness and of consequences, go hand in hand—but
never without friction. Even considerations of solidarity are thus subject to an
inevitable cost-benefit trade-off and can be supported by greater institutionalisation.
Policy based on the two logics is not limited to the Member States, but also affects
non-EU countries with which the EU has established partnerships. These ideas can
be incorporated into an overhaul of migration policy that is no longer buckling
under the pressure of maintaining an appearance of unity. At the same time, they
preserve what the European Asylum System can achieve, i.e. unity in terms of
procedures and policy content pursuant to the basic prohibition against refoulement
as set out in the Geneva Convention. Finally, it is important to recognise that any
serious preventive policy can only be the work of a European Union that presents a
united front on the international stage. The Union must pursue a common policy on
country of origin and take proactive measures to avert fresh crises.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Variation as a Guiding Perspective
The European Union seems to lurch from one crisis to the next in the past decade,
from the financial crisis to the euro crises and from the refugee crisis to Brexit, not
to mention pressure on the democratic rule of law in some Member States them-
selves. Opinions vary widely as to how best to respond to these push-pull forces:
some argue that the answer lies in closer European integration,1 while others
suggest that it is time for Europe to invest in an exit strategy and to develop a
disintegration policy.2
The choice between deeper integration and hard disintegration is misleading,
however. European variation is a reality whose worth remains underappreciated or
underexploited. It is not a question of everything or nothing. Cooperation within the
European Union allows for a number of different approaches. Only rarely do the
Member States move simultaneously in the same direction in every policy domain;
very often, they differ. That is usually regarded as a problem, but in our opinion,
that view is unjustified. Just because their positions diverge does not mean that
cooperation between them can only be suboptimal at best. What it does mean is that
cooperation demands more conscious and proactive variation than a stark choice
between a uniform Community alliance in which all Member States work together
and a selective alliance in which obstructionists necessitate opt-outs or multiple
speeds. There is enormous diversity in Member States, challenges, issues, policy
domains, procedures and institutions. Contrary to what the choice between inte-
gration and disintegration suggests, it is such diversity that is the appropriate motto.
Options allowing for greater diversity can be found both within and outside the
current Treaty frameworks. The aim is to make the current quest for an optimal
form of cooperation both proactive and more conscious, so as to provide a basis for
a more constructive process. That requires us to place the debate on the future of the
EU in a broader context. At the moment, the focus of discussion tends to be on the
form of the institutional order. That focus, however, is based on a straightforward
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contrast between ‘more’ or ‘less’ EU. By looking more specifically at the rela-
tionship between the nature of the problems, the differing goals, public interests and
motivations, and possible forms of cooperation, we will gain a clearer idea of the
forms of variation available.
This final chapter elaborates on the main message of our book. To support
that message, we also review the variation options discussed in the chapters on
the internal market, the euro area, and asylum, migration and border control.
Our purpose is not to identify specific policy choices, but rather to illustrate pos-
sible directions for policymaking that could lead to greater variation. While our
discussion covers the institutional structure, we do not make any specific recom-
mendations in that regard. If more scope for variation is created in terms of which
Member States are involved in legislation and policymaking in a given domain,
then it is obvious that provision will also be made for non-participation in
decision-making by representatives of other Member States. As in the case of the
European Monetary Union, only representatives of the Member States involved will
be able to take part in the decision-making process.
As this book explains, what variation is not is the consequence of an attempt at
integration that has stranded halfway. There is no specified end point to cooperation
in the European Union. Cooperation is always open-ended, because the nature of
future relationships can never be clear. The emphasis should therefore be on the
fundamentally open-ended nature of the destination to which the Member States
and the EU are headed. That is why we have developed guidelines that we believe
will help the European Union respond more effectively to the needs and legitimate
expectations of its citizens. We recommend approaching the further development of
the European Union with variation in mind. What this means is:
– accepting that not all tasks for which governments are responsible need to be
based on the same relationship between European, national and regional or local
policy (leaving room for variation in policy content), and
– recognising the value of different patterns of European cooperation between
Member States (which may manifest themselves in different decision-making
methodologies and/or different forms of membership).
Unlike the existing differentiation by means of opt-outs and deviations, variation
is not a concession intended to resolve impasses in negotiations; it is, rather, a
different structuring principle that takes differences in needs and in democratically
expressed convictions seriously.
Variation cannot be accepted or pursued in every policy domain or everywhere
to the same extent. A common core remains necessary for the European Union as a
whole, specifically concerning the basic principles of democracy, rule of law,
fundamental rights and freedoms, and the common market.
Article 2 of the TEU states that the Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The Member States
share these values and they have asserted and committed themselves to upholding
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them. Their societies endorse pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and gender equality values that should be reflected explicitly in the EU’s
political communications and institutional design. This is crucial for the credibility
of European integration.3 We therefore back the AIV’s recommendation (in its
report The will of the people? The erosion of democracy under the rule of law in
Europe) that respect for diversity in states’ democratic functioning should be paired
with efforts to prevent the erosion of the rule of law.
We expect that elaborating on variation as a guiding perspective will nurture the
critical political and policy-related imagination, so that it can also be declared
applicable in other domains in which European public tasks have an impact.
This could have significant consequences in terms of the EU’s institutional
structure. Where variation implies that not all Member States participate, and that
European legislation therefore does not apply in all Member States, then it must
also be possible to vary the composition of EU institutions. In the future, for
example, this could mean that the Council and Parliament meet in differing con-
figurations depending on the subject matter and territorial scope.
Because variation allows the relationship between European, national and
sub-national bodies to differ depending on the issue at hand, it also creates leeway
to root the fulfilment of public tasks more firmly in the political basis of the
Member States. The institutional design may be altered in certain respects, but what
is most important is to regard the EU less in terms of a state-like institutional
design; instead, it should be viewed as a system of dispersed and shared principles
and responsibilities, with democratic roots both in the Member States and in the
European Union thus clearing the way for the concept of demoicracy.
This book further explores the variation perspective in the domains of the
internal market, EMU and the euro, and asylum and migration. It can, obviously,
also apply in many other policy domains, and in fact it already does so. Our final
chapter outlines the dimensions in which variation can occur (Sect. 9.2). We follow
up with an overview of our findings in a number of policy domains (Sect. 9.3) and a
description of the prospects for variation in the ongoing development of the
European Union (Sect. 9.4). We conclude our book by describing how the
Netherlands can contribute to further consultations on the future the European
Union (Sect. 9.5).
9.2 The Dimensions of Variation
The EU’s current situation has forced the debate on variation as a tool for change in
the EUout into the open. The Treaties and the reality on the ground already offer
myriad examples of what could be seen as steps towards variation, pushed even
further by the turbulence in the euro area. Perhaps, in the years ahead, variation will
gain political acceptance as a desirable feature of the fulfilment of public tasks in
the context of the European Union. This book sees an opportunity here to align the
European Union more closely with its existing political and social diversity, but it is
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not blind to the risks associated with too much variation. Coherence between
different policy domains could be undermined, and Member States might engage in
cherry-picking. All this raises questions concerning the appropriate relationship
between socio-economic stability, human rights, security, and the four freedoms
that define the internal market.
This book reveals a whole range of possibilities for variation within the
European Union. It discusses forms of variation that fall both within and outside the
current framework of European Union Treaty law. As we stated earlier, variation
has three dimensions: (1) policy content, (2) decision methodology, and (3) the
Member States. The options for variation can be represented as a three-dimensional
continuum whereby the degree of uniformity in each dimension runs from mini-
mum to maximum.
Variation in policy content
The first dimension concerns the scope for variation within the content of policy,
i.e. the leeway that each Member State has to interpret how certain public interests,
objectives and values are to be achieved. This means that Member States can have
different interpretations of policy but continue to participate in decision-making and
show support for a political form of solidarity. More specifically, they are given
more policy discretion in directives involving minimum harmonisation or open
standards. Such directives employ concepts that allow the Member States more
leeway to shape national policy as they see fit. At the other extreme are regulations
that apply directly at national level and that limit national policy discretion.
The room for manoeuvre created for the Member States in this manner prevents
the tensions caused by diverging aims from resulting in opt-outs, for example
(variation in membership). Variation in policy content makes it possible to incor-
porate the Member States’ diverse motivations for collective action or diverse
interpretations of the same into the process of European integration without com-
promising unity in participation. The process of policymaking must then reveal,
time and again, how much room for manoeuvre there actually is.
Trade-offs are also possible within a policy area. One example of this is ‘flexible
solidarity’ within the context of migration, asylum and borders. Variation in this
domain is not meant to ignore the basic principle of solidarity, but it does require
paying greater attention to geographical and political differences between the
Member States.
Variation in the decision-making method
This dimension concerns the way in which policy and legislative decisions must be
taken: in an intergovernmental context, via the Community method, or entirely at
supranational level.
Within an intergovernmental framework, there is no interference from institu-
tions to which the cooperating states are subordinate; competences are not sur-
rendered and are thus retained at the national level. Decision-making thus requires
unanimity. States have the right to veto any policy measure or legislative act,
guaranteeing that their policy autonomy is preserved. The open method of
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coordination (OMC), which does not involve legislative competences and in which
decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, is one example of this form of
variation.
Policies and legislation developed according to the Community method apply
equally to all participating Member States and are based on (1) supranational
institutions as initiators and guardians of the Treaty order, (2) qualified majority
voting in the Council and (3) co-decision-making by the European Parliament
(ordinary legislative procedure). The difference between this and a fully suprana-
tional decision-making framework is that, in the Community method, qualified
majority voting makes it possible to form blocking minorities, for example in the
Council. This means that, unlike in the supranational method, enough Member
States must cooperate to reach a decision.
Variation in membership/members
The third dimension concerns membership. If the Member States’ motivations for
collective action differ too much to fulfil public tasks by means of the Community
method or variation in policy content, the Member States can switch to the most
extreme form of variation, i.e. variation in membership/members. In this form of
variation, the Member States do not see sufficient reason to undertake collective
action and must pursue a different type of relationship with one another. Examples
include opt-outs, lead groups, multiple speeds, and closer cooperation. When new
Member States accede to the Union, this form of variation allows for a more
realistic and less constrained approach to situations where a state is not ready to
accept all aspects of the Union’s total body of laws and rules (the ‘acquis’).
To apply the variation options in actual practice, however, the Union must keep
an open mind to the opportunities afforded by the existing Treaties by (1) consid-
ering the relationship between motivations for collective action and the possible
institutional orders, and thus (2) relinquishing its fixation on regulations and
directives, the Community method and participation by all the Member States, and
on the resulting compulsion to rely on certain motivations for collective action.
The normative and actual evolution of the relationship between socio-economic
stability, human rights, security and the four freedoms determines whether and, if
so, what variation in European integration is appropriate and necessary. Variation in
the internal market for goods is scarcely feasible (although some Member State
regions are excluded territorially) because unimpeded trade is only possible when
products are subject to the same requirements. In the initial decades of the European
Communities, differences in place of establishment still played an important role:
the free movement of persons was still closely linked to the frameworks of the
national labour market and mainly concerned effective participation in this market.
That changed quite suddenly when the free movement of services was imple-
mented in full. The free movement of services could then be used to circumvent the
frameworks of the national labour market and weaken the associated protection.
In response—and in addition to tightening up the Services Directive and the
Posting of Workers Directive—there were calls for closer harmonisation of
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socio-economic policy. That is an obvious next step, but since there is little
inclination to do, greater variation may offer an alternative.
While membership of the current Member States is regarded as a given, it is
possible to reassess, in dialogue with and between Member States, which policy
domains require the EU to fulfil public tasks. The conclusions may differ from one
Member State to the next. Variation not only means ‘which Member States
cooperate in which domains and in which form’. As indicated, it can also mean a
change in the design of the institutions of the European Union, for example by
allowing them to operate in different configurations depending on which Member
States are involved or their relationship with national parliaments. It can also mean
reassessing the relationship between the four freedoms and important public tasks
associated with stability, security, prosperity and social protection.
9.3 Variation (Options) Within the Internal Market, Emu
and Asylum, Migration and Border Control
In this final chapter, we elaborate on the main message of this book and illustrates
the options for variation. This section looks at the options described earlier for the
internal market (Chap. 5), the euro area (Chap. 7), and asylum, migration and
border control (Chap. 8). More specifically, these are options for exploring and
analysing opportunities for variation, not concrete policy options or policy
recommendations.
Variation is not an end in itself, but a path ripe for exploration. It offers solutions
whenever stalemates threaten cooperation and it creates opportunities that take
existing differences between the Member States and their populations into account.
The main question is: How can variation serve as a starting point for European
cooperation? Variation is certainly not the answer in all cases, and not all issues
allow the same degree of variation. Nevertheless, there are myriad opportunities for
making further use of variation, and it can serve as a guiding perspective in many
policy domains.
9.4 Variation and the Internal Market
In Chap. 5, we considered which options are currently available in each of the three
dimensions of variation. Within the internal market, variation in policy content
currently consists of minimum harmonisation, open standards, and higher levels of
protection in certain Member States. Regarding the second dimension, variation in
decision-making, the internal market illustrates how the special legislative proce-
dure (in the form of the open method of coordination) concerns not the harmoni-
sation of national legislation but rather the coordination of national policies
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(without mandatory standards). Member States cannot be outvoted in this
decision-making method because decisions are only taken unanimously.
The internal market’s legal framework is so flexible that both the legislator and
the Court can weigh economic market interests against other public interests, the
former from a political and the latter from a legal standpoint. That is because the
organisation of the internal market reflects the explicit pursuit of a social market
economy and the view that fundamental rights and the principles of solidarity,
proportionality and ‘mainstreaming’ (which mirror public interests) are important
principles of market organisation under the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaties assume
that the functioning of the internal market will contribute positively to the public’s
well-being and standard of living.
There are also objections to variation. Variation between the guiding principles
of the internal market and closely associated policy domains raises problems when
it comes to establishing a social market economy. Variation in the way the Member
States interpret the four freedoms could also pose a major risk not only to the
economic completion of the internal market but also to the safeguards afforded to
the associated social and public interests. The general principles of Union loyalty
and effectiveness of Union law limit such variation, in any event. At the same time,
however, we also see that the broad spectrum of principles underpinning the
internal market does, in fact, offer more scope for national variation, especially
where no EU legislation applies. These principles allow for variation by permitting
Member States to apply certain rules and practices that protect certain public
interests in preference to the interests of the internal market.
Existing variations within the internal market inspire variation options within
other policy domains, such as EMU and asylum, migration and border control, two
controversial and divisive topics within the European Union. We discuss these
below.
9.5 Variation in EMU and the Euro
Chapter 7 on variation in EMU and the euro outlined various possibilities for
variation. Here, variation requires different, co-existing arrangements. Elements of
the current governance of the euro that can be included in variation without further
ado are:
– the extent to which euro-area Member States exercise market discipline;
– whether the Member States want mutual insurance, and the status of a common
monetary fund;
– whether the IMF should be involved.
This list begins with the option of variation in policy content, but that does not
exclude the possibility of variation in membership and decision-making.
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What are the options that arise working with the above elements (on the
understanding that we do not immediately assess their feasibility)? Below, we
discuss two potential routes to variation, by which we mean different arrangements
that can co-exist. They are:
1. variation by means of market discipline and IMF involvement going forward;
2. variation by means of a European Monetary Fund (EMF).
In addition, we discuss variation as a form of macroprudential policy as it
currently exists and as explained in Chap. 7.
Re 1. Variation by means of market discipline and IMF involvement going
forward
One option is for some Member States to exercise market discipline and submit to
the IMF’s recovery programmes in the event of difficulties while other Member
States establish a common fund providing mutual insurance. The market discipline/
IMF arrangement is appropriate for countries that are committed to taking
responsibility for their own affairs. The fund arrangement, in turn, requires a large
measure of trust between the Member States that choose to participate (e.g. in an
EMF). An EMF may be of particular value as an emergency fund, but Article 122
(2) of the Treaty already provides for the possibility of financial assistance to
Member States in such cases. As an interpretation of this clause, an EMF could take
the form of an ex ante fund and/or (mutual) borrowing capacity.
In the case of mutual borrowing capacity, variation is possible in policy design
(and possibly also in decision-making and degrees of participation). That would
certainly be true if such organised borrowing capacity can be applied in tandem
with pre-existing IMF funds (formed by euro-area countries). Specifically, this
could mean, for example, that euro-area Member States whose government deficits
regularly test the boundaries of the rules and agreements would be more likely to
request assistance from an EMF and/or the IMF, and do so more frequently, than
other euro-area Member States.
Variation can be built in by pegging risk premiums to this fiscal behaviour, for
example by applying SGP criteria. Another option would be to make the estab-
lishment of an emergency fund optional for Member States: those that want to
arrange joint coverage contribute to the fund (and can rely on it in crisis situations);
those that do not, do not contribute and must rely on themselves (and the IMF) in
crisis situations. As a result, the basic fund, in which everyone participates, may be
limited or very limited. Variation in this sense may also imply less integration,
for example with regard to fiscal rules.
The Dutch Council of State has also examined this approach, noting that if this
more ‘decentralised’ trend were to be continued, three elements would be impor-
tant: (1) completion of the banking union, (2) certain financial safety nets,
(3) European enforcement of fiscal and economic rules in special circumstances.4
This is in keeping with the main thrust of the analyses in this section and the
previous chapter of this book.
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Re 2. Variation by means of an EMF
An EMF could function as a stabilisation mechanism for the monetary union. The
single currency as it now stands offers starting points for a move in that direction.
For example, the European Stability Mechanism could form the basis for a per-
manent stabilisation fund. The set-up of the fund can remain intergovernmental in
nature. Within that set-up, all sorts of variation options are conceivable (in policy
content), and more scope can be created for democratic control and/or economic
‘conditionality’ as prerequisites for such a fund. The latter can be intergovernmental
in nature or involve a hybrid blend of intergovernmental and Community elements
(variation in decision-making).
An EMF could bolster the monetary union by allowing for variation in short,
medium and long-term measures, as well as in overarching conditions of demo-
cratic control and economic robustness. It could also mean that euro-area Member
States whose government deficits regularly test the boundaries of the rules would be
more likely to request assistance from an EMF or the IMF, whereas others would
not have to. It then becomes possible to build variation into the architecture of an
emf, for example by charging different premiums on such fiscal behaviour.
An EMF would be an outgrowth of the ESM that is already in place, and would
align with the institutional paths trodden in response to the euro crisis: excluding
Treaty amendments but including the structural involvement of the IMF. In certain
respects, this would also fit in with the next phase of the programme to strengthen
the euro area—following the acute crisis management of recent years—which will
need to focus on reassessing national and European responsibilities for the single
currency going forward. This will be part of a broader approach to the underlying
problems that stem largely from the lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms
for dealing with major differences between economies.
Variation in the form of macroprudential policy
Finally, with reference to EMU and the euro, this book briefly mentioned an
existing example of variation in the form of macroprudential policy. As it now
stands, a conscious choice has already been made to let national authorities chart
their own course in this policy area, given that financial cycles can vary widely
between Member States. This policy should be positioned alongside the existing
macro-economic imbalances procedure and the enforcement of price stability, a task
entrusted to the ECB. The case for developing a macroprudential policy of this kind
stems from the increasingly decisive role that financial factors play in the func-
tioning of EMU and the euro. The options for institutional design range from
intergovernmental to supranational.
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9.6 Variation in Asylum, Migration and Border Control
Chapter 8 on asylum, migration and border control outlined several examples of
existing variation and also described other options. The statutory provisions con-
cerning the treatment of asylum seekers laid down in the Geneva Convention on
Refugees, Article 3 of the ECHR, and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union establish a clear-cut minimum level of uniformity in
European asylum policy. Only refoulement—forcibly returning people to a country
where they are likely to be exposed to persecution or degrading treatment—is in
any case prohibited. This obligation is incumbent on both the Member States and
the Union as a whole. Even so, this human rights standard need not lead to a
completely uniform asylum policy; in fact, it even allows scope for variation in the
way in which asylum is ensured. In other words, in all further questions of policy
and legislation, the point is to assess the most appropriate model of action.
We can assess variation in the fulfilment of European public tasks concerning
asylum and migration in part by considering whether such variation strengthens
democratic support for migration policy. Social and political differences between
the Member States suggest less unity, but the nature of the problems may in fact
require more.
In 2016, the Advisory Council on International Affairs recommended creating
more scope for variation in migration policy within the circle of Schengen coun-
tries.5 The AIV drew attention to the possibility of closer cooperation as defined in
the EU Treaty (Article 20 TEU) between Member States wishing to implement the
Schengen Agreement within the framework of a fully functioning common asylum
system, including similar forms of reception and integration, the acceptance of
distribution keys, sharing information on abuses, coordination with the UNHCR on
resettlement, and agreements with safe countries outside the EU regarding the
return of migrants. This is an example of variation in membership. Other Schengen
countries would maintain open internal borders under normal circumstances and
share responsibility for external borders and the common visa policy, provided that
they agree to share costs, jointly manage external borders and perform selective
checks at internal borders, all of which points to ‘flexible solidarity’ towards the
resettlement of asylum seekers, as suggested by a number of Central European
Member States. This proposal allows for societal differences between Member
States and includes trade-offs within a policy domain—in other words, variation in
policy content. After all, there is little point in forcibly transferring a refugee to a
Member State that does not want to take in asylum seekers. In terms of the EU’s
own development, it is important that this variation does not jeopardise the
socio-economically valuable single market.
Variation in the decision-making method is conceivable, for example when
treaties are concluded by departing from the usual decision-making procedure (e.g.
by means of intergovernmental decision-making within the European Council). It is
crucial that minimum thresholds, such as the principle of non-refoulement reaf-
firmed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are fully
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respected. Anticipatory policy must set the stage for what follows in all cases.
That can only be entrusted to a European Union that pursues international policy
towards countries of origin and takes action to prevent new crises.
9.7 Perspective on Change
The capacity for change and adaptation has always been a critical force behind
European integration. It is vital that we rediscover that capacity, because if the EU
itself cannot change, then circumstances will at some point force inevitable changes
upon it. The main objective is not to amend the Treaty, but rather to adopt a
different attitude towards the Treaties and their application. This will also lighten
the burden on new Member States that are caught between the political will to
accede to the Union and the real obstacles to their immediate and equal partici-
pation in all areas. Nor is it necessary to make a binary distinction between Member
States and non-Member States in relation to associated countries and territories. The
same applies to the distinction between overseas countries and territories, including
the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the ‘outermost
regions’.
The functional rationality that has long been a powerful driver of European
integration is not inviolable. History has made that more than evident. The
(1) unique momentum of market integration, (2) spill-overs between sectors, i.e. the
‘dissemination’ of integration practices from one policy domain to another, and
(3) their consolidation by supranational institutions that uphold the supranational
rule of law, are, moreover, processes that cannot be maintained under altered cir-
cumstances. European cooperation and integration have often been the result of
negotiations or major external events that required a response. To forge a covenant
between peoples is not to narrow that covenant down to an institutional narrative.
How can the Member States continue to chart a course on the basis of
self-determination? The notion of ‘demoicracy’ put forward in this book is based on
the assumption that the ‘demoi’, the political peoples of Europe, should be regarded
in plural. This would, for example, be possible if national parliaments not only had
negative powers, such as the yellow card procedure, but also the right to initiate
European policy and legislation, including variations in that policy. What we are
emphasising here is that there are no hierarchical but rather cooperative relation-
ships between EU and national institutions. The EU’s current system is in fact not
modelled on the structure of the national state. In that context, legislative,
policy-making, administrative and judicial competences are derived from the power
structure shaped by history. The exact opposite is true in the European
Communities and now in the EU: the need for a partly common legal order led to
the creation of institutions by treaty.
What this implies is that, at European level, the principle of democracy takes on
a different meaning. The European order is a legal order, an economic order and, in
a certain sense, a political order, but it is not a democracy in the same manner as a
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state. The EU provides a structure for cooperation, to offer protection and build a
future lived in freedom; based on those goals and the common values in which they
are rooted, however, it is also a structure for taking and overseeing joint decisions.
In this European context, citizens exercise their influence primarily through their
national elections, and it is there that the EU must seek its basis of support.
In addition, by being more self-aware and proactive in its approach to variation,
the EU can better reflect the diversity of ‘demoi’, and the different interests and
aspirations arising from it, in legislation and policy. To involve the ‘peoples’ more
closely in the EU, it must have a closer relationship with the national parliaments. It
should also be more aware that each and every parliament represents a people who
want space and protection for their life plans and those of future generations. The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can serve as a guideline in
this respect. The Charter does not refer specifically to the division of tasks between
European and national governments, but it does identify and protect the fulfilment
of public tasks as indispensable to the pursuits of citizens, their organisations and
businesses.
The ‘logic of consequences’, i.e. the question of what costs and benefits are at
stake, is inextricably bound up with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, i.e. the question
of what moral considerations play a role. After all, cooperation within the Union is
always based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
and freedoms, including social rights and the right to protection against persecution.
These requirements are particularly important when it comes to the protection of
the rule of law, democracy and human rights. If we accept variations as a feature of
the European Union, we must face up to the question of what the Union’s essential
common features are. Only then will it be possible to appreciate differences while
maintaining sufficient cohesion. Too often, the European Union stands accused of
straightjacketing its Member States and showing no regard for their individuality.
Such dissatisfaction indicates a fundamental cross-border appreciation for indi-
viduality in diversity. Respecting this means seeing people not as separate indi-
viduals, but as persons who engage with others on the basis of their culture, beliefs
and traditions. That is the view of humanity that underpins the notion of human
rights.
The scope for variation sought in this book and recommended with a view to
future developments must not endanger the above vision of human society; in fact,
it is precisely this vision that has inspired our call to abandon the forced pursuit of
uniformity. Respect for individuality is manifest—or, indeed, lacking—at various
levels. In each case, what is at stake is the rights and responsibilities of people as
citizens: as citizens of their town or village, as citizens of their country, and as
European citizens. No variation in the allocation and fulfilment of public tasks
should lose sight of that. It is expressed in the scope of application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 51 as interpreted in the case
law of the European Court of Justice).
The variations that we have recommended therefore do not limit the fundamental
values set out in Article 2 of the EU Treaty, let alone cast them aside. Only by
recognising that these values—which include democracy, the rule of law and
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human rights—are closely bound up with the EU and European citizenship can an
EU of variation maintain and act upon its vision of a shared future. While the effect
may vary depending on local and national circumstances, the democratic rule of law
must be regarded as inviolable. We therefore endorses the AIV’s recommendation6
in its report The will of the people? The erosion of democracy under the rule of law
in Europe that respect for diversity in states’ democratic functioning should be
paired with efforts to prevent the erosion of the rule of law.
Another important aspect of the perspective offered in this book is that,
regardless of the level of policy diversity or uniformity, the EU’s internal rela-
tionships must be equal to the challenges posed by the outside world. The EU and
its Member States are dealing with external forces, forces that affect international
trade, security, data transmissions and even the integrity of democratic procedures.
The nature and intensity of European integration must be able to adapt constantly to
these forces.
9.8 The Dutch View of the European Union
What is the significance of the variation perspective for the Netherlands? The main
purpose of this book is to consider a particular approach to European cooperation.
The options put forward in different policy domains in the previous chapters pro-
vide examples. However, our most important message here is that the fundamental
openness of the European project should be perceived as a space for creativity and
imagination. In other words, variation should not be a mere last resort when
compromise is required and differences are simply unavoidable.
Variation does not offer carte blanche to Member States, including the
Netherlands. The significance of the ‘variation’ perspective for the Netherlands is
evident in two areas, namely the area of interests and the area of values. This
distinction—which is rife with interdependencies in the real world—corresponds to
the logic of consequences (interests, cost-benefit) and the logic of appropriateness
(normative perspective), discussed earlier.
The ‘logic of consequences’ has become even more important for the
Netherlands, in part because Brexit has brought about an intensification in
Franco-German cooperation. The economic, cultural and technical evolution of the
Netherlands is inextricably bound up with that of these important neighbouring
states. In its relationship with these and other Member States, the Netherlands must
regard its place in the European Union as a given, but alterable, reality. To deny this
would lead to further democratic alienation and involve portraying matters as if
nothing could be changed about European integration.
It is therefore necessary for the Netherlands to express its political commitment
to Europe in words and deeds, and it is equally necessary for this commitment to be
reflected in the form of the EU at the same time. Both manifestations of political
commitment are essential, all the more so because the political organisation of
the EU is highly specific and its democratic embeddedness is extremely complex.
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In today’s reality, we see this in the position of the prime minister, for example,
who has increasingly also taken on the role of ‘Minister for European Affairs’,
partly owing to his or her position as a member of the European Council—a role
that can go to improve the visibility of European affairs.
Public tasks are not merely the outcome of a process of give and take, of
wheeling and dealing. They are fundamental because they arise against the back-
drop of shared history, geographical proximity, trade, and political ideals. The
creation of the European Communities and, later, of the European Union was, of
course, the result of negotiations and agreement reached between states as sover-
eign actors, but this particular process of international coordination differed from
ordinary negotiations in two respects. It was compelled by the insight that the
governments of Europe, and the peoples they represented, had more to gain than a
mere trade-off of interests: the experience of destruction that preceded the coordi-
nation process taught them that they shared an important interest in the relatively
small continent of Western Europe, where close relationships had always abounded.
That meant finding an arrangement on which citizens and their organisations and
businesses could depend across national borders. That is the essential feature of the
European Union.
A parallel can be drawn in this sense between the discussions on the future of
‘the Netherlands’ and those on the future of ‘Europe’. Both in the European context
and in the Netherlands, there is a need to flesh out the ‘big words’ that are needed so
that the outcomes of cooperation are not reduced to a trade-off of interests. Those
outcomes may be better than expected or disappointing, which is why they are
always debatable. In that sense, the debate on the Netherlands and the EU is the
same: it requires a discussion about long-term reliability in the fulfilment of public
tasks.
The ‘logic of consequences’, i.e. the question of what costs and benefits are at
stake, is inextricably bound up with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, i.e. the question
of what moral considerations play a role. Cooperation within the Union is always
based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and
freedoms, including social rights and the right to protection against persecution.
If we accept variation as a feature of the European Union, we must, time and
again, face up to the question of what the Union’s essential shared features are. The
common foundations are set out in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union. Cooperation within the Union is always based on the
principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms,
including social rights and the right to protection against persecution, and the
principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Respect for individuality is manifest—or,
indeed, lacking—at various levels of organisation. At each level, what is at stake is
the rights and responsibilities of people as citizens: as citizens of their town or
village, as citizens of their country, and as European citizens. Variation in fulfilment
is crucially important because the desire for personal responsibility is something




2. Jones (2018); Zielonka (2012).
3. AIV (2017c).
4. Raad van State (2017a: 93).
5. AIV (2016).
6. AIV (2017c).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
9.8 The Dutch View of the European Union 149
Appendix A
Applying the Matrix
Possibilities and Impossibilities of European Public
Tasks
In this appendix, we apply the matrix described in Chap. 4 to some recently pro-
posed policy instruments. Our examples illustrate the centrifugal forces now at
work in European cooperation. They are: the quota system for relocating asylum
seekers among the Member States, adopted by the Council in 2015 on a proposal
from the European Commission, (Decision (EU) 2015/1601); the establishment
of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624),
which succeeded FRONTEX; and a controversial proposal in 2016 to revise the
1996 Posting of Workers Directive (com(2016)0128—Proposal for a Directive
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework
of the provision of services) in accordance with the principle of ‘equal pay for equal
work in the same place’.
Our discussion proceeds as follows:
1. We illustrate the background to each policy instrument by explaining the
European Commission’s original initiative.
2. We assign the proposal a position in the matrix that mirrors the motivation for
collective action combined with the institutional order. This is the combination
envisaged in the Commission’s proposal. These proposals illustrate both the
straitjacket of reciprocity and Community cooperation and the (functionalist-
Community) ‘policy rationality’, which increasingly invokes normatively
charged motivations for collective action, such as ‘calculation based on
European interest’ and ‘solidarity’.
3. By way of explanation, we position some of the more notable political positions
of a number of EU Member States in the matrix. Their motivation for collective
action (vertical axis) determines their preference in terms of institutional order
(horizontal axis). Their views also reveal differences in public interests or the
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prioritisation of the same. It thus becomes clear why the fulfilment of European
public tasks has become so difficult, but we also see new opportunities emerge.
Tensions Associated with the Influx of Refugees:
Relocation of Asylum Seekers by Means of a Quota
System
Background and content
The changing geopolitical landscape and the many ‘hotspots’ along European
border regions have driven large groups of migrants across the Mediterranean and
Aegean to the European continent since early 2015. In that year alone, more than a
million migrants arrived in the EU, many fleeing persecution and war, some also to
escape bleak economic prospects. A significant proportion of these migrants applied
for asylum in the hope of obtaining refugee status or secondary protection. This had
a disruptive impact on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Combined
with the closing of the Balkan route by national measures, the Dublin Regulation
led to large numbers of asylum seekers being detained in the first country of arrival
(Greece or Italy), but also to some of them moving on to Western Europe, in
particular to Germany.
To manage the flow of refugees and to alleviate the pressure on Greece and Italy
and their already shaky asylum systems, the European Commission announced a
plan in 2015 to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers from these two countries to the
other EU Member States in a two-year period.1 Germany was particularly sup-
portive of this plan. The Council of Ministers voted in favour of the proposal by
qualified majority. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania voted
against it. This was noteworthy, as the Council usually seeks consensus for sen-
sitive decisions.
The asylum quotas established on the basis of a distribution key were manda-
tory. For the Netherlands, this meant receiving approximately 7,000 asylum seekers
who would be obliged to go through the asylum application procedure there. The
four Member States that had voted against the proposal were also allocated a
number of asylum seekers. An appeal against this decision was rejected by the
Court of Justice on 6 September 2017.2
Position of the relocation decision in the matrix
The asylum quotas are meant to get all the Member States to share the considerable
burden bearing down on the southern Member States. The relocation mechanism
also forces the Member States to share responsibility for safeguarding the funda-
mental rights of asylum seekers, based on Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. This obligation is also in line with Article 18
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and also applies to all
Member States individually by virtue of international conventions.3
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At the very least, the relocation of asylum seekers requires ‘calculation based on
European interest’ as a basis for collective action. For this proposal to function in
the longer term, however, recourse to the principle of interstate solidarity may also
be necessary. The Commission’s proposal reflects this. It means that Member States
share the responsibility and absorb individual losses in pursuit of a higher intangible
goal, namely to safeguard human rights and the fair sharing of burdens. This does
not imply, however, that it is impossible for the objective of relocation to be based
on other motivations for collective action, for example reciprocity (see Sect. 3.1).
Given the critical circumstances and the existing institutional order applicable in
this policy area, including opt-outs for the uk, Ireland and Denmark, the final
Commission proposal was designed as a flexible arrangement, in line with the
CEAS within which the quota plan had been proposed.
In the relocation decision, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ provides the decisive
arguments for cooperation, with the asylum quota plan being based on normative
considerations of interstate solidarity. The decision is therefore politically charged,
increasing the risk that some Member States will regard the relocation of asylum
seekers as coercive and undemocratic.4 It is therefore not inconceivable that
cooperation with like-minded Member States can be raised to a higher level. First,
however, it is necessary to explore the opponents’ motivations and whether a
compromise is possible that gets everyone on board: can a form of variation be
conceived that does not immediately lead to variation in membership, including
new opt-outs and lead groups (Fig. 1)?
Fig. 1 Position of Commission’s asylum quota proposal
Appendix A: Applying the Matrix 153
Notable political positions of some EU Member States
The asylum quotas quickly met with fierce resistance from a number of Central
European Member States that did not wish to implement the decision. Partly as a
result, the plan soon ran aground. Hungary and Slovakia even took their case to the
Court of Justice to challenge the mandatory relocation. In their petition asking the
Court to annul the relocation mechanism, they argued as follows:
1. The content of the decision took the form of a legislative act, which should have
only been adopted under a legislative procedure, whereas the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union did not provide for any legislative powers to
this end. This violated Article 78(3) of the TFEU and the rights of the national
parliaments and the European Parliament.
2. The national parliaments and the European Parliament were not consulted
sufficiently during the procedure.
3. The Council’s amendments and additions to the Commission’s proposal were
not properly made, as the European Parliament was not involved and the
amendments and additions were not adopted unanimously by the Council.5
These arguments can be read as a demand for respect for the autonomy of the
Member States. The Court of Justice ruled that Hungary and Slovakia should
comply with the Council Decision adopted on the basis of the Commission’s
proposal.6 The fact that these Member States, together with Poland and the Czech
Republic, nevertheless refuse to implement the decision places them in the ‘au-
tonomy’/’intergovernmental’ cell in the matrix.
In defending the relocation mechanism, the southern Member States Italy and
Greece invoke the ‘principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility …
between Member States’ as set out in Article 80 of the TFEU. Countries such as
Germany and the Netherlands argue the issue mainly by referring to the fair dis-
tribution of costs. On that basis, and recognising the uk, Ireland and Denmark
opt-outs, Italy and Greece are positioned in the ‘solidarity/flexibility’ cell, while the
Netherlands and Germany are in the ‘calculation based on European
interest/flexibility’ cell (Fig. 2).
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(Formerly FRONTEX): ‘Flexible Solidarity’?
Background and content
In December 2015, the Commission presented a proposal to create a European
Border and Coast Guard Agency, giving new impetus to the existing agency,
FRONTEX, which had proved inadequate to managing the refugee crisis. After
brief resistance from Hungary and Poland, the regulation was adopted on 14
September 2016 and the new agency became operational the following month. The
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implication was that the Member States and the EU would need to cooperate more
closely to secure the EU’s external borders.7
The new regulation significantly increased the powers and tasks of the European
border and coast guard. For example, the agency sees to it that EU legislation on
border management is implemented correctly. It is notable that it is allowed to
intervene even when not requested to do so by the relevant EU Member State, in
any event when the proper functioning of the Schengen area is at risk. In other
words, the agency has become more supranational in nature, and the borders of
Member States situated on the EU’s external borders have since become the
external borders of all EU Member States. The policy autonomy of the EU Member
States located on the EU’s external borders has thus been further reduced.
The joint securing and protection of the EU’s external borders is a critical
component of the EU’s political response to the tensions surrounding the influx of
refugees. It is an attempt to join forces in controlling migration, improve the EU’s
internal security, and restore the Schengen system of free movement of persons.
It is further regarded as a move towards the Member States and the EU sharing
responsibility and towards a more inclusive European asylum system.
Position of the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in
the matrix
Both FRONTEX in its old form and the new European Border and Coast Guard
Agency are organisations that deliver collective benefits to the EU through the
Fig. 2 Commission’s asylum quota proposal, position of Member States
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pooling of forces. The basis for collective action is therefore the prospect that such
cooperation will serve the greater good of the Union as a whole, i.e. internal
security and the free movement of goods and persons. Since the creation of the
European Border and Coast Guard Agency, individual Member States situated at
the EU’s external borders, such as Poland and Hungary, have lost out by surren-
dering their autonomy over their national border controls.
Whereas FRONTEX was a non-binding intergovernmental alliance, the new
agency is much more supranational in nature because it can intervene in exceptional
situations without being asked to do so by the Member State in question. It can also
recommend the reintroduction of internal borders if a Member State refuses to
cooperate. Like other policy instruments in the domain of migration and asylum,
this instrument is flexible. There are opt-outs for directives and regulations under
the CEAS, which is based on reciprocity and the convergence of different asylum
systems within the EU (Figs. 3 and 4).
Notable political positions of some EU Member States
In May 2016, the Commission put forward a controversial proposal to impose a
‘solidarity contribution’ on Member States that refused to implement the asylum
seekers relocation plan. The fine could mount to as much as 250,000 euros per
refused asylum seeker and would be spent on the reception of refugees in those
Member States that did respect the asylum quota. The Commission’s idea was to
prevent Member States such as Hungary and Slovakia from blocking an asylum
Fig. 3 Position of Commission’s European Border and Coast Guard Proposal
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policy based on solidarity. This opened the door to the idea of ‘flexible solidarity’,
which the Central European Member States used to introduce a new perspective on
both flexibility and solidarity in October 2016 (in the sense of ‘trade-offs’ within or
between policy areas).
The principle of ‘flexible solidarity’ included new forms of solidarity as an
alternative to the relocation mechanism for asylum seekers. One specific example is
the deal between Austria and Slovakia whereby the latter temporarily receives
migrants who, under the Dublin Regulation, must ultimately apply for asylum in
Austria. Reinforcing the European Border and Coast Guard or freeing up more
development funding also fall under ‘flexible solidarity’. Central European Member
States add their support to such trade-offs by arguing that security should take
precedence as a European public interest. As a result, Slovakia and Hungary have
shifted to the same position on the matrix as Germany and the Netherlands, namely
‘calculation based on European interest’/’flexibility’ (see Fig. 5). European min-
isters, but also the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship,
Dimitris Avramopoulos, took this idea on board, recognising that flexibility was
needed in this instance to reach a compromise. The result was variation in coop-
eration by permitting trade-offs within the asylum policy domain, with Member
States being allowed to decide for themselves which public interest was most
important to them.
The European Commission has reconsidered this issue since then and, bolstered
by the Court’s ruling, has demanded that the Central European Member States also
Fig. 4 Position of CEAS
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participate in the relocation mechanism. The President of the European Council,
Donald Tusk, then asked that greater understanding be shown towards the Central
European Member States and called for the mandatory asylum quotas to be with-
drawn. Estonia, which held the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2017,
presented a compromise proposal based on quotas but allowing exceptions. As
tensions mount in response, the question is what forms of variation within the
asylum policy domain can help the parties involved reach a compromise. It is a
question that has become more relevant, emphasised by the fact that, by accepting
‘flexible solidarity’, the different Member States and the Commission are moving
towards the same cell of the matrix (Fig. 6).
Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive According
to the Principle ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work in the Same
Place’
Background and content8
In March 2016, the European Commission submitted a proposal to revise the
Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC. The directive lays down rules on the
posting of workers when providing services in another EU Member State. The
Fig. 5 Shift in Position of Hungary and Slovakia on Asylum Quotas
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Commission’s aim in proposing the revision is to promote a level playing field, that
is to say fair competition. It argues that in a competitive internal market, compe-
tition should be based not on labour costs but on quality of service, productivity and
innovation. The proposed amendment aims to promote the free movement of ser-
vices by clarifying the applicable terms and conditions of employment.
After two years of intensive debate, the Member States and the European
Parliament reached an agreement in principle on the Commission’s proposal in
March 2018. The agreement stipulates that the same collective agreement will apply
to posted workers as to workers in the host country in question. Previously this was
the case only in the construction sector, but the rule is now to be extended to all
other sectors (except transport). It has also been agreed that a secondment may last
for a maximum of 12 months, with a possible six-month extension. Once this period
has elapsed, the host Member State’s employment law also becomes effective.
Social security contributions may still be paid in the home country for up to 24
months, however.
Position of the Commission’s proposal in the matrix
The revised version of the Posting of Workers Directive mainly aims to create a
level playing field by harmonising labour costs. The motivation for collective action
is therefore reciprocity. This position can also be presented as ‘calculation based on
European interest’, since it can be argued that all EU employees benefit in this way.
Fig. 6 Position of ‘flexible solidarity’
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The overall objective of the revision is to stimulate the internal market through
better management of the free movement of services. In the current EU system—in
which the integrity of the internal market is a shared general principle—Community
cooperation is the obvious course of action. Legislation can be produced within the
framework of the internal market that weighs free movement against other interests,
but this would then apply to all members. Structural invalidation of the four free-
doms would make free-rider behaviour possible. After the ‘Better Deal for Britain’,
however, this became an increasingly distinct possibility; after all, the EU showed
itself prepared to negotiate with the uk about the social security entitlements of EU
migrants (Fig. 7).
Notable political positions of some EU Member States
From the outset, the Netherlands was in favour of revising the Posting of Workers
Directive. To encourage the Commission to take the initiative, the Netherlands and
six other like-minded Member States—France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Austria—wrote a letter to the European Commissioner for
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility in June 2015 in which their
ministers of Social Affairs argued in favour of reforming the Posting of Workers
Directive. In response, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria sent a letter opposing the revision. These
Member States were initially against further harmonisation of posting policies in the
EU.
Fig. 7 Position of the Commission’s proposal for a Posting of Workers Directive
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In essence, both sides are standing up for their own employees. Some countries
oppose more stringent requirements for posted workers because this would deprive
them of their competitive advantage. After all, Central and East European workers
benefit by offering cheaper labour than workers in the host country. On the other
hand, workers from Northwest European Member States benefit from equal pay for
the same work because they are then less likely to be driven out by the competition.
All of the Member States have therefore taken up the position of ‘calculation based
on national interest’, albeit in defence of different public interests (free movement
versus social policy).
The two sides have different ways of bringing their views to bear. The main
proponents, including the Netherlands, are calling for the creation of a level playing
field and fair competition within the European internal market and the associated
reciprocity. Their approach to reciprocity takes the working conditions of EU
employees as its starting point. They regularly pay lip service to the social objective
of improving the working conditions of all EU employees (in that case, the ratio-
nale for their position is ‘calculation based on European interest’). The opponents
want the existing situation to continue. They invoke the optimal functioning of the
economic freedoms, in the sense of mutual access. In the matrix, the proponents are
positioned in the ‘reciprocity’ and ‘calculation based on European interest’/
‘Community’ cell. The opponents, on the other hand, are positioned in the
‘reciprocity/Community’ cell (Fig. 8).
Member States’ Different Positions
This appendix analyses some recent policy instruments related to two major
European issues (i.e. the future of the free movement of persons and services, and
the tensions surrounding the influx of refugees) using the matrix introduced in
Chap. 4. The instruments analysed are the Decision to relocate asylum seekers
according to established quotas, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (the
successor of FRONTEX) launched in 2016, and a proposal in 2016 to revise the
1996 Posting of Workers Directive.
We see that the Commission’s proposal on asylum quotas follows the ‘policy
rationality’ described in Chap. 2, which often tends towards deeper European
integration to deal with problems and which increasingly invokes motivations for
collective action that are normative in nature, such as ‘calculation based on
European interest’ and ‘solidarity’. Because the refugee issue is politically charged,
the relocation mechanism is a divisive force in European politics. It is therefore a
prime example of the politicisation of European public tasks, and it is no surprise
that the decision itself reflects contrary trends in the EU, i.e. ‘policy rationality’
versus ‘democratic alienation’. The establishment of the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency also calls for deeper European cooperation with supranational
aspects, to which ‘the logic of consequences’ is admittedly more applicable.
The EU straitjacket of reciprocity and Community cooperation—as described in
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Fig. 8 a A position of the member states on the posting of workers directive. b B position of the
member states on the posting of workers directive
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Chap. 2—is clearly in evidence in the proposed reform of the Posting of Workers
Directive.
There is variation, however, in the position of the EU Member States. A demand
for more variation is emerging, most explicitly in the demand for ‘flexible soli-
darity’, which encourages a different way of looking at the EU and what is possible.
Specifically, ‘flexible solidarity’ is not only about variation in form, where dis-
cussions about flexibility often get bogged down in the traditional question of
which Member States will or will not participate. Instead, variation here concerns
the question of how much policy discretion the Member States can be given to
weigh up the various European public interests, values and objectives themselves.
The matrix shows that, as long as we continue to look solely at the form, based on
institutional order and the number of participating Member States, the different
Member States may indeed appear to view an issue from a similar perspective but
will still not be able to resolve it, and no progress will be made on designing
European public tasks.
Notes
1. This breaches the ‘Dublin system’ because the Dublin Regulation makes the
Member State where the asylum seeker first entered the EU responsible for the
asylum application procedure. As a result, Greece and Italy in particular are now
bearing the brunt of processing large numbers of asylum seekers.
2. ECLI:EU:C:2017:631.
3. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July
1951 and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (also known as the European Convention on Human Rights), Rome, 4
July 1950.
4. A study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung shows that the majority of European
citizens want a fair distribution of refugees within Europe. There is, however, a
notable difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States. All in all, the
study shows that EU citizens want a European solution. See https://www.
bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-meldungen/2016/februar/majority-of-
the-eu-citizens-wants-a-fair-distribution-of-refugees/.
5. ECJ 2 December 2015 C-643/15 (Slovak Republic V Council of the European
Union), ECLI:EU:C:2016:038/55.
ECJ 3 December 2015 C-647/15 (Hungary v Council of the European Union),
ECLI:EU:C: 2016:038/56.
6. Judgment of 6 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631.
7. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard.
8. This section is based on the BNC-fiche Wijziging detacheringsrichtlijn and
https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vk2aqy964tui/herziening_detacheringsrichtlijn#p5.
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Appendix B
List of Interviewees
A. Agotha, European Commission
S. Alonso, NRC Handelsblad
H. Benink, Tilburg University
A. Brenninkmeijer, European Court of Auditors
M. Boots, Dutch Ministry of General Affairs
B. Borgman, VNO-NCW
M. Bos, Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands
T. van den Brink, Utrecht University
Chr. Calliess, European Commission and Freie Universität Berlin
V. Cramer, Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security
E. Dame, Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
M. Dekker, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate
R. Dekker, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
F. Duijn, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
J. Dijsselbloem, former Dutch Minister of Finance and President of the Eurogroup
B. Eickhout, Member of the European Parliament representing GroenLinks
M. Emmelkamp, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Baghdad
F. Fabbrini, Dublin City University Brexit Institute
E. Faber, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
W. Geurts, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P. de Gooijer, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Paris
M. de Grave, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
D. Grimm, Humboldt Universität Berlin
B. Hassing, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
E. Jones, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
M. van Keulen, Hague University of Applied Sciences
C. Lobbezoo, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
H. von Meijenfeldt, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
J. Morijn, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU and University
of Groningen
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E. Mulders, Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
C. Noland, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
J. Pelkmans, Centre for European Policy Studies
K. Piri, Member of the European Parliament representing Partij van de Arbeid
M. de Ridder, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
B. van Riel, Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands
F. Ronkes Agerbeek, European Commission
J. Rood, Clingendael Institute and Leiden University
A. Schout, Clingendael Institute
L. Senden, Utrecht University
B. Smulders, European Commission and Free University of Brussels
M. Sie Dhian Ho, Clingendael Institute
A. Sorel, European Asylum Support Office
J. Terstegen, Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security
T. Vanheste, De Correspondent
S. Vanthournout, Sense about Science EU
S. de Vries, Utrecht University
J. Waanders, Dutch Ministry of Defence
J. Wiers, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and University of Groningen
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